Arquivo para a ‘Linguagens’ Categoria
Spirit what is
23
May
In Greek origin the word is pneuma meaning “breath, seeing, air” in translation
into religious “divine breath, spirit” or “Holy Spirit”, in analysis of the theme that we developed in the previous topic it means a consequence of true asceticism, a “assistance” of the Holy Spirit in everyday matters.
In the Hebrew translation the word is “ruah” (or ruach), meaning something like “breath, air”, but distances itself from the Christian idea of the Holy Spirit as a person.
The Hebrew word ruah also has the meaning of “breeze” or “breath”, in Genesis for example: “They entered the ark with Noah, two by two of all flesh in which there was the spirit of life”, in Hebrew.
The Hebrew word ruach also has the meaning of “breeze” or “breath”, in Genesis for example: “And of all flesh, in which the spirit of life was, two by two entered Noah into the ark”, the translation in this case This seems out of place in philosophy or even contemporary ideas, but since the Greeks: Plato, Plotinus and more recently the Hegelians have explored several meanings close to this of absolute spirit, truth or life. the Hebrew word “ruach” is more than that.
This spirit, which is the Supreme Good of Plato and Aristotle, will be articulated in medieval philosophy and will reach Kant’s practical philosophy, to describe the greater good that human beings should seek, but in this case it is confused with Eudaimonia, which means ethics of happiness (in a sense not always “supreme”).
Plotinum (205-207 AD) is particularly important for having received influence from Plato and having influenced: Christians, Islamic, Jewish and Gnostic Enneads through his book, his influence particularly on Augustine of Hippo is quite strong, on the nature of the Intellect and on the “beyond the Intellect”, that is, the One, although it can be classified as having a metaphysical thought, it is in the articulation of the intellect with the soul, where the One can encompass both.
This idea was developed in Augustine of Hippo, for whom it is the dichotomous separation between good and evil (Augustine was a Manichaean) that makes the intellect distant would justify the episode of the Fall of the primordial couple? Augustine’s answer is for the insufficiency of good, that is, the absence of good gives rise to evil.
So it seems more correct in a broader sense, the idea of Spirit of Truth, of Wisdom and a category “superior” to the world of substantiality.ce itself from the soul, thus raising the question of how the Supreme Good would consent to the prevailing manifestation of the evil in the world? What would justify the episode of the Fall of the primordial couple? Augustine’s answer is for the insufficiency of good, that is, the absence of good gives rise to evil.
So it seems more correct in a broader sense, the idea of Spirit of Truth, of Wisdom and a category “superior” to the world of substantiality.
Ascension in body and soul
19
May
Both human and spiritual ascesis are a question to be answered by human
existence, human existence because it implies advancing to higher stages of life, the photos of the current war in Eastern Europe ask us if we are heading towards this, the spiritual being the vision Greek, idealist or religious show that there is an issue.
For both, the answer is not simple, otherwise in thousands of years of civilizing process humanity would have already answered, the question that arises for the present day is how one can (and should) cooperate with the other, the bottom line is that kind of spirituality makes this cooperation productive.
The Latin motto “mens sana in corpore sano” which is from the Roman poet Juvenal, from the first century of the Christian era, indicates a precedence of the mind, however the mind, like the body, also ages and dies, which separates the idea of mind from soul, but only a spiritual ascesis that does not limit life to its bodily finitude can admit this immortality.
The soul is also not a specific theme of Christianity and other Abrahamic religions (Islamism and Judaism), Greek philosophers also speculated about the soul and Eastern religions that admit reincarnation (in the philosophical sense would be resubstance or reembodiment) also do not see the finitude of life.
Also in contemporary philosophy the speculations of objectification (or reification, res – thing) in the sense of finitude.
In the Christian way of seeing, a certain vision of separation of body and soul persists, but a deeper reading shows that the body can also be vivified by the soul, and the biblical proof for this are both the various appearances of Jesus alive after his death and resurrection, where he even eats bread and fish, as the maximum feast of his ascension.
The Christian biblical scene that is described in Acts of the Apostles 1, 9-10 is described like this: “After saying this, Jesus was taken up into heaven in their sight. A cloud covered them, so that their eyes could no longer see him. The apostles kept looking up to heaven as Jesus went up.”
For those who do not believe in the possibility of this life after death, all that remains is to consume life and this can also prevent a human asceticism.
Asceticism and the dualism between body and soul
18
May
Already in Greek philosophy, self-discipline and self-control of body and
mind (or soul) accompanied asceticism as well as the search for truth.
