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Arquivo para a ‘Método e Verdade Científica’ Categoria

Counterfeiting and beliefs

22 Nov

For Popper, to support the objective world, he hoped to provoke what he called “philosophers of belief” (Popper, 1972, p. 109), namely “Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, or Russell are interested in our subjective beliefs. in its basis of origin ”and thus placed it in its third world (beyond the physical and cognitive) as“ the world of objective content of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thinking and of works of art ”(Popper, 1972, p. 108). ), but his worldview is expressed in the extent of his work, and this is his beyond.
What involves beliefs is not only religious acts, but the fixation on dogmas, or rather the construction of “objective content of thought” that seems to give us certainty where it is only apparent, and thus we fall into the easy path of “induction”. as Hume wanted.
The falsifiability method is not just a way of staying in the critique of science, but it is first of all to point out that many beliefs are “beliefs,” and beliefs themselves can help the human worldview if they understand that they should not be limited. purely to dogmas, I make a single argument using Popper… without criticism there would be no human progress.
These are times of disbelief, and unfortunately it strikes even the most dear to us, human life, there is little appreciation and little discomfort for the vulnerability of life, and beyond human contempt for nature and the planet seems to be. common voice.
But everything is a mark of an end of the epoch, and thought can and should play a very important role in a turn of the epoch, and in the matter of science falsifiability, responsible criticism is clear, and transdisciplinarity can be an essential exercise, yet. little done.
Criticism can be misunderstood, I see many “inductive” thoughts that thinking is not good, if we don’t think and just let the waves go we will go to uncertain destinations.
However, to think is necessary method, and what should be obvious but is not, to be lover of the truth beyond our convictions, to respect and to hear the Other with openness, and to know to go beyond. One phrase said in the revolutionary walls of the Sorbonne of Paris: “our ears have walls, our walls have ears”, it is necessary to superior several types of authoritarianism, and the most serious of all, the non-acceptance of the Other, which is not what we idealized, beyond, simply Other.
Evangelist Luke is the one who essentially follows the “way” of Jesus, so I would say in scientific or hermeneutic terms, the one who gives us “the method of Jesus”, the way in which he narrates his end near his death on the cross is narrated in this perspective.
In Lc 23,40-43, Jesus conducts the dialogue with the two thieves, would say that it is his “falsifiability” to speak of life near his death and in dialogue with two thieves, one mocking and the other asking that he be in his kingdom.
To those who believe the only saint with confirmation of Jesus is a thief (Lk 23:43): “You will still be with me in paradise today,” ironically the only one confirmed by Jesus, there was no other.
This near-death thief could see further: “Remember me in your reign.”
POPPER, k. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo (Objective Knowledge), Ed. University of São Paulo (Brazilian edition), 1975 (original 1972).

 

