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Being, Appearance, and Selfhood

15 Nov

In both philosophical and juridical representation, there are two subjects, one that is and one that represents it. In the presentation it means that the Being is in relation to the Entity.

It was only in belief. For example, the president of a country is his presentation, so if any attack or violence means that the country is under attack, of course made exceptions to dictators who are not worthy representatives of popular will, but in philosophy the Being of the Entity, it is veiled, who he is.

Dasein is the Heideggerian response to this Being and the modern confusion the question of Identity, Freud’s Ego, the Cartesian code, and other proposals, but let us read two current ones.

The concept of identity is used to describe something that is different from others, but identical to itself, most definitions fall between identity and difference as dualism and not as presence of the Other, it is from a deep reading of Husserl that this change.

We already warned in the previous post, that Being is being, for a more precise definition let us use Husserl who sees it from his experiences: “This act passes, but I am and remain from now on a self that decided this way or that. , […] while it [the decision] is valid for me, I can come back to it often ”(Husserl, 2000: 83).

Paul Ricoeur makes a breakthrough when he analyzes the duality he perceives and manifests himself as an equal identity (sameness, being identical with himself and unchanging in time) and ipse-identity (ipseity, personal and reflective identity, shaped by alterity), and this is the presentation of Being in the Being.

The alternation carried to the utmost is the ability to put oneself in the place of the other, evidences both the selfhood of oneself and another, and one does not allow oneself to think without the selfhood, does not nullify the Self.

It is only in this reflective ipse-identity that the possibilities for change fit, different from the iden-identity which is genetic, being a form of primary socialization unable to see the Other.

The need for a “social democracy” (portuguese term of priest Manuel Antunes) means a great cultural change where man will no longer see himself as a mirror, but in essence, in relation to the Other, and in society that will come in this reality.

It must be changing, as Jesus said when he saw men astonished with a temporal Temple. Luke 21: 6: “You admire these things, the days will come when there will be no stone unturned. Everything will be destroyed”, and did not speak of the end of the world, but great transformations that societies must go through.

HUSSERL Edmund, 2001. Cartesian Meditations: Introduction to Phenomenology. Sao Paulo: Ed. Madras, brazilian edition.

RICOEUR, Paul, 2000. Narrative identity and the problem of personal identity. Trad. Carlos João, Ed. Arquipélogo, Brazilian edition.


Being, the other and identity

14 Nov

Identity has been worked on by a number of authors, some in particular, the father of empiricism David Hume saw identity (the self) as his empirical argument starts from the idea that ideas are formed from previous impressions, so identity is a product. of various impressions, and as an empiricist he speculates on thought experiments.
Hume is important to the question of identity, although it fixes on his empiricism, because he is for modernity the complement of idealist logic, it can be said that it comes from Parmenides and Heraclitus reaching Aristotle, we know that Plato’s dialectic is different.
Hegel in his work Science of Logic will adopt logic, but with overcoming immediacy, ie the relationship with the other being has disappeared, there is only a relationship with himself, a relationship of negation, ie his being denies the relationship and from from denial he identifies himself, the act of looking in the mirror for example is a negation of oneself, an ‘image’, and that is identity.
The biblical text that says, “We still see ourselves as in a mirror in the Letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 13:12). Paul makes the reflection:“ Now, therefore, we see only a dark reflection, as in polished material; however, there will be a day when we will see face to face ”, I would say it is a historical prophecy, because much of philosophy, namely that which points to the ontological turn, says that this is the time of otherness, of seeing the Other beyond the self. .
But there may be some confusion because it is not a denial of identity, it is not a question of cultural, ethnic or religious identity, which are also dilemmas of our time, the fact that each has a personality, sees himself as a person, does not mean non-alterity.
It is just the opposite, it is easier and more possible to talk to people who see themselves beyond the mirror, it says in common language “they are resolved”, although we are always under construction, and it is precisely in this that the relationship with the Other helps, something like that. : “The more I know who I am, the more tolerant I am of the Other” and I want him to have his own personality and identity.
Also in the cultural and religious field this is so, if I have a clear conviction of my personality, my culture and my belief (not only about religious belief, science can involve “beliefs”), I can dialogue and be more tolerant of each other, and reciprocity.
Fundamentalism, dogmatism, and intolerance are the result of ignorance in general, and difficulty with one’s own identity in particular, if “I am” I am “in relation to the Other,” and there is no need for denial, but “epoché”, that is, put in parentheses. how does phenomenology think.