This quest and its corresponding asceticism is present throughout philosophy and even in literature, it is from Shakespeare’s Hamlet “there are more things between heaven and earth than vain philosophy supposes”, but it is from the same play “To be or not to be, this is the question” that refers to ontology.
Freud also said that the main task of an existence is to understand the mind, in contemporary philosophy there is the classic dilemma of separating body and mind (or soul), even Marx proposed to reverse Hegel’s path “from earth to heaven” , clear Hegelian sky.
What is certain is that the civilizing process depends on asceticism, on men as a community and on individual men, because otherwise they will not have anything to bring to the community if it does not have its own asceticism, they will take away the human misery and decadence that they experience.
The body and mind dualism is the one that separates the phenomena of the mind (which would be just mental, in the case of the soul, just spiritual) and the body that are physical and, therefore, are largely separable, there is also today a cheap philosophy that states that what I think will come true, I do not cite the books so as not to give greater popularity to this one without any theoretical or practical basis.
Husserl’s phenomenology will penetrate the ontological category of “intentionality” to remove this obstacle “the peculiarity by virtue of which experiences are experiences of something” (HUSSERL, 2010), and in § 14 of Cartesian Meditations (1931), repeats it o again, but in a more complete way: “The word intentionality does not mean anything other than that fundamental and general particularity of consciousness of being conscious of something, of carrying, in its quality of cogito, its cogitatum in itself” (HUSSERL, 2010).
Husserl and his teacher Franz Brentano recovered Aquinas’s category of intentionality for which the exterior in nature (esse naturale) is how things exist, the forms being distinct from existing in thought (esse intentionale), thereby supporting the mode of existence, in which things exist in the intellect (in intellectu) as “things thought”, but Husserl removes from intentionality the empirical basis and immanent objectivity.
In the previous post, we showed this separation between Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit as divergent and even opposite, by admitting that in a certain way there is in consciousness some form of awareness of something that is the basis for phenomenology and then in ontology and existentialism, there is in the consciousness a definite and transcendental form of what is external, but part of the intentionality of consciousness.
The transcendent is present in the mind (or soul) through intentionality, while the transcendental is of a higher order and only becomes knowledge if it can be understood within the transcendental mystery of existence, or we return to nothingness.
Husserl, E. (2010) Meditações Cartesianas. Conferencias de Paris. Phainomenon –Clássicos de Fenomenologia . Portugal, Lisbon: CFUO.
The Other, the Infinite and the Truth
12
May
The development of the question of Being in modern philosophy is not separated
from the religious question, Gadamer recalls the example of the gods in works of art from the Greek world (Gadamer, 1997, p. 18),
The other is treated in different areas of ontology, becoming almost an essential category.
Another important point on the path to Truth, states that it is necessary to recognize: “The finitude of understanding itself is the way in which and where reality, resistance, the absurd, and incomprehensible reaches validity.” (Gadamer, 1997, p.24), and expands this history to the historical one, where he criticizes Dilthey’s romantic historicism and emphasizes that it is not ahistorical.
Thus, the path (or the method) to the Truth is traced the development of the hermeneutic circle as a new and revolutionary method for the Truth, listening to the text (or the Other) and performing a fusion of horizons, where it is possible to see and rethink more clearly the Truth.
The simple elaboration of narratives that justify the power of certain truths is nothing more than a return to the obscurity and opportunism of the modern sophist discourse, now using as a resource the limits and specialties of certain sciences, for example, law and economics that seen in their restricted fields are nothing but sophisms that justify each other.
When analyzing the possibility of the end of metaphysics, Gadamer points out: “If science rises to total technocracy, and thereby covers the sky with the “night of the world” of “forgetfulness of being”, the nihilism predicted by Nietzsche, may if then you keep looking behind the last glint of the sun that went down […]” (GADAMER, 1997, p.27), that is, science is not part of this question.
A true humanism must look to the infinite, not just the one that is now visible through the James Webb megatelescope (which raises many questions as well), it cannot fail to ignore the infinite, the mystery and the religious phenomenon.
For Christians, this truth was revealed humanly and visibly in Jesus, last week we remember the disciples saying “Show us the Father” (Jn 14:8), now on another front Jesus reveals himself more fully to those who follow him (Jn 14:8). 14, 16-17): “And I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, that he may abide with you always: the Spirit of Truth, which the world is not able to receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him” .
