Arquivo para a ‘Information Science’ Categoria
The liquid visionaries
03
Jul
Analyzing Dilthey’s “romantic” vision of history,
Hans-Georg Gadamer first emphasizes his rightness that “what we call the meaning of life is constituted, many times before any scientific objectification, within a natural vision of life about itself ” (GADAMER, 2006, p. 31).
However, he will criticize Dilthey, that “every expression of life implies a knowledge that forms it from within”, and returning to the analysis from Hegel, he questions his vision of an objective spirit, if the “ethical environment in which he lives and the which he shares with others constitutes something “solid” that allows him to orient himself despite the somewhat vague contingencies of his subjective élans” (Gadamer, 2006, p. 32), the emphasis on the solid was made by the author.
The author remembers Dilthey’s “Investigating solid forms” (one of the themes of the Collection of Writings), which implies that both contemplation and reflection “always imply practical experience”, then contests Gadamer: “in Dilthey’s eyes, the objectivity of scientific knowledge, no less than the meditative reflection of philosophy, is an unfolding of the natural tendencies of life” (GADAMER, 2006, pp. 32).
In the same collection, recalls Gadamer, Dilthey said that “our task… will be to explain how the relative values of an era can acquire a somehow absolute dimension” and despite being a concern with the absolute, the path between relativism and totality is quite another, since Dilthey’s “being consciously a conditioned being” is not an explicit critique of idealism.
All this philosophy, says Gadamer, starts from a certain intellectualism, I would say, from a “liquid” visionary and points to an “intellectualist motivation of the objection to relativism, an intellectualism incompatible not only with the ultimate implication of his philosophy of life, but also with the starting point chosen by him, that is, the immanence of knowledge in life itself” (GADAMER, 2006, p. 36).
It clarifies Dilthey’s point of view “which demands that his philosophy extends to all domains in which “consciousness, through a reflective and doubtful attitude, finds itself freed from the dominance of authoritarian dogmas and aspires to true knowledge” ‘ (Gadamer, 2006, p. 34) quoting Dilthey himself in quotation marks, from his Collection of Writings.
The questions of the spirit in Hegelian philosophy always remained in the vague concept of the absolute, and never understood the question of contemplation, of a knowledge beyond, its transcendence is that which goes from the subject to the object without any divine or superior plan.
This was Thomas’ dilemma in carrying out the experience, although he lived with Jesus after his death, he was unable to maintain his conviction and needed to touch the master’s wounds.
GADAMER, H-G. The problem of historical consciousness. Trans. Paulo Cesar Duque Estrada. RJ: Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2006.
Courage and Being
02
Jul
The imprudent is not courageous, in ancient times
Plato and Aristotle defined it in a similar way, for Plato courage “knows what not to fear” while for Aristotle it is the moral virtue that lies in the middle ground between cowardice and recklessness.
However, when courage becomes cowardice, it is certainly not when one is prudent and knows the dangers that surround a certain attitude, but if it is a virtue it cannot be far from the truth, so it means that it cannot renounce the truth, under penalty of renouncing the your Being.
But truth is not a vision of data, facts or a position in the face of reality, philosophy and modern physics include a third hypothesis between Being and non-Being, and thus the Aristotelian “middle term” is possible without it being the capitulation of truth.
The theme of anguish and fear, which occurs when there is a threat to one’s existence, often leading people to remain in the dispersion of concern, in Heidegger, this dispersion, which is the way of existing for most people, can only be overcome through an “anticipatory decision” that leads Dasein to accept within it only what is finite, moral or immediate.
Other authors, such as Kierkegaard, who criticized those who had thought of a solution to this concern in a God “imagined” by reason, and in this sense he is correct since it is not deposited in faith, criticize those who had thought of a transcendence of the “God above of God”, which would be a kind of courage of the Being, and this would be the power of being with roots in transcendence, they are right because, not being something divine, “trust in God” transforms into a power located beyond, and thus becomes the confidence in yourself.
There is something in human existence that is a kind of ultimate fear: death, there are those who seek the source of eternal youth, the prolongation of life, but human finitude is something that causes a fatal fear, and in the face of death, very few are those that do not invoke the divine presence, the presence of the mother or some other divine resource.
