Arquivo para a ‘Sem categoria’ Categoria
Exegesis and Hermeneutics: dichotomies
Any text out of context is critical, but what exactly is the context, which means the terms in the language of the time it was written and mostly what the exact interpretation that can give him is hermeneutics, since exegesis depends only on the interpretation.
The first great fallacy is that one is of biblical origin, in this case exegesis and other Greek origin fallacy because both are of Greek origin, Exegesis (the ἐξήγησις Greek ἐξηγεῖσθαι “take out”) is an interpretation or critical explanation , although it has the particularity to the religious text, while hermeneutics comes from the Greek “ermēneutikē” which means “science” and “art”, but refers to the god Hermes, who gave rise to language and writing.
If we consider classical antiquity, since hermeneutics is more complete because it means studying the language, literature, culture or civilization in a Historical view in written documents, while not explicitly speak of memory, speech culture and literature.
Already pointed out here that was Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), in the early nineteenth century, hermeneutics receives one of the goals was to unify the Biblical hermeneutics and law, so called universal hermeneutics, had profound influence on the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger.
Heidegger says that understanding has a “circular structure” from which comes the hermeneutic circle: “Any interpretation to produce understanding, must have understood what is going to interpret” (Heidegger, Martin Being and Time, New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
Wilhelm Dilthey, says the explanation (itself the natural sciences) and understanding (own science of the spirit or human sciences) would be in opposition that is, “clarified through intellectual processes, but we understand the cooperation of all the sentimental forces in the apprehension by dipping the sentimental forces in the object.” (PALMER, Richard Hermeneutics:. Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidgger, and Gadamer Evanston. NUP, 1969).
Paul Ricoeur wants to overcome this dichotomy, for him to understand a text is to chain a new discourse in the text of the speech, because on the one hand there is no reflection without meditation on the signs; on the other, there is no explanation without understanding the world and yourself. (Ricoeur, Paul. Theory of Interpretation, Fort Worth: Texas Christian University, 1976).
The dialogue impossible
In the political field and the scenario that it is presented in national and
international field, remember here Trumph versus Hillary the edge of one of the largest and most impressive witnessed campaigns in American history, a time that Donald Trumph seems like a character out of some banana republic dictators and not a great country.
Lack wisdom, some real rigor and even common sense, but let’s look at it another way, what happens in the knowledge of mankind.
At the edge of the second world war many were the signs of decay and conservative arrogance, but looking thought we could see: the circle of Vienna, but this was the Marburg School passed by Ernest Cassirer, Paul Natorp (1854-1924) and Hermann Cohen (1841-1918) who had published Theorie der Erfahrung, the starting point of this group.
All agreed that the main emphasis was the “theory of knowledge” and therefore will be in the epistemological chain, while elsewhere was reappearing, but with a new hue, ontology through the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), of where they came from his student Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and then Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) and Emmauel Levinas (1905-1995), and many others of course.
What was at stake between the apparent debate between gnoseologies and ontologies, Popper (1902-1994), Lakatos (1922-1974) and Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) are not the same question about the thought of what is knowledge and science also is in play between ontologies, because since Husserl, I think his teacher Franz Brentano should be evaluated part, to Levinas and Ricoeur, can be thought so, from where the knowledge but of being, and not part of being that is the truth, that is, the question is knowledge, hermeneutics that is metaphysical and scientific, then it is in the three fields, although targeted.
For something thoughtless and totally new, Schleiermacher considering the Bible as a text of historical-literary nature, proposed a method which now serve to elucidate not only the Scripture but also of all the texts that possess this nature, under this influence Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) reexamines Heidegger and proposes the hermeneutical circle, reviewing the pre-concepts, proposes the fusion of horizons and the reading of the author, resurfaces the field of hermeneutics now on linguistics and ontology, new ample space for dialogue.