This is not an arrogant Truth, it can and must dialogue with the cultures of our time.
Gadamer, H.G. (1997) Verdade e método. Transl. Flávio Paulo Meurer. Brazil: Petrópolis, RJ: ed. Vozes.
The fundamental question of the method
11
May
The historical question could not be missing, in fact before the book “The truth
and method”, it was a lecture by Gadamer that started this work, called “The question of historical conscience”, the book was corrected and translated into English after publication of the masterpiece, and from this version came the Portuguese version.
Thus the author states: “Because, only with the failure of the naive historicism of the historical century, it becomes evident that the opposition that exists between a-historical-dogmatic and historical, between tradition and historical science, between ancient and modern, is not absolute.” (GADAMER, 1997, p.22).
So it is in the face of this finitude of knowledge that one must depart: “The finitude of understanding itself is the way in which and where reality, resistance, the absurd, and the incomprehensible reaches validity. Anyone who takes this finitude seriously must also take the reality of history seriously” (Gadamer, 1997, p.24), and from there he resumes and reorganizes the hermeneutic circle.
Thus, what he calls effectual history starts from the understanding of “what makes the experience of you so decisive for all self-understanding” (idem), it will be from there that he will elaborate his philosophical hermeneutics, which seems paradoxical, he states: “precisely Heidegger’s critique to transcendental questioning and his thought of the “turn” (Kehre) serves as a basis for the development of the universal hermeneutic problem, which I undertake” (Gadamer, 1997, p.25), and thus for him “language does not arise in the consciousness of those who speaks” and has nothing to do with subjectivity, since the subject’s experience has nothing “mystical” or “mystifying”.
He clarifies that his methodology goes beyond a purely metaphysical view, and says about the method of idealism: “I think that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is binding, and that propositions that do nothing more than add, by thought, and dialectically, the infinite to the finite, the being in itself to what is humanly experienced, the eternal to the temporal, I consider them as mere extreme determinations, from which, by the strength of philosophy, no knowledge of our own will be able to develop. (GADAMER, 1997, p.26).
With regard to metaphysics, he clarifies that even the Hegelian tradition, which does not abandon the idea of infinity, has: “the tradition of metaphysics and especially its last great formulation, Hegel’s speculative dialectic, contains a constant proximity.” (idem).
And he resumes Heidegger’s question of the oblivion of being: “What does the end of metaphysics mean, as a science? What does it mean to finish in science? If science rises to total technocracy, and thereby covers the sky with the “night of the world” of the “oblivion of being”, the nihilism predicted by Nietzsche, then one can look behind the last glint of the sun that has set […]” (GADAMER, 1997, p.27).
The opening to the Other opens up a perspective of merging the horizons of the Being, which applies a new meaning to the text (or discourse) and allows one to question oneself about the truth and reach it, this is the hermeneutic circle.
Gadamer, H.G. (1997) Verdade e método. Transl. Flávio Paulo Meurer. Brazil: Petrópolis, RJ: ed. Vozes.
Understand, see and believe
05
May
Not being able to have a category for itself that contemplates the Whole,
beyond the universe and its mysteries, the Being that precedes everything and everyone, Hegel’s category for itself returns to be the one that Sartre sees with the return to being- purely human in itself and finds nothingness instead of everything.
Yes, it is a mystery, how the universe itself reveals itself, even penetrating the depths of our Being we will only find both the being-in-itself revealed as designo (in the sense of divine designer) if we truly find the for-itself, and in this case as there is an infinite mystery, it is necessary to believe.
But it is not a blind belief, or pure fanaticism, not even an act of elevated altruism, it must be an encounter with our own Being, there we sit in a comfortable armchair and understand that we were born to build, grow and love, without these premises , the opposite will be dangerous and when taken to the whole society, hatred, intolerance and in the end: war prevails.
It is not the threat of a divine Being who created us for perfection, it is the threat of those who deny more than the need for a supreme Being and Knowledge (Plato called it the Supreme Good), which cannot be realized except in the fullness of a pure Being that is Being-in, Being-for-Itself and being-from-above that humanity becomes.
Hegel came close to a trinitarian concept, but idealism prevented him, since there is an intrinsic dualism in him, which divides objectivity (of being-in-itself) from subjectivity (of being-for-itself).
This difficulty was striking in Thomas who wanted to see and touch the marks on the body of the Risen Jesus, also in another passage (a little forgotten) Philip asks Jesus to “show the father”*, to which Jesus replies: whoever sees me, sees the Father .
