Arquivo para a ‘Antropotécnica’ Categoria

Being, the other and identity

14 Nov

Identity has been worked on by a number of authors, some in particular, the father of empiricism David Hume saw identity (the self) as his empirical argument starts from the idea that ideas are formed from previous impressions, so identity is a product. of various impressions, and as an empiricist he speculates on thought experiments.
Hume is important to the question of identity, although it fixes on his empiricism, because he is for modernity the complement of idealist logic, it can be said that it comes from Parmenides and Heraclitus reaching Aristotle, we know that Plato’s dialectic is different.
Hegel in his work Science of Logic will adopt logic, but with overcoming immediacy, ie the relationship with the other being has disappeared, there is only a relationship with himself, a relationship of negation, ie his being denies the relationship and from from denial he identifies himself, the act of looking in the mirror for example is a negation of oneself, an ‘image’, and that is identity.
The biblical text that says, “We still see ourselves as in a mirror in the Letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 13:12). Paul makes the reflection:“ Now, therefore, we see only a dark reflection, as in polished material; however, there will be a day when we will see face to face ”, I would say it is a historical prophecy, because much of philosophy, namely that which points to the ontological turn, says that this is the time of otherness, of seeing the Other beyond the self. .
But there may be some confusion because it is not a denial of identity, it is not a question of cultural, ethnic or religious identity, which are also dilemmas of our time, the fact that each has a personality, sees himself as a person, does not mean non-alterity.
It is just the opposite, it is easier and more possible to talk to people who see themselves beyond the mirror, it says in common language “they are resolved”, although we are always under construction, and it is precisely in this that the relationship with the Other helps, something like that. : “The more I know who I am, the more tolerant I am of the Other” and I want him to have his own personality and identity.
Also in the cultural and religious field this is so, if I have a clear conviction of my personality, my culture and my belief (not only about religious belief, science can involve “beliefs”), I can dialogue and be more tolerant of each other, and reciprocity.
Fundamentalism, dogmatism, and intolerance are the result of ignorance in general, and difficulty with one’s own identity in particular, if “I am” I am “in relation to the Other,” and there is no need for denial, but “epoché”, that is, put in parentheses. how does phenomenology think.


The originality of Being in Heidegger

13 Nov

The great question of Being in contemporary philosophy emerged from the thought of Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl from which he inherited phenomenology as a method, essentially proposed to penetrate the question of being.
Although it has been studied by philosophy at all times, even Kantian idealism has an ontology that is displaced from Being to the subject, it already existed in Plato as an idea (Platonic eidos is not Kantian) and Aristotle as substance.
The being does not manifest directly, but always with the being of the being, you can play a joke with the contemporaneity that is the sick Being, because the Being of the Being is hidden in appearance.
One can seek pure Being in an ethereal existence of a God, but it is the existential door through man that one has access to Being, in this case Heidegger is applying the phenomenological method, he departs from man in fact (not idealized by example), let it manifest itself as it is and only then try to understand it in its manifestation after the presence.
Its first existence is being-in-the-world, one of the most widely accepted translations for Dasein, but as this being is also a Being-in-Situation, Heidegger’s careful reading can clarify this, I make a translation of being-being itself. – in the world, because Heidegger also uses the worldview (Weltanstchauung), which is open to the world and the cosmos, including the worldview.
This concept is important for Heidegger’s understanding of Being because it means this worldview as the circle of beliefs, affects, interests, and even philosophical concepts that Being has, even if it does not study philosophy, Being is “being-in-a-situation” that It does not mean just place or even context, but the very vision one sees in seeing the world, its “worldview”.
So many ideas and beliefs seem obvious to a person, but practically all of them are tied to temporal situations and thus limited by the “situation” that does not exclude thinking.

This vídeo sumarizes some ideas from Hiedegger:


The question of consciousness

11 Nov

The big issue for artificial intelligence was until recently autonomy, robots, autonomous machines and now autonomous cars, with all the controversy the project evolves, Germany, for example, already provides a line of autonomous cars for the next decade that will begin.

The new issue is the question of consciousness, it has occupied the minds of philosophers for over a century, and can conceptualize in general terms the ability to take actions and consequences of these actions, which has to do with autonomy, because autonomy It is to analyze the consequences of acts performed by machines, the limits of dangerousness and privacy.