The Korean-German philosopher Byung-Chul Han clarifies this well: “The modern loss of faith, which concerns not only God and the hereafter, but reality itself, makes human life radically transitory” because living well in each present moment is be in eternity.
Not everyone believes because they need to see the eternal, but Thomas, who lived with Jesus, needed to touch him when he was resurrected to believe that there is the eternal, there is the infinite beyond the human, the Being-there that we are.
Religiosity and liberal culture
27
Jun
Modern liberalism created an environment
where many cultural practices that were previously questioned, especially those that ignore social rights and duties, were gradually being released, the idea (in the sense of philosophical idealism itself) of freedom is one that pleases the will, in the sense of rational and practical requirement of universal self-determination, with this morals and ethics are not those that prevent the exercise of evil, but those that please reason.
Thus, it makes no sense for contemporary liberalism to combat usury, extortionate interest rates are practiced by banks, not to mention usury, the fight against public immorality, public nudity and pornography is no longer a moral issue and the various types of health problems, to social well-being has even become a joke in media discourses.
It is also not a matter of puritan moralism, nor of personal taste in relation to the way of expressing oneself and behaving socially, but of debauchery, of public offense to all who want a minimum of public morality, Theodor Adorno wrote about the “Minima Moralia ” in the 40’s, in the sense of how “damaged life” developed into a form of violence and horror in the contemporary world.
There are also forms of bad religious culture, one that lacks a true asceticism that encourages the world towards empathy, healthy social coexistence (also in terms of health in a world intoxicated by the use of alcohol, drugs and toxic substances), without forgetting that The most harmful and terrible thing is the cultural offense, and the culture of violence that reaches its limit in the forms of armed and unarmed wars in the contemporary world.
Regarding the religious aspect, it is worth remembering to everyone who tries to use the religious alibi for antisocial practice, the biblical passage from Matthew 23: “Then I will say to them publicly: I never knew you. Depart from me, you who do evil” and in the passage is a clear reference to preachers who “cast out demons” and “performed miracles” in the name of Jesus.
The toxic narratives that are used for these practices are generally unable to provide a complete narrative, they need to use false examples and even meaningless testimonies to justify the insanity of the practice and permissiveness in relation to public and social morals, they use offense and even public insults that make clear their adherence to exclusion and antisocial behavior public permissiveness, that which refuses coercion and the punishment of antisocial attitudes are also forms of violence by omission.
The result is a psychologically difficult environment, a damaged social life, as expressed by Adorno, and a life in which everything is transitory as seen by Byung-Chul Han.
Pharisaism and Jonah
26
Jun
What the absence of spirituality consists of today,
more than the lack of God, says Byung-Chul Han is the fact that everything in life becomes transitory, but also the consequences of a strong polarization in which all moods are concentrated and limit true interiority, true spirituality outside the bubble, in the allegory explored by Sloterdijk in Spheres I, Jonah’s sign is somewhat reminiscent of the biblical passage (Luke 11:29-30): “This generation is a perverse generation: it asks a sign, but no sign will be given to him except the sign of Jonah. Just as Jonah was a sign to the inhabitants of Nineveh, so will the Son of Man be to this generation.”
Sloterdijk saw the lack of centrality in a dyad, which serves both polarization and polycentrism, that is, an absence of being situated in the world. We remember that the central point of his philosophy is what it means to be in the world, and Jonas who tries to escape his mission ends up in the belly of the whale, that is, his desire to escape the world and his mission, is the idea of taking refuge in a pure interior of which those who practice despiritualized asceticism, try not to being in the world, which is different from Being-in-the-world, a category in which Sloterdijk uses the word “vorhandensein”* to explain his controversy on humanism with Heidegger, who uses the term dasein for Being in the world.
Where was Jonah when he was in the world? Inside the whale. The whale is part of Jonas’s consciousness that provokes him to think about the outside from the inside. Heidegger had already thought about this pure interior of which we are all victims, a radical and intrinsic space, our unique and first dwelling through which all our impressions, thoughts and affections permeate.
The sign of Jonah, the only sign for this generation that seeks a “sign of God” is, therefore, finding this interiority even while being in the world and subject to its dyads (poles) or even polycentrism (half-truths of different narratives) without manage to achieve true asceticism, however Jonah leaves the whale and goes to Nineveh to fulfill his mission.