The historical Jesus cannot be denied, he is not a myth, nor a symbolic fact, there was a man in himself, a God-for-himself and a man/God-of-himself in relation to humanity.
* The specific passage of the Bible is in John 14, 8-9: Philip said: “Lord, show us the Father, that is enough for us!” Jesus answered: “Have I been with you so long, and you don’t know me, Philip? Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father.”
The question of the consciousness of Being
04
May
Thanks to the new and surprising advancement of deep intelligence machines
(deep learning), the issue of consciousness, which was already thought of in philosophy, now spreads across all areas of thought, and what we dealt with in previous posts also dealt with this.
Now it is a matter of deciding whether it is possible to think of consciousness only as something logical and instrumental, so the machine, through deep and elaborate algorithms in dialogue with humans, could reach this level, if something beyond, which we reformulate in the category for-itself, then we have to think of a consciousness of the universe and it cannot be a thing, but a Being.
Why is there something and not nothing is a question raised since Leibniz, who solves it through the monad, and God is (would be) the “Monad of monads” (the phrase is from Hegel, sic!), then the universe was putting into movement, then in a quantum space-time, the Big Bang, and now the James Webb telescope captures an image that would be of a possible origin of the universe, with many galaxies, something is wrong.
In an article published in the journal Nature on February 22, “A population of red candidate massive galaxies 600 Myr after the Big Bang” (Labbé et al.) (Myr, millions of light years) indicates that close to the big bang there would already be massive galaxies and not the first formations of nebulae, for example (see our post), so could it be that there was already a universe in formation from the beginning?
Regardless of this, the question remains: who what or what mystery sent the beginning of everything.
Just as one cannot speak of ethics without metaphysics, it is not something substantial but spiritual, one cannot speak of consciousness only as something natural, based on experience.
Starting from Husserlian phenomenology, his disciple Heidegger elaborated consciousness as follows: the phenomenology (experience) of consciousness is not a path that lies before natural consciousness and leads it towards the absolute, like an itinerarium mentis in deum (Heidegger, 2007 , p. 169), rather it is the course that the absolute itself follows on the way to the truth of its complete appearing. (Heidegger, 2007, p. 169)
But Heidegger continues as in any modern building, he has the question of knowledge as a pillar of natural consciousness, he does not admit a transcendent revealed consciousness (for-itself), thus being a knowledge that has not yet realized in itself the whole truth (Heidegger 2007 , p. 169).
So it is about denying the truth revealed as truth, although your consciousness remains linked to the Being (it is ontological as your thought), there is no possibility of a pure primordial Being, a Being-for-itself, omniscient and omnipotent, so we are left looking at the telescope image.
There is a transcendent for-itself that surrounds this question, and thus a consciousness that projects beyond even the beginning of the universe, and that at the same time is present in every being-in-itself.
Heidegger, Martin (2007). Hegel. Translation by Dina V. Picotti C. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007.
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Being, Nothingness and the Other
02
May
In 2023, the 80th anniversary of the publication of Being and Nothingness:
an essay on phenomenological ontology (1943) by Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980), under the strong influence of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, will complete a path different from others. existentialists who see in the Other a special meaning that Sartre does not.
It was not by chance that he said “Hell is other people!”, Sartre saw before human consciousness a “condemnation” to freedom, thus he sees in consciousness a self-centered definition: “Man is nothing more than what he makes of himself”.
It is so self-centered that her romance with Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986), after Sartre’s death she wrote “The Farewell Ceremony” in 1981, and when she died she was buried in the same tomb of Sartre, in the Montparnasse Cemetery. , never lived in the same house, she who in her time already shouted feminist themes (The Second Sex, 1949) and he in his self-centered conception.
They always read each other’s works, and the existentialist influence is clear in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and De Beauvoir’s The Guest, but recent scholars show that the writer has other influences besides Sartre, such as Hegel and Leibniz.
It is important, in the categories treated by Sartre, to analyze Hegel’s in-itself, of-itself and for-itself.
De Beauvoir’s analysis of the Other, comes from this influence of Hegel, where the social construction of woman as a quintessence of “Other”, indicates that the capital “O” of Others indicates “all others”, and this indicates both women , as Other in other religions, cultures and ethnicities.
Due to this distinct position on the Other (his hell), and an agnostic par excellence, Sartre goes on to say that in the human case (and only in the human case) existence precedes essence, thus man first exists and then defines himself, so if there is no human preset, there is no God.
