Philosophy of testimony
10
Aug
The philosophy of testimony (also, epistemology
of testimony) considers the nature of language and the confluence of knowledge, which occurs when beliefs are imposed between speakers and hearers through testimony. Testimony constitutes words, gestures or statements that convey beliefs.
According to Nick (2023) what we know about the world: history, science, politics, each other, etc. comes from the testimony of other people, although it is indispensable for knowledge, specifying exactly how we are able to learn from a speaker’s opinion is a very difficult task, what I point out personally is our ability to open and listen (or read).
Still on the author, testimony is the basic source of justification, but can it be reduced to a combination of other epistemic sources, such as perception, memory and interference?
Another question is: can testimony generate knowledge or just transmit it?
It can be understood as only individual (in the sense that one’s testimonial justification depends entirely on factors related to oneself), or it must be seen as anti-individualistic (in the sense that one’s testimonial justification depends on one, at least in part , from factors that have to do with yourself) ?
How to understand the testimony between an expert and a new one?
Do groups witness? And if so, how can we learn from the opinion of a group?
What is the testimony itself? (since it is not to be confused with narrative, but with experience).
In his work, the author clarified that these are not the only questions, citing other authors such as M. Fricker (2007) who takes the issue of crediting testimonies that gave rise to an epistemic injustice, there are also interesting questions regarding eyewitness testimony and the law (Wells & Olson, 2003) and (Burrogghs & Tollefsen, 2016), as well as witness and affirmation (Pagin, 2007 [2016]).
There is also what he considers particularly important, which is a growing literature on moral and aesthetic testimony, and the author gives the example of the opinion of a friend who believes that eating roast beef is morally wrong because only his friend tells him so.
However, the author focuses on the issues mentioned above.
The witness must therefore be a leaven of truth and have experience in order to be credible.
Burroughs, Michael D. and Deborah Tollefsen, (2016), “Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child”, Episteme, 13(3): 359–377.
Fricker, Miranda, (2007), Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
Pagin, Peter, (2007 [2016]), “Assertion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/assertion/>
Wells, Gary L. and Elizabeth A. Olson, (2003), “Eyewitness Testimony”, Annual Review of Psychology, 54: 277–295. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145028