Thus, the relationship with the outside is a constant tension, and there is no way to escape it, it is not a filter for the truth, but the search for a clearing, for a space where we cultivate our interior, so in Sloterdijk’s vision that helps us, Jonah’s sign is his inner life when he was in the belly of the whale, within his “sphere” in Sloterdijk’s conception.
So it is not the one who shouts Lord, Lord nor the one who lives on external “good intentions” only, it is necessary to live this inner tension and be the Being that he is in the world.
Pharisaism is living on external appearances that do not correspond to interiority, but also “pure” interiority is staying in the belly of the Whale without experiencing external tension.
* the literal translation would be: to be available (in Jonas’ case for the mission).
Sloterdijk, P. (2016) Esferas I: bolhas (Spheres I: bubbles). Translated by José Oscar de Almeida Marques. Brazil, São Paulo: Estação Liberdade.
The Just, wrath and serenity
21
Jun
Martino Bracarense, an author from the 5th 
century AD who is little known but is one of those responsible for the days of the week in the Galician-Portuguese language Monday, Tuesday, etc., stated that “Anger transforms all things that are best and fairest into their opposite”, There are many philosophical, psychological and even poetic reflections on anger, William Shakespeare stated that: “Anger is a poison that we take waiting for the other to die” (the photo on the side is by Andre Hunder on unsplash).
In stormy times, to maintain justice and serenity, a great effort of character and temperance is necessary because the normal thing is to react to the pain of hatred with some form, even if disguised as hatred, Aristotle stated: “a desire, accompanied by pain, to perceived revenge, due to a perceived disregard towards an individual or his neighbor, coming from people from whom disregard is not expected” (Aristotle’s Rhetoric).
What does accompanied (anger) by pain mean? This requires Aristotle’s definition of pathê: “emotions are all those things because of which people change their thoughts and disagree with their judgments, being accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear and all other things similar to their opposites”, is clearly not an exhaustive definition of anger, as it would require psychological and pathological elements and a more in-depth analysis of the topic.
The important thing is to know that it: escapes justice, produces intemperance and is placed in a sequence of structural hatreds, it ends up creating a total absence of serenity, of capacity for reflection and, in the end, it produces a great source of injustice and even even psychopathologies.
Another point is to think about the antidote to this state of mind, often cultural, structural and produced by those who believe they defend peace, of course in essence these same individuals are themselves pathological cases, because disguised anger, or as the popular saying goes “distilled poison”, unlike medicine, is not antithetical, it is poison in continuous and progressive doses.
Where then to find serenity? The answer is simple in hope, the very hope that waits, that breathes and that meditates and contemplates, a theme exhaustively elaborated in Byung-Chul Han in almost all of his themes, In the swarm where he exhorts “respect” as the only form of symmetry, silence and contemplation in “Vita Contemplativa” and the concept of affective tone in his work “Heidegger’s heart: about the concept of affective tone”, although he never sites the term directly, I think that is what he ultimately intends to contribute to contemporary thought to recover its ability to think, contemplate and Be.
The religious thought of our time also needs to recover more than serenity, sobriety, because they seem to be enveloped by certain intoxications of our time, as stated by Judeo-Christian thought, the wind came and God was not there: “after the earthquake there was a fire , but the Lord was not in it. And after the fire there was the murmur of a gentle breeze” (1 Kings 12) and the storm of Jesus among the sleeping apostles and a storm happening is also famous, He wakes up and tells the sea to calm down to the astonishment of the apostles (Mk 4,39).
The Just and reconciliation
20
Jun
Justice practiced only in a legalistic way and
without any mercy is only human and does not presuppose social peace, it incites hatred between adversaries.
The social contract established in modernity, actually comes from the idea of Absolute by the first contractualist John Hobbes (1588-1679) and also from the idea of Machiavelli’s The Prince, in fact transfers all rights and justice to the State and this does not mean that he does not practice injustice, in modernity we know that he does.