Cogito wounded and political
Paul Ricoeur is one of the few current French philosophers (died in 2005) who not only reads and translates from German and English, but also speaks to international currents of thought as diverse as German phenomenology (was translator of Ideas I of Husserl in 1950), to Gadamer’s hermeneutics or the English analytical philosophy and American.
Its flagship book, Soi-même comme un autre (national translation The oneself as another is bad), brought inscribed his beautiful title both on the issue of identity (Soi-même) as his invention of identity through otherness : comme un autre, emphasizing both the metaphorical dimension as well as ethics of this invention, metaphors are in his book: the living metaphor.
Opposing the “exaltation of the Cogito” in Cogito wounded a “broken” (brisé) or “injured” (blessé) as already wrote in the preface to himself as another.
This decline is both the seizure of a much larger unit, even if never totalizable the subject: a unit that is established in every action, in every work, such as the reintroduction of the subject and the world, surpassing the subjects and objects separation.
In politics the cogito injured, is the impossibility (if we are not able to see how Other (comme un autre), the result is a dialogue sometimes confrontational other times of silence, under an even greater suspicion.
Ricoeur distrusts the same tendency to a totalizing hubris and distrusted the Cartesian solipsism, he saw an uncritical application, that is, beyond its limits, the recent anticartesianos paradigms of which hybridity is the worst aspect.
Political dialogue is not hybridity, not composing speeches and exchanges of favors, in a sense, is discussion and clash in another discovery of shared values and thoughts.
Nicholas Carr back load
Critical of the indiscriminate use of technology, Nicholas Carr opened his
speech saying about autonomous vehicles, “I think a lot of views on the overall automation assume that every vehicle will be automated and the whole direction of infrastructure will not only mapped in minutes, but It will also be equipped with the kind of sensors and transmitters and the entire network infrastructure that we need.”, said to ComputerWorld.
New criticism because she had called “Dumbest generation” and in his 2003 book as the Harvard Business Review published the book, “IT Does not Matter” where Carr raised the ire of big names in technology which questions the notion that the iT infrastructure provides strategic advantages to companies.
His new book “Utopia is Creepy: And Other Provocations”, which will the American publisher Norton & Co. on 6 September. It is a compendium of articles, such as “Would Google making us stupid?” And “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of privacy,” now not only young people but all be stupid, imagine what it will mean the Pokemon Go So!
In the interview he says that when his blog was ten years old in 2015, he began to look back through the posts and I realized that many of the items still resounding today, he publishes interesting blog and book just now.
He says he saw what was happening in the world of technology, particularly in the rise of what we used to call Web 2.0 and is now known as social media and social networking, but does show how critical it is in those articles.
He also calls the “ideology of Silicon Valley” the sense that the Internet and social media were breaking down the barriers to personal expression, freeing people and as if we our trust in Silicon Valley and its programmers to lead a kind of Utopia. It is a collection of articles, but with a theme running through it.
Let’s wait for the book, but decidedly Nicholar Carr’s vision is pessimistic.
I have good taste ?
I see in a lot of cars this phrase (in brazilian cars), and I began to wonder what it would take a large number of people of all social classes, parties and religions to begin to put this in the car, I asked a few people and the response was not convergent.
I remembered again the book is not finished in Theodore Dalrymple holidays: “Our culture … or what’s left of it,” which states that political, economic and cultural factors began to destroy our culture … or what’s left of it.
Thought is an unconscious but important reaction because something is bothering us as much as injustice (theft, corrupt, abuses, etc.) and the economic crisis.
Our notion of aesthetics and beauty seems changed, not just the one that selects colors and races, but in any race or color what really means the beautiful and the good.
The question of aesthetics is linked to contempt for the poetic, the imagery (and imaginary) and more deeply the concept of lost aesthetic since the beginning of modernity, this requires a deeper study of what we think of everyday life: a harmony to (in ) Being.
(Português) Popper: um crítico específico de Hegel
Embora a grande contribuição de Karl Popper lembrada no mundo acadêmico seja em relação a sua visão de ciência, a questão da ciência “normal” que surge das contribuições e acréscimos em paradigmas científicos, há uma contribuição mais profunda na crítica a Hegel.