At least one Other was always present in his life, his companion and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, who, not by chance, did not fail to address the subject directly.
Sartre, Jean-Paul.(1984) Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.
What is acting in the face of contemplation
26
Apr
It was Hanna Arendt, in her analysis of the “Human Condition” (1958) who reacted to the idea of “levelling the vita activa” (HAN, 2016, p. 121), the “error in believing that the primacy of contemplation is responsible for the vita activa in work” (idem) is what destroyed and hierarchized the being according to the substance.
Arendt defines her “vita activa” in three human activities that are not equal: hard work (labor), work (work) and actioness (action) that she understands as fundamental.
The first, the one consecrated by industrial society and which made man what the author calls “homo laborans” is pure activity without reflection or meditation, it is not the same as work because it is preceded by thought, not only intellectual work in which thinking is immanent, but also daily tasks like taking care of nature or cooking, for example.
Without the determination to act, man is reduced to homo laborans and Arendt is right about this, but Byung-Chul corrects her: “but Arendt, erroneously, understands contemplation as a detention (Stillegegung) of all movements and activities, as a passive tranquility, which makes any form of vita activa appear as restlessness” (HAN, 2016, p. 122).
Byung-Chul claims that Aristotle “clearly describes the vita contemplativa (bios theoretikos) as an active life”, where thinking as Theoria is, in effect, an energy – which literally means “activity at work” or “being at work” (en egô einai)” (idem) and thus Arendt’s classification makes sense, despite the error.
Thus, we leave for the final part the important connection to action (action) as part of the vita activa, which is not opposed to, but complements, the vita contemplativa, and puts Thomas Aquinas in line with Aristotle: “the external bodily movements are opposed to the repose of contemplation, which consists of being alien to external occupations. But the movement that the operations of intelligence imply makes art out of rest itself” (T. Aquinas in Han, 2016, . 122).
Thus, says Arendt, although she realizes that modern life is moving further and further away from the contemplative vita, it is not a question of abandoning Work or Action, but of pausing time, breathing and allowing space for contemplation, the taste, aroma and taste of life.
ARENDT, Hannah (2010). A condição humana (The human condition). Translation by Roberto Raposo. 11a. ed., Brazil, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense.
HAN, Byung-Chul (2016). O aroma do tempo. (The scent of time). Trans. Miguel Serras Pereira. Lisbon: Relógio d´Água.
No time to Being
25
Apr
Neither the pandemic, nor the Home Office, nor the intriguing series
(personally I still prefer to go out and go to the movies) have made men calmer, more serene and happy, everything needs to be accelerated.
The “Aroma of Time: a philosophical essay on the Art of Delay” (2016) is nothing more than a counterpoint to this destructive stigma of our time that culminates in desires to exclude the Other, hatred and violence without borders, in short, an ever-increasing war. cruelest on a dark horizon, there is no time to be, just to have, to satisfy the simplest entertainment, not just games. The essay originally published in Germany in 2007, Byung-Chul updates what is not only an acceleration of time but also a temporal crisis based on a desynchrony not only of reality in a nobler and more poetic sense, whose discontinuity leads to something without direction, order and impossibility of a synthesis or conclusion that allows our lives to last in an “aroma”, as its “delay” should be understood.
He quotes and analyzes “Marcel Proust “In search of lost time” (Proust, 1913) what he calls a “temporal crystal” or his vision of aromatic time: “silent, sonorous, fragrant and clear hours” (in Han, 2016, p. 59 ).
There is a time of temporal anguish, it seems that the time spent slips through the fingers and is lost.
What is substantial and essential in our lives, essence and substance are the main forms of desynchrony in our being, they are referred either to an angelic delirium (false essence) or to a sculptural, decorative and unreal physical form (false substance).
As Byung-Chul deduces: “it presupposes that existence is historical, that each of us has a trajectory. The aroma is that of immanence” (Han, 2016, p. 59).
In philosophy and practice immanence is something that has an end in itself, as opposed to transcendence that something or an end outside and superior to itself.
Such is our lost “aroma” of time, to contemplate experiencing Being-in-time as having an end beyond, as Byung-Chul ends and concludes in his essay the necessary correction: “a large measure of strengthening the contemplative element” (Han, 2016, p. 186).
Han, Byung-Chul (2016). O aroma do tempo: um ensaio filosófico sobre a Arte da Demora. transl. Miguel Serras Pereira, Lisbon: Relógio d´Água.