Also at the height of idealism, Hegel (1770-1831) developed a teleological idea of the Absolute, which is an abstract figure even though he characterizes it as a “substantial power”, which at the moment of its subjectivity and singularity of this concept manifests itself as a universal substance, which through its abstraction If it is effective as a kind of singular self-awareness, replacing the idea of essence of Ontology, it is something abstract indeed.
The idea of justice translated in the Just by Paul Ricoeur, Habermas and other authors is the idea that it is not the singularity of a substance, but must be embodied in something concrete which is the Just, this potentially can and should develop within what is moral and ethical, in classical antiquity the philosophers, in particular Plato who sought education for citizens, he should have the virtues, aretê, which in its most precise meaning means excellence, and Aristotle develops it as phronesis, which is the politician.
It seems like a lot of abstract theory, in our view Hegelian idealism really is, but the virtues and political excellence of each person is not abstract, it means the ability of each person to exercise politics considering the rights of the other and the ethical responsibility towards social goods, in particular, the common good.
Reconciliation is always that conflict situation where it is possible to review each person’s social responsibilities and the different ethics of social positioning, if someone commits a serious or minor offense, it is always possible to find the Just, that point at which the parties involved can establish a type of private social contract, minimizing damage or loss to the parties involved.
The biblical reading says if you do not reconcile with your brother, he will take you to the judge, the judge to the court and from there you will go to prison, so it is better to reconcile first.
The Just sees the Other and is delicate
19
Jun
Paul Ricoeur in his two volumes of The Just will
dedicate himself to unveiling this relationship, which involves power relations, starting with the cry that is considered fair: “This is unfair!” he says in the preface of his book in reference to the first chapter of R.J. Lucas’s book “On the Justice” (1955) and recognizes it as a proclamation of a protest.
As in much of Paul Ricoeur’s work, it is in recognizing the face of the Other that we must understand the principle of Justice, but he makes a long analysis of John Rawls’ work “Theory of Justice” because it does not ignore power relations and their influence on the vision of current justice, even Habermas analyzed it.
The experience of injustice is made by ourselves as well as by other individuals and even more so by human groups, especially those who are at war because they consider the theft of their rights to be serious, but the experience of injustice requires deep reflection, especially in those cases where there is violence against victims and social injustice.
Ricoeur takes up Aristotle to analyze the “good life”, but it is necessary to clarify that it is not the pejorative sense of good life of scoundrels and opportunists used in common sense, in Aristotelian and ancient Greek language the good has an eminently ethical meaning, that is , the good that one seeks is inseparable from the good of the other, thus seeking peace and not conflict or the usurpation of goods as Eduardo Galeano classifies all wars, it is beyond any reprehensible selfishness, which demeans the subject, preventing him from achieving and be respected on a moral level.
In the essay truth is justice, from Justo 2, Ricoeur refers to the same expression that serves as the title of his book The other as a self, where he comments: “The formula of « Self as an other» is in this sense a primitively ethical formula, which subordinates the reflexivity of the self to the mediation of the otherness of the other.”
There is a deontological dimension that is not far from the theological in his thinking about the Just, Ricoeur’s ethics are not limited to the monologism inherent to Kantian formalism, present in John Rawls, at the same time that he refuses to appeal to feeling, let’s say to “heart” has a dimension of “delicacy” in respect for the Other.
Byung-Chul Han remembers in his book “On the exam” that only one relationship is symmetrical (we would say horizontal, without the power relationship): “respect” and it is this respect that leads us to understanding the Just in relation to the Other.
Thus, those who practice justice rarely seek the spotlight or their own shine, they know that in essence what they do is a relationship of respect for the Other, different and diverse.
Ricœur, P. (1995) Le Juste 1. Paris: Éditions Esprit.
The clearing and the forest
18
Jun
Ontology is that scientific vision where Being 
must be present, even if wrapped and unfolded around beings, beings are that which designates everything that “is”, that is, it refers to the present participle of the verb to be, thus Heidegger will thinking about what the being of beings is, in short, everything that is related to the world we live in, but never forgetting that it is in it that Being lives.
Thus the philosopher thought of truth from the Greek word alétheia (a- no, lethe – hidden), this is the act of unveiling the truth of Being and its relationship with beings in time, truth is then distinct from the common concept that considers it as an objective descriptive state.