Publicou em 1934 A lógica da pesquisa Científica, enquanto ainda era professor escolar, nela criticou o neopositivo lógico do Circulo de Viena, criando uma teoria que a falseabilidade potencial é o critério a ser usado para distinguir ciência de não ciência.
Depois emigrou para Nova Zelândia onde foi lecionar na universidade de filosofia na Universidade de Canterbury, em Christchurch.
Dizia corretamente que era herdeiro de David Hume e Immanuel Kant, mas sua abordagem empírica tem elementos novos, influenciado por W.V. Quine diz que a observação empírica não é “simples”, porque é sempre seletiva, no sentido de que ocorre a partir de uma perspectiva, e esta perspectiva é sempre favorável a corrente filosófica que conduz à pesquisa, mas ele vê a ciência como um esforço de resolução de problemas, e mesmo sendo humana é possível diferenciar se ela é ou não ciência “pela solução”.
A crítica a Marx, que coloca entre todos os sistemas “totalitários”, feita no seu trabalho a Sociedade Aberta e seus inimigos, parte da ideia que todos historicistas (inclui Hegel) usam de modo inapropriado a ciência, porque a história humana não pode ser “prevista”, mas além de filosofia da ciência fez também trabalhos de história da ciência, a partir dos anos 1960.
Popper: um crítico específico de Hegel
Embora a grande contribuição de Karl Popper lembrada no mundo acadêmico seja em relação a sua visão de ciência, a questão da ciência “normal” que surge das contribuições e acréscimos em paradigmas científicos, há uma contribuição mais profunda na crítica a Hegel.
Publicou em 1934 A lógica da pesquisa Científica, enquanto ainda era professor escolar, nela criticou o neopositivo lógico do Circulo de Viena, criando uma teoria que a falseabilidade potencial é o critério a ser usado para distinguir ciência de não ciência.
Depois emigrou para Nova Zelândia onde foi lecionar na universidade de filosofia na Universidade de Canterbury, em Christchurch.
Dizia corretamente que era herdeiro de David Hume e Immanuel Kant, mas sua abordagem empírica tem elementos novos, influenciado por W.V. Quine diz que a observação empírica não é “simples”, porque é sempre seletiva, no sentido de que ocorre a partir de uma perspectiva, e esta perspectiva é sempre favorável a corrente filosófica que conduz à pesquisa, mas ele vê a ciência como um esforço de resolução de problemas, e mesmo sendo humana é possível diferenciar se ela é ou não ciência “pela solução”.
A crítica a Marx, que coloca entre todos os sistemas “totalitários”, feita no seu trabalho a Sociedade Aberta e seus inimigos, parte da ideia que todos historicistas (inclui Hegel) usam de modo inapropriado a ciência, porque a história humana não pode ser “prevista”, mas além de filosofia da ciência fez também trabalhos de história da ciência, a partir dos anos 1960.
Os trabalhos de Michael Polanyi (1871-1976) e Thomas S. Khun (1911-1996), deste em especial a Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas, que mostra que Popper trata apenas da ciência normal e não dos períodos paradigmas, cita como exemplo a superação de Newton por Einstein, vão fazer que Popper refaça suas teorias influenciando a questão científica, mas não a filosófica.
Entre os livros mais conhecidos desta época: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, (1963), Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (1977, In Search of a Better World (1984), Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem: In Defence of Interaction (1994).
Os trabalhos de Michael Polanyi (1871-1976) e Thomas S. Khun (1911-1996), deste em especial a Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas, que mostra que Popper trata apenas da ciência normal e não dos períodos paradigmas, cita como exemplo a superação de Newton por Einstein, vão fazer que Popper refaça suas teorias influenciando a questão científica, mas não a filosófica.
Entre os livros mais conhecidos desta época: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, (1963), Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (1977, In Search of a Better World (1984), Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem: In Defence of Interaction (1994).