In the context of social or historical consciousness, this was Gadamer’s great debate with Dilthey, to which he attributed a conception of romantic consciousness for the absence of a “historical mediation” from facticity, and asks “how will the task of hermeneutics ”and finds a common ground between Schleiermacher and Hegel” (Gadamer, 2002, Truth and Method, p. 256), with the concepts of reconstruction and integration, and according to him, Dilthey makes the intermediate path between them.

Gadamer explains: “Schleiermacher and Hegel could present the two extreme possibilities of answering this question.

Their answers could be assigned to the concepts of reconstruction and integration. For both Schleiermacher and Hegel, in the beginning there is the awareness of a loss and alienation from tradition, which is what drives hermeneutic reflection” (idem).

However, he will say, each of them will determine the task of hermeneutics differently, and what Gadamer calls reconstruction and integration means the separation of preconceptions and alienation from tradition, and therefore rebuild and integrate.

Schleiermacher’s famous thesis is “What matters is to understand a better author than one would have understood himself,” Gadamer thought about the work of art, but Schleiermacher is stuck with his conception of “history of the spirit” which is his concept.

What Hegel says, according to Gadamer, is the creation of a category by stating that the essence of the historical spirit is not the restitution of the past, but the mediation of thought with the present life, which is the prevalence and idealism of the ideal over the factual questions.

And the origin of consciousness, as it happened, is that Terence Deacon is right in claiming that the mind came from matter, and with it came consciousness, if it is true, it is possible to think that somehow the machine, on the levels of intelligence artificial, you may have “consciousness” and then you will know that it is machine and that we humans are not.

What we relate in the videos of Gadamer and Peter Sloterdijk was to introduce this question, and the question of truth is proposed as the genesis of historical consciousness (Gadamer, 2002, p. 265), so machine consciousness cannot have this level.

GADAMER H. G.(2002) Verdade e Método (Truth and Method), 4th ed., Tr. Flavio P. Meurer. Petrópolis: Vozes (Brazilian edition).


Between the eternal and the temporal

08 Nov

There is no dualism between body and mind, as the idealists want, but there is that which is temporal and what is eternal, but in a strictu sense at least in the broad sense, it takes principles to determine the values and what drives humanity in critical times of society.
Byung Chul Han, in a January lecture at the Barcelona CCB where he showed the tearing of our time between narcissism, self-consumerism and an absence of relationship with the other, which must revolutionize time, or the way we manage it.
He said of the other and in reference to the universities: “In any case, we live in a time of radical conformism: the university has clients and only creates workers, it does not form spiritually; the world is at the limit of its capacity; maybe that will short circuit it and we get that original animal back. ”
He stated at the Barcelona CCB: “The current acceleration diminishes the ability to remain: we need a proper time that the productive system does not allow us to have; we need some free time, which means standing still with nothing productive to do, but not to be confused with recovery time to keep working; time worked is time lost, not time for us. ”
Modern humanism criticized by his master Peter Sloterdijk who asserts this sense back to the original animal, of course, is not in the sense of wild animality, but the idea that he must regain his relationship with nature will not be saved and will even condemn planet. Sloterdijk clearly outlines these ideas in the video below.
What the natural man means and his relations with the eternal, now not only nature, but in a worldview of paradise and eternal life, means that we must look at remaining values.
When questioned by the Sadducees, who were a more aristocratic class in Judaism, about who a woman who would marry several brothers after their deaths, would tell them that believing in eternal life means that the people will no longer die, Jesus response the question would not make sense and also that God is “God of the living” (Luke 20:38).
Looking only at temporal values and conjunctural situations prevents us from seeing the future and the eternal.
Follows Peter Sloterdijk’s interview on the braziliam program Fronteiras do Pensamento *“Borders of Thought”).