About truth and philosophy

06 Nov

It was rationalism that led to doubting outer existence, the classic division of body and mind, the question until the late Middle Ages was between realists and nominalists, the former saying that the real is and the latter we only name what is. outside, what exists is in the mind.
Imannuel Kant states that the perceptions of the senses are after the experience while a universal a priori is necessary, using the realists’ argument, calling it analytical judgment while the first are the synthetic ones, made from the gathering of information.
The pinnacle of idealism is Hegel, which sets out several ideal concepts: state, spirit, and ethics, but the crisis of modernity will return to old dilemmas: language, discourse, and what is the thing or Being, there are then three twists: the linguistic, the ontological and the “sacred”.
Karl Klaus (1874-1936) already complained about the truth in the journalistic medium, it is true that the cultural industry moved masses, and the network media now too, but what about the truth?
The truth of facticity has lost its strength, there are alternative views and even the corruption of facts, something absurd as “alternative facts”, is not at all hermeneutic because it is precisely its absence, the lack of a hermeneutic circle where preconceptions are. overcome and new horizons can be traced that reinterpret the facts and build the future.
Groups entrenched in their half-truths behave only as twisted, dialogical, acceptance of the Other, and Empathy are but demagogic forms as attempts to co-opt members for the crowd itself.
Of course there is a latent future, sectors of society where cooperation, solidarity and the exercise of seeing the Other is already exercise, are groups and people who have changed the dogmatic way of seeing the world for a broader vision, beyond the group and from the crowd.
But still there are those who closing ranks in their “groups” will demand blind obedience, respect for “authority,” and often will resort to authoritarian methods of bending the Other.
Truth will emerge amid chaos, in the niches of society where there is Phronesis, true reflection, looking at the world as a whole and the other with respect to its particularities.


Hermeneutics and the truth

05 Nov

The great architect of hemeneutics in the twentieth century was Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), influenced by the studies of Martin Heidegger, who was a student at the Universität Marburg.
In his masterpiece Truth and Method: Elements of a Philosophical Hermeneutic, published in 1960, Gadamer not only revolutionized modern Western hermeneutics, but reoriented it by creating a new philosophical hermeneutic based on language ontology.
According to Heidegger, hermeneutics is philosophical rather than scientific (in the sense of conventional methods still in force), ontological rather than epistemological, existential rather than methodological, because it seeks the essence of understanding and not its norm or “method.” The study and understanding of existence, since it allows the knowledge of Being, precedes norms, even that considered “ethical” by the Enlightenment / idealism, because “Sabbath belongs to Man and not Man belongs to Sabbath” , here in reference to the “Jewish ethical rule” or Sabbath-keeping Sabbath.
According to Heidegger, hermeneutics would be philosophical rather than scientific; ontological rather than epistemological; existential rather than methodological. It would be responsible for seeking the essence of understanding, not the standardization of the comprehensive process.
The study of comprehension would be confused with the study of existence, since it would allow the knowledge of the Self.
Although contemporary hermeneutics comes from Schleiermacher and Dilthey, who advocated opening the spirit to an age that judges the antecedent, and this would be the historical process, Gadamer points out that we cannot abandon the present and take the past as having a “historical lesson”.
On the contrary, it is the terms of past questions that can define the terms of the present. The fact that man experiences a historical reality causes his worldview, and consequently, his possibilities of knowledge to depart from the preconceptions that surround him, making it impossible to completely eliminate them, so that he can read the absolute truth, as intended modern illuminists and historicists, is a veil over the truth and not itself.
The hermeneutic circle that was already drawn in Heidegger’s work from Gadamer’s point of view has an ontologically positive sense for understanding, which, according to him, in the course of interpretation, the elaboration of new projects and a new horizon is necessary.
Thus only with the admission of the preconceptions coming from the historicity of the interpreter that when properly analyzed in their veracity, allows a new understanding, the development of new horizons, truly coherent.
Going from pre-comprehension to analysis and synthesis is to remain in error, however creative this process may be, the rupture of preconceptions comes from outside, from openness and reworking.
That is why addicted, closed, provincial and demagogic systems succumb, crush the Being, claim to give it “identity”, but give only closure and obsession.