For Heidegger, however, there is a fundamental difference between Being and Entity, Being refers to the foundation of existence and ways of existing, while Entity corresponds to concrete existence, or, human reality, as a presence in the world, thus generally we think about the Being of Entities (the cacophony is intentional here) and not Being as Being.
Being as Being is this being-there (dasein without an exact translation, in my view, into Portuguese), the one that “exists” being the only entity that exists, the others are, but do not exist (as consciousness , or more recently as sentience) even though animals can have emotions and affective reactions.
In other words, sentience is the ability of beings to feel sensations and feelings consciously, thus avoiding negative, violent or temperamental reactions.
So the clearing is that encounter with your own truth, in the middle of the forest, there is a space where everything is revealed and our true Being meets and encounters the Other.
The being of the being, projected onto merely mundane things: money, facilities and achievements, finds a space for its active and contemplative life, everything around it is revealed, re-enchanted and has meaning, it is not easy or simple because the forest is still there and we continue to explore it in search of “beings” and we even find them, but again we have to go in search of new ones because it is not yet the clearing, it is different from Plato’s myth because there is a dual world there: the world of ideas and the world of the senses.
Modern man needs to place himself at the center of his Being and have a relationship of transitory ownership with entities, everyday things and the real world.
Modern man needs to place himself at the center of his Being and have a relationship of transitory ownership with entities, everyday things and the real world.
In the biblical narrative we must always love the Other, even asking and praying for those who do not want our good, this limits us from shooting at beings as Being.
Stories of a future life
14
Jun
There are many visions and even prophecies
about the contemporary polycrisis, it goes beyond thinking and reaches social life, politics and wars on a worrying scale, but the
The question is what are the reasons to have hope, and at the same time what Edgar Morin called “resistance of the spirit”, in the final sections of The crisis of Byung-Chul, he criticizes current politics: “political narratives offer the perspective of a new order of things, they paint possible worlds… we drag ourselves from one crisis to the next. Politics is reduced to problem solving. Today we precisely lack future narratives that give us hope.” (Han, 2023, p. 132).
The solution to specific and emergency problems is the solution to great problems, the “works” it can be visible and bring popularity to those in power, when they should have both the long-term perspective and the notion that they are short-term solutions implemented sparingly that lead to long-lasting, sustainable and effective responses and concludes Byung-Chul: “every action that transforms the world presupposes a narration” (idem) and thus there are few cases of immediate responses that are lasting.
There is a well-known narration that a young woman asks the man who was planting dates “why do you waste time planting what you are not going to harvest”, the man turned and he replied: if everyone thought like you, no one would eat dates.
The idea that things can be quick and simple is present in today’s storytelling: how to lose weight effortlessly, how to learn this or that complex job in just a few lessons, how to speak clearly and simply about a problem with a complex solution and many other “magic” formulas that have little magic and enchantment, are narratives that aim to sell and easily consume products whose effectiveness is questionable.
The first idea is to understand medium and long-term solutions, second is to be suspicious of easy solutions that are not lasting and third to admit that a complex problem it requires a longer narration and silent listening to different voices and different listenersto listen carefully.
To a biblical saying that says that the Kingdom of God is like a mustard seed (one of the smallest seeds), you plant it, in years it grows and becomes a leafy tree and only it depends on its own nature and waiting time (Mark 26-27).
Says Byung-Chul Han in his final paragraph: “in the world of storytelling, everything is reduced to consumption. This blinds us to narratives, other ways of life, other perceptions and realities” (p. 132-133).
Han, Byung-Chul (2023). A crise da narração. Trad. Daniel Guilhermino. Petrópolis: ed. Vozes.
Justice, fairness and morality
13
Jun
The three words are important at a time of great
crisis in thought and the idea of justice, even though it has already been explored by authors such as Jurgen Habermas (we mentioned in a previous post on the issue of inclusion of the Other) and we quote in passing the two volumes by Paul Ricoeur o Justo (volume two published by Martins Fontes) the author says it is an essay, however it penetrates a deeper aspect, the question of truth and morals.