Common sense and critical science

21 Nov

It may seem that Popper’s critique of Hume, and directly in some books or directly in others as well as Kant, is only a theoretical problem, but there is something profound about addressing the real question about irrationality or ignorance beyond induction: the common sense.
Popper states in the preface to the English edition of Objective Knowledge (1972) (brazilian edition 1975): “I am a great admirer of common sense, which I claim is essentially self-critical”.
But if I am willing to uphold the essential truth of common sense realism to the end, I regard the common sense theory of knowledge as a subjectivist blunder. ”(Popper, 1975, p. 7).
After making a “tabular” summary of several common sense theory thinkers, he concludes that the attempt to maintain “common sense theory as an integral whole – realism plus common sense epistemology – tends to crumble… and the latter can be rejected. and replaced by an objective theory that uses the former. ”(Popper, 1975, p. 107).
Despite Plato and Hegel’s criticism, his lectures “A theory of the Platonic world” or “A theory of the objective spirit,” as the titles themselves confer, are the dialogues made with these theories, which will define what he calls the ´third world´”, it is in Popper’s most general view.
Although he says he uses “world” and “universe” without taking words seriously, his worldview or worldview is serious indeed, when we read that the other two worlds are:
“the first, the world of physical objects or material states: second, the world of states of consciousness or mental states, or perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act, and third, the world of objective content of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thinking and of works of art” (Popper, 1975, p. 108), which reveals influences but also their originality.
It admits the influences of Plato, Hegel and include that of Bolzano (had a theory of the universe as propositions and truths), and in the end admits the influence of “Frege’s universe of objective content of thought” (Popper, idem).
Different because it says what your thinking experiences are, the first surprising for the contemporary world is the experience that “all machines and equipment are destitute… but libraries and our ability to learn from them survive.
Clearly, after much suffering, our world can continue to walk ”(pp. 109-110). In the second as before, experience that machines and equipment are destitute: “as well as our subjective learning, including our knowledge of machines and equipment and how to use them.
But this time, all libraries have also been destitute, so our ability to learn from books becomes useless. ”(P. 110).
Italics are from the original. In stating experience as “subjective learning”, where even books are useless, it is contrary to Frege’s own thinking which quotes on the following page: “By thought I mean not the subjective act of thinking, but its objective content…” (Frege in Popper, 1975, p. 111).
It will say using the Oxford dictionary that knowledge is “being aware or informed,” but the information here is like books and not subjective / ontological information.

POPPER, K. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo, Editora Universidade de São Paulo, 1975. (original english version 1972).

 

Popper’s solution to empiricism

20 Nov

Recognizing as important the division between the logical and psychological problem, Popper’s solution to Hume’s induction was to reformulate HL (logical) by replacing it with ‘test assertions’, ‘basic assertions’ or ‘observation’, and will create two claims L1 and L2 (Popper, 1975, p. 18).

L1 is the claim that a universal explanatory theory would be true for “empirical reasons”, assuming Popper’s test and observation assertions, and his answer is no. L2 is the claim extending L1 and admitting the hypotheses that a universal explanatory theory can be either true or false for “empirical reasons” and in this case its answer is positive.

But Popper will recall that Hume has also proposed competing theories, that is, whose formulations do not agree, and the problem of choosing between various theories requires a new L3, suggesting a third claim of the problem of induction.

L3 is may a “preference” (author’s emphasis) with respect to truth or falsity, for some universal theories in competition with another, be justified for “empirical reasons”, yes but the author himself adds “if we are lucky” ( page 19), and I add there may be mysterious theory, which is not yet known and may come to light, this is the ontological reason, and is related to Being.

The author points out that the negation of L1 must be viewed as “all laws or theory as hypothetical or conjectural, that is, as assumptions” (Popper, 1972, p. 20). Of course (psychological) HPS is related to this, but Popper’s complementary solution will come in the formulation of the worlds, but before this it goes a long way in science.

In this way I point out his disagreement with Gilbert Ryle who states that certain hypotheses, in Popper’s case, means “proposition… which only conjectures to be true” (page 20), and that for Hyle there are “firm” propositions and these “are called laws, not hypotheses ”.

This was the opinion of many when Popper wrote Logic of Scientific Research (1959) in which he states that the logic of induction often leads “from singular (… or particular) statements, such as descriptions of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories.” (Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Research, 1972, p. 27).

There is always a “logical” leap from private to universal, but the most serious problem in postmodernity is that “general” or universal theories are no longer seen as such. Induction is an important problem because it is through it that we prove our “theories” that justify our “beliefs”, but often they are beliefs and induction is purposeful, we can, for example, find confirmations of our political view and when there are not, We say you see it is linked to harmful ideologies, there is no logical argument, but only induction.

Thus the evidence confirming a particular theory should not be taken into account, unless the test is genuine of this theory, as it can be said as in phenomenology, the object has its own method, but of course this is different from Karl’s theory of falsificationism.

Popper The criterion of the scientific status (Popper uses instead of law) of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability or testability, so the problem of narrative in science is rejected.

POPPER, K. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo, Editora Universidade de São Paulo, 1975 (original english edition 1972).