Overworked and true empathy

29 Oct

Always smiling and needing to be happy can be altruism and even heroism of many people, which should give us confidence and empathy should be transparency, which is not always empathic. Of course, this does not mean being rude or rude, nor deviation from personality, but the relief of inner dualism in the face of truth, even when it is not sympathetic, makes one have greater internal coherence, which is not confused with identity.
Identity may be personal, group or cultural, sometimes confused with being conniving or convenient, but at the root this is falsehood, so empathy has its place in the face of truth and being, not always the social ethics that dictate rules of convenience. and “legality,” which has come to be called politically correct, but could well be politically convenient.
Since the 1930s, the Brazilian has been spoken of as the “cordial man”, although there is a great anthropological and historical distance from the politically correct, this would not be just the update.
Empathy should then be a good mood in the sense that the ability to calmly get into controversial issues and issues with a strong possibility of polarization, the world today needs this, and therefore confusing it with hypocrisy, easy smile or just tolerance can be “ cordial ”and may not be a true feeling.
In fact, doing to the other what we would like it to do for us, is not the empathic system, what neuroscience shows is that we have a set of neurons called mirror neurons that say that imitating the other is a more natural empathic form than To do something to another simply because we would like it done to us, deep down we are “asking” for something we want.

Empathy means the gift that everyone has to be able to feel what the other feels, so to speak of the Other is the true way of both finding an innate gift of humanity, neuroscience reveals, as well as making this truth explicit, we exist and feel the Other.
We only deny it by denying the self that has empathy as a natural “skill”, just by a constant denial training. There is, therefore, no true self without the Other, without the empathy with the Other, natural and not forced, which is thus made a staging and the Other will feel, empathy is thus ontological, part of Being.
The vídeo of  TedX by psyquiatrist Helen Riess is very interesting:



Idealism and its religion

24 Oct

Beginning with the critique of idealism, in “The German Ideology” (1932), where he talks about Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, who even call them St. Buer and St. Stirner, for their claim to be theology.
If the essence of idealism is the separation of object and subject, I make a purposeful inversion, the essence of religious thinking for Ludwig Feuerbach is the separation of subject and sensible objects, for for him object consciousness can be, although distinct from itself, a consciousness that coincides shortly thereafter when dealing with the religious object, because of its “transcendence” is exactly what makes it return to self-consciousness, I explain.
For Feuerbach, and the sensitive object is out of being (though ontology here is only an appeal), the religious object is in it, it is an intrinsic object, and neither does it abandon it, its moral consciousness leaves it, it is an intimate object. , and even the most intimate, is the closest of all.
His critique of theology using idealism essentially presupposes a critical judgment, the “difference between the divine and the non-divine, between what is and is not worthy of worship,” so that with this dualism it is possible to play all the essence of the divine in the mass grave of the Ideal.
The consciousness of God is man’s consciousness itself to him, this is the Hegelian idealism made religion: the knowledge of God which is man’s self-knowledge, there is no God-self for man.
The negation of the subject is considered irreligious, and its relation to sensible objects, a negation of the subject, is the atheistic religion of Feuerbach, which Marx will turn to call them the Old Hegelians, and seeks to make their inversion here new now. from object to subject, here is the new “religious” version of the Young Hegelians, like Marx, even criticizing Feuerbach’s main atheistic thesis: “thought comes from the subject,” not the object.
It is no longer about Heaven to Earth,” said Marx, but now “from earth to heaven,” that is, from the object to the subject, the labor force and the production, to their divinization (of the object, of money, economy, etc.). If, for Marx, fetishization was the separation of labor from his instrument of labor and commodity, fetishization may be reification (res – thing) or objectification for these young “Hegelians”, where he sees the separation between subject and object. , in religious fetishism is the separation of (sinful) consumption of the individual (seen in self-awareness) to which the religious must “attend” and live his “concrete”. The fair relationship with money, work, health and education is only a surpassing of the idealistic religious view, its consummation in a man in harmonious relationship with the world, and in this case also beauty, poetry and life. healthy would have a perspective, for the “pure” religious not. This religiosity lacks an asceticism that in fact “elevates” them, although they seem as linked to contemporary themes, actually has an idealistic god and not pretending to be realistic as they would wish, their concrete is the modern state god their economy, or the positivist law and his narrow view of justice.