Idealism and Pharisaism

25 Oct

The pretense of idealism was to create a knowledge system capable of uniquely verifying the truth and for this purpose created a method that relates the subject to the object of knowledge, called transcendental reduction. Idealism split in two shortly after Hegel’s death in 1831, young Hegelians opposed groups of right-wing Hegelians or old Hegelians, who held the department’s chairs and other prestigious positions in university and government.

It was Ferdinand Lassale who defended the fundamental thesis of Hegelianism: “The State is God,” a phrase that Hegel himself was most cautious about. Hegel simply stated that it is “God’s course through the world that constitutes the state” and that in dealing with the state we must contemplate “the Idea, God Himself present on earth.” Only one thinker denounced this falsification of the idea of ​​religion at that time, was David Strauss (1808-1874), a Protestant liberal who wrote “The Life of Jesus” (Das Leven Jesu).

Already the young Hegelians saw the state apparatus as a claim for legitimacy based on religious doctrines, ideas that came from Lutheranism in Prussia, but wanted this theory to apply to any state, to this “fundamentalism” Marx will oppose, saying that it must think of the earth for the sky and not of “ideas” for the earth.

In germ, the ideas of fundamentalism, the almighty state, or the self-righteousness of the state must be governed by biblical “laws,” the whole new testament changes the idea of ​​law to that of man, the incarnation, and the living of faith, not relating it to the state, but people, will give these doctrines an amalgam for the fusion of idealism with religion.

The idea that theocentrism ended with the end of the middle ages is not to read carefully what Hegel proposed, albeit cautiously, but it is the idea that those who observe “the laws” are Christian.

The Bible gives a scandalous example of the tax collector, one who therefore performs the worst duties in the state and the Pharisee, one who follows the “laws” and thinks himself superior.

The biblical text says Luke 18: 11-13: “The Pharisee standing up, I prayed to him,“ O God, I thank you, because I am not like other men, thieves, dishonest, adulterers, nor like this collector. tax, I fast twice a week, and tithe all my income. ‘ But the tax collector stood at a distance, and did not dare look up at the sky, but beat his chest, saying, “My God, have mercy on me that I am a sinner!”

And in the end Jesus says that only one returned home justified.



Idealism and its religion

24 Oct

Beginning with the critique of idealism, in “The German Ideology” (1932), where he talks about Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, who even call them St. Buer and St. Stirner, for their claim to be theology.
If the essence of idealism is the separation of object and subject, I make a purposeful inversion, the essence of religious thinking for Ludwig Feuerbach is the separation of subject and sensible objects, for for him object consciousness can be, although distinct from itself, a consciousness that coincides shortly thereafter when dealing with the religious object, because of its “transcendence” is exactly what makes it return to self-consciousness, I explain.
For Feuerbach, and the sensitive object is out of being (though ontology here is only an appeal), the religious object is in it, it is an intrinsic object, and neither does it abandon it, its moral consciousness leaves it, it is an intimate object. , and even the most intimate, is the closest of all.
His critique of theology using idealism essentially presupposes a critical judgment, the “difference between the divine and the non-divine, between what is and is not worthy of worship,” so that with this dualism it is possible to play all the essence of the divine in the mass grave of the Ideal.
The consciousness of God is man’s consciousness itself to him, this is the Hegelian idealism made religion: the knowledge of God which is man’s self-knowledge, there is no God-self for man.
The negation of the subject is considered irreligious, and its relation to sensible objects, a negation of the subject, is the atheistic religion of Feuerbach, which Marx will turn to call them the Old Hegelians, and seeks to make their inversion here new now. from object to subject, here is the new “religious” version of the Young Hegelians, like Marx, even criticizing Feuerbach’s main atheistic thesis: “thought comes from the subject,” not the object.
It is no longer about Heaven to Earth,” said Marx, but now “from earth to heaven,” that is, from the object to the subject, the labor force and the production, to their divinization (of the object, of money, economy, etc.). If, for Marx, fetishization was the separation of labor from his instrument of labor and commodity, fetishization may be reification (res – thing) or objectification for these young “Hegelians”, where he sees the separation between subject and object. , in religious fetishism is the separation of (sinful) consumption of the individual (seen in self-awareness) to which the religious must “attend” and live his “concrete”. The fair relationship with money, work, health and education is only a surpassing of the idealistic religious view, its consummation in a man in harmonious relationship with the world, and in this case also beauty, poetry and life. healthy would have a perspective, for the “pure” religious not. This religiosity lacks an asceticism that in fact “elevates” them, although they seem as linked to contemporary themes, actually has an idealistic god and not pretending to be realistic as they would wish, their concrete is the modern state god their economy, or the positivist law and his narrow view of justice.