Reading the text, Inclusion of the Other by Habermas, clarifies that in philosophical terms, that morality in John Rawls, in Kantian terms, has differences between Kant’s original political liberalism and Kantian republicanism, which is how Rawls defends it, this would be enough, but there is a long analysis in Volume 1 by Paul Ricouer on justice in Rawls.
To understand Ricoeur’s book 2 it is necessary to understand that for the Greeks the first philosophy is that which for them, and the ontological resumption has to do with this, metaphysics as questions about Being, existence, the cause and the meaning of reality and physis (nature) must be placed prior to the second, aspects linked to logic and ethics.
Book 2 addresses what seems most essential in Ricoeur, although he confesses that it is an essay, its goal is “to justify the thesis that theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy are of equal levels; as none of it is first philosophy in relation to what Stanislas Breton characterized as the meta- function (I myself defended this reformulation of metaphysics in terms of the meta- function, in which “the maximum genres” of the dialectic of Plato’s last dialogues would be united and Aristotelian speculation on the plurality of the meaning of being or beings) “ (Ricoeur, 2008, p. 63) … but he did not speak (initially it was written in a conference) about this but rather about the two second philosophy.
His analysis is based “initially, thinking about justice and truth without each other; in a second moment, think about them in a way of reciprocal or crossed presupposition” (Ricoeur, 2008, p. 64) and this undertaking “has nothing revolutionary, it is located in the line of speculations about transcendentals…” (idem) .
When approaching the first stage of the analysis: “I thought of Rawls’ statement at the beginning of Théorie de la justice: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just as truth is the first virtue of theories” (pg. 65) and There the author takes up the ethical part of another text of his: Soi-même comme um autre, to “guarantee the eminent status of justice”.
The idea developed there is that this triad leads to “equity”, it is not the dualism between the Self and the Other (the next one also uses Ricoeur), “the triad belongs to the horizontal axis and does not consist absolutely in the simple juxtaposition between the self, the near and far; it is the same dialectic of the self. The desire to live well roots the moral project of life, in desire and lack, as marked by the grammatical structure of the desire… but without the mediation of the other two terms of the triad, the desire for a good life would be lost in the darkness of the variable figures of happiness… I would say that the short circuit between wanting a good life and happiness is the result of ignorance of the dialectical constitution of the self” (pg. 66).
The author formulates the idea of distance in these terms: “fair distance, a middle ground between the very little distance typical of many dreams of emotional fusion and the excess of distance fueled by arrogance, contempt, hatred of the strange, unknown. I would see in the virtue of hospitality the closest emblematic expression of this culture of just distance” (pg. 66).
Justice on the vertical axis, that of power and norm, is seen by the author as follows: “on the vertical axis that leads to the pre-eminence of practical wisdom and, with it, justice as equity, a first observation can be made regarding the relationship between kindness and justice. The relationship is neither one of identity nor difference; goodness characterizes the goal of the deepest desire and, thus, belongs to the grammar of wanting. Justice as a fair distance between the self and the other, found as distant, is the fully developed figure of kindness. Under the sign of justice, good becomes common-good” (pg. 67).
I consider the triad to be the self, the other and the distant, if also seen as a transcendent alterity, there is another “unknown” that can be divine and a carrier of messages, in network theory for example the “weak link” is considered fundamental , Ricoeur’s essay is rich, however, when returning to the question of the Kantian categorical imperative, which justifies political idealism, I believe that Habermas is correct in stating that this is the mistake in John Rawls’ consistent and very current “A Theory of Justice”. influential.
A part of the biblical reading can expand the concept of this distant as transcendent otherness (Mt 5,20): “Unless your righteousness is greater than the righteousness of the teachers of the Law and the Pharisees, you will not enter the Kingdom of Heaven”, which in the deontological sense one could say “you will not enter into the truth of justice”.
A part of the biblical reading can expand the concept of this distant as transcendent otherness (Mt 5,20): “Unless your righteousness is greater than the righteousness of the teachers of the Law and the Pharisees, you will not enter the Kingdom of Heaven”, which in the deontological sense one could say “you will not enter into the truth of justice”.
Ricoeur, P. (2008) Justo 2: justiça e verdade. (Fair 2: justice and truth and other studies). Trans. Ivone C. Benedetti. Brazil, São Paulo: Martins Fontes.