The crisis of Reason: the dissent

21 Oct

Much has been written about it, but usually without leaving it, it’s like postmodernity, everyone shudders at the term, but any serious thinker knows we’re in the end of the modern, which will come later only crystal ball, but read The signs and understanding what changes we are experiencing can help a lot.
First I explain the prison we live, years ago when reading Horkheimer’s book the “Eclipse of Reason”, original from 1947, that Editora Unesp did a good translation of German, the author analyzes the technoscientific signs of modernity, but as instruments of More than those who can take dangerous and arduous tasks out of the hands of workers, the economic subjugation of course continues, which will lead to a mechanistic analysis of the digital universe, which is something other than Fordism and Toyotism.
In the philosophical aspect the work is between “objective reason” and “subjective reason”, which is basically the realization of human potentials as ends, with the development of practical instruments that enable such goals, the “means”, without escaping beyond rationalism. of ideas of progress.
It was another work that aroused my analysis beyond rationalism and development and progress at all costs, a compendium parading several national authors on “The Crisis of Reason”(Companhia das Letras, 1996), among several interesting essays highlighting the Jacques Rancière “The Dissent” and Gerard Lebrun’s “About Technophobia”, written in 1996.
Rancière makes a correct analysis based on the idea that “the currently dominant discourse that identifies political rationality to consensus and the consensus to the very principle of democracy” (Rancière apud Novaes, 1996, p. 367), and made his criticism pointing out three paradoxes.
The first paradox is soon after the fall of the former Soviet Union its opponents while celebrating its fall, resumed the “objective necessity”, ie the idea of resuming the productive forces of development in full swing, emptying the alternatives, thus established the “consensus” democracy as “the pure regime of economic necessity” (idem).
The second paradox is the mismatch of political wisdom, criticizes the discourse “which glorifies the actor, the individual who argues, who hires, who acts” (idem), the less things are to be discussed, “the more the ethics of the discussion are celebrated. , of communicative reason, as the foundation of politics ”(idem), is not what he says, but paradoxically when there is less ethics and less dialogue.
The third paradox is almost a prophecy, which Rancière calls “the national consensus of political parties and the advent of the great supranational spaces, reappear the brutal, more archaic forms of ethnic wars, exclusion, racism, xenophobia” (Rancière apud Novaes, 1996, pp. 368), it should be noted that the text is old, but this revival of the “national” was already evident.
His discourse is more complex as the text progresses, highlighting a passage that I consider important about consensus: “In its ordinary statement, consensual wisdom is presented as a thesis on the evolution of the politician summarized in the following idea: The old form of politics, that of conflict, has lapsed. The modern form is that of covenant, to deal between responsible partners…” (idem, p. 378), that is to say, it is not consensual, therefore, the dissent.
Ranci{ere, J.  (1996)O dissenso. In: NOVAES, A. A crise da Razão. Sâo Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996.

(in Picture, between among several paintings in text, I chose the Divine Freedom of Goya).


Beyond tiredness, the present moment

17 Oct

Several factors succeeded can put our lives in disharmony, even if they are involuntary, deaths, tragedies, misunderstandings, etc. It may seem like little or nothing can do to change them, a familiar formula that is meditation and / or prayer may seem. escape.
There are several cultural currents that think of an appeal or religious that associate them with the new age, but the society of tiredness has discovered contemplation, Byung Chul Han wrote about this, Sloterdijk his master warned of “a de-spirited ascesis”, both are not Christians, and both may encounter aspects that call co-immunity or even contemplation.
Gradually the troubled mind becomes clear again, choosing a thought or attitude to make the day better, seeking a way to calm and relax and overcome conflict situations.
Psychopolitics, and the resurgent attempt at control of people, must have a calm reaction to claim that this is not working without upsetting anyone around them and to prevent them from making the moment, to try to control the attitudes of those around them.
Finally, what we wrote yesterday, in the midst of turbulence, even war are possible moments of truce, of happiness if we live detached from what is past and no longer exists.
The number of growing social problems will require attitudes not to fall into some form of psychic illness, depression, discouragement, dejection, or heavier syndromes.
There is a profoundly positive side to this, some form of spirituality has become urgent, and so far there are dangers because there are few who promise what they do not deliver: peace of mind, for social peace will take time and the obstacles to be removed are huge, but we have to do it too.
When watching movies, books and culture, of course of high level, everything seems to point there, a resumption of Being, uniting objectivity and subjectivity, action and contemplation may at last cost, but something will have to reflect and leverage a more “human” future beyond. of the fragmentary humanism of the modern.