For a spiritual ascesis

18 Oct

What we see beyond the crisis and cultural night, beyond a deep social crisis without a thought that catalyses the real forces of society that point to the future, is also a night of God, educator Martin Buber describes it as God’s Eclipse.
Buber wrote in his book: “I later built for myself the meaning of the word ‘mismatch’, through which was roughly described the failure of a true encounter between human beings. When, after another 20 years, I saw my mother, who had come to visit me, my wife, and my children from afar, I couldn’t look into her still astonishingly beautiful eyes without hearing the word “mismatch” somewhere as if it were. tell me.
I suppose that everything I have experienced over the course of my life about the authentic encounter has its first origin at that time in the gallery. ”(BUBER, 1991, p. 8). Thus revealing the true face of the “silence of God” of Judaism in which it has its roots, will be in another book the “I-Thou” where he will reveal an aspect of his asceticism which is “the encounter with the Other”, which for Buber more. than one person, your Tu has a divine essence, God inhabits the other.
These days there are two strong tendencies, and in both asceses there is in fact no spirituality beyond transcendence, or the activism that Byung Chul condemns as the “active vita” that leads to tiredness, or the idealistic subjectivism that can It seems to be religion but it is not, what it arouses is nothing but sentimentality, and can lead to “faithful” tears, not necessarily to God, if they do discover Him they must seek another true asceticism.
Thus it is possible that they will find God in one way or another, but there is no other way to remain in the faith, not of the blind but of those who have found a clearing, if indeed meditation and prayer are to remain, they are indispensable.
For those who have no faith, a good reading, separating passages and thoughts, living the moment as we wrote in the previous post, is fundamental, that is, also for reading can follow the rule of doing it without “gluttony”, try put the soul in silence, making a true “epoché”.
To those who believe always reflect that Jesus prayed, and asked his disciples to pray with him, and not to lose this practice, Jesus will tell the parable of the bad judge who does not want to attend the widow, but by his insistence and so that she does not. he curses, he answers, says the opening passage: “Jesus told the disciples a parable to show them the need to pray always, and never give up…”, which is in Luke 18: 1.
BUBER, Martin. (1995) Eclipse de Dios. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995.


Collaboration and ingratitude

08 Oct

Seemingly so distant terms are deeply connected, collaboration that almost always involves a dose of gratuitousness (may even be paid, but does it with some generosity), and the ingratitude, which is not acknowledging the gratitude, of what is done. with some donation dose.

This always involves the means of power, in times of psycho-power, the choice of means for certain ends is fundamental, what the individual influences or challenges for his own benefit, is explained in Habermas using the concept of Hanna Arendt and polemizing with Max. Weber: “It is this capacity for disposition over means that enables one to influence the will of others that Max Weber calls power. H. Arendt reserves for this case the concept of violence ” (Habermas, 1980: 100).

Thus, it can be theorized that what does not lead to collaboration can lead to a form of power or violence, if we admit that collaboration has an essential opposition to ingratitude, or to even theorize, a dose of ingratitude.

Still in the field of theorizing, in phenomenological life I think that “means” have accelerated the idea of ​​collaboration, Habermas will speak of a “methodological individualism” applying it to forms of power that do not allow “mutual understanding” or overcoming ” egoic sense of power ”, which leads to non-collaboration and non-recognition of gratuitousness.

I think Hanna Arendt is more straightforward because her model is “a communicative model” (interactive) where consensus would be reached by non-coercive means, by “reciprocal understanding” that would lead to “common will”, in my view, is still lacking, idea of ​​gratitude.

In environments where collaboration and reciprocity, mutual actions of co-working, that is, working together, is already a reality, power is dispersed and the leader does not appear as coercive, Latin coercive power, meaning retention.

What is proposed then, starting from Hanna Arendt is to think of the way that allows collaboration as a communicative way of influencing the will of the other without coercing it, this leads to systems of ingratitude, misunderstanding and power struggle through of violence.