At exam or the butterfly flight

15 Oct

Byung Chul Han wrote in “Ar the Exam” talking about the influence of social media today on our thoughts and actions, which he calls psychopolitics, that the “gift of power reduces the improbability of accepting my selection of course, my decision willingness on the part of others ”(Chul Han, 2013, p. 17), which can lead to lack of reflection and swarm.

He wrote of this reflection that: “The word of power suddenly eliminates the noise that inflates. It produces a silence, namely, the space for action. ”(Idem). He also wrote, from reading Flusser’s “Digital Turn”: “that the human being is… an artist who designs alternative worlds. The difference between art and science disappears ”(p. 82).

It dislikes and is strange that Flusser’s “new anthropology” is grounded in the “Judeo-Christianity” that “sees in human being only dust” (Flusser apud Chul Han, p. 83) which I like and refer to. It is precisely in this line that he will say “There is no subject and no object: we can no longer be subjects, for there are no more objects to which we could be subject, and no hard core that could be subject to any object” (quoting Flusser from “Media Culture ”, P. 213s).

Dislikes and does not accept Flusser’s messianism and says that “it does not do justice to the current topology of the digital connection” (Chul Han, p. 83), but I like both and I fully accept Han’s idea that in the Digital Swarm we lose perspective of reflection, or how he likes contemplation for action, I counter the idea of ​​the butterfly.

The butterfly because of the butterfly effect of E. Lorenz, his famous thesis that “butterfly wing beating can influence the weather in Texas”, ie small individual or group actions can generate the reverse effect of the swarm, but this effect exists and became evident with the modern digital media that Flusser little knew, died in 1991 the Web was just born.

Flight of the erratic and disconcerting butterfly nevertheless has direction and meaning, its birth is also curious it is born dragging like a larva and when it leaves the cocoon it is prepared for flight, dresses in multiple colors and shapes, it is less noted that the bees, but also does her “work”, I would say she is the artist of nature, performative and colorful.

The comparison with the swarm is because, as Han wrote, again quoting Flusser: “we too are ‘digital computers’ with buzzing punctual possibilities,” but then makes a harsh criticism of Flusser, there is an alternate digital where the butterfly takes flight, the art meets contemplation, and the birth of the present “active” world without reflection is not from now, see our previous post about a 1909 writing.



Collaboration and ingratitude

08 Oct

Seemingly so distant terms are deeply connected, collaboration that almost always involves a dose of gratuitousness (may even be paid, but does it with some generosity), and the ingratitude, which is not acknowledging the gratitude, of what is done. with some donation dose.

This always involves the means of power, in times of psycho-power, the choice of means for certain ends is fundamental, what the individual influences or challenges for his own benefit, is explained in Habermas using the concept of Hanna Arendt and polemizing with Max. Weber: “It is this capacity for disposition over means that enables one to influence the will of others that Max Weber calls power. H. Arendt reserves for this case the concept of violence ” (Habermas, 1980: 100).

Thus, it can be theorized that what does not lead to collaboration can lead to a form of power or violence, if we admit that collaboration has an essential opposition to ingratitude, or to even theorize, a dose of ingratitude.

Still in the field of theorizing, in phenomenological life I think that “means” have accelerated the idea of ​​collaboration, Habermas will speak of a “methodological individualism” applying it to forms of power that do not allow “mutual understanding” or overcoming ” egoic sense of power ”, which leads to non-collaboration and non-recognition of gratuitousness.

I think Hanna Arendt is more straightforward because her model is “a communicative model” (interactive) where consensus would be reached by non-coercive means, by “reciprocal understanding” that would lead to “common will”, in my view, is still lacking, idea of ​​gratitude.

In environments where collaboration and reciprocity, mutual actions of co-working, that is, working together, is already a reality, power is dispersed and the leader does not appear as coercive, Latin coercive power, meaning retention.

What is proposed then, starting from Hanna Arendt is to think of the way that allows collaboration as a communicative way of influencing the will of the other without coercing it, this leads to systems of ingratitude, misunderstanding and power struggle through of violence.

Habermas, J. (1980). A crise da legitimação do capitalismo tardio. (The crisis of legitimation of late capitalismo). Rio de Janeiro, Tempo Brasileiro.