Habermas, J. (1980). A crise da legitimação do capitalismo tardio. (The crisis of legitimation of late capitalismo). Rio de Janeiro, Tempo Brasileiro.


The missing future, semi-open dialogues

03 Oct

The idea that we are about to change is in the mouth of many apocalyptics and some idealist theorists and philosophers, although most claim openness and dialogue, what they think about it is not elaborate, make long speeches and weave unrealistic narratives.
The true dialogue between tradition and change, fortunately in this field many people are doing this properly, must at the same time provide a rereading of the past, a respect and an understanding of why the events happened this way or that.
This is the reading from the pre-Socrates, through the high and low middle ages, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, although criticism can be done throughout, and even it must be well done, it is easy to do critical rereading because this time It has been difficult because the time has come.
Especially difficult for the Enlightenment and modernity, postmodernity or late, or its continuity, is still difficult to read because the transition has not taken place and the problem is the difficulty of overcoming it, almost everyone will agree that the Modernity is already more tradition than any possibility of a new “revolution” within its thinking, although the attempts are many.
Nietzsche called this dilemma “eternal return”, he already realized in his time and some think this is new, and in part was right for the horizon he saw in his time, but when the new is not born traditional thinking suffers from aging. and sameness.
It tries to look ‘new’ or ‘creative’, but there is nothing that really changes reality. Great sociocultural problems of our time, moral and even religious, will not change without a new perspective, although redundant one would say a brand new “new”, and in order not to be pure imagination, one must find elements already living that point to the future.
Three new elements are visible: a globalized planet, it is already possible to see itself as a world although different cultural aspects are not yet respected, an exhaustion of the forces of nature, the domination of nature by man was the great mode of modernity, and the end of hunger and misery on the planet, though with resources available for it, has not been realized.
Of course there are many other factors, but they stem from a lack of dialogue with the future, the centralization of autocratic groups, the absence of a networked politics and culture, although the mechanisms for this exist, are countered as “alienation” and even as responsible for problems that exist long before any thought about new technologies.



Perfectionism and true righteousness

27 Sep

Idealism has created a form of humanism and “rights and duties” that have little or nothing to do with Being and true human needs and concerns.
According to novelist Anne Larnott (translated to Portuguese only Word for word): “Perfectionism is a form of cold and bad idealism, while messes are the artist’s true friend”, I think she meant what appears to be an imperfection or a “Mess” as she wrote, but that’s only human.
Three factors can lead to perfectionism becoming a “borderline” syndrome, as psychologists call it, making the distinction or quality of the Other unacceptable, but also making “human” or “normal” pathological defects that can lead to despair, and, perhaps worst of all, the still little realized that is contempt for the Other, especially for the humblest people, for vanity and pride.
Other aspects such as communication, harmony in order to have the environments around us more integrated with our Being, the adoption of a spirituality (it has become dangerous because religiosity has also acquired pathologies, care must be taken) and what should be future of humanity, but there are already signs, that is the sharing of resources and talents in order to produce self-sustaining and healthy goods and consumption.
There are several currents that can help from the point of view of ‘elaboration of thought’, one of the serious shortcomings of idealism has been to separate practical from theoretical, and the reinvention of dialectic (in Hegel in particular) has badly solved this problem, phenomenology has reinvented hermeneutics to return to the “thing itself” and to take back the “Lebenswelt” (Husserl), the philosophy of life.
The three parables in the 16th chapter of Luke, misunderstood and read, are not one work that makes the connection between them, namely that of the returning son (called the prodigal son), that of the unfaithful steward (called dishonest or clever). and the one that complements the three, which is the death of Lazarus, the poor man who lived from the leftover table of the rich man who, when dying, goes to his father’s bosom, while the rich man goes to the “region of the dead, in the midst of torment”. (Lc 16.23).
They are complementary and point out three essential aspects: the son who is in his father’s house, does not accept the returning brother, the unfaithful steward cannot be faithful in a short while (this is not perfectionism, but training for honesty) and finally this parable of the rich and Lazarus, who shows that he is in “hell” not the one who has little or nothing, but the rich.
It makes us think, and there should be a connection between the three, for contextualization and a non-fundamentalist reading of the bible, to love the “imperfect” brother who returns or apologizes, to be faithful in the “little” and to love and respect the poor and humbleness, it seems. simple, for some theologians not.