What contemporary ontology is not
20
Mar
Based on the works of social psychology, 
where Franz Brentano worked on two categories of Thomism: consciousness and intention, modern phenomenology was derived from Husserl and then from Heidegger, a deviation towards an ontology called continental, from Nicolai Hartmann and with it a well-known doctrine emerged. as ontic structural realism (OSR).
What seemed like an unveiling, an appropriate term used by Heidegger to infer his clearing, becomes confusing again, because OSR not only gained prominence but was subdivided into three doctrines: OSR1, which is the view that relations are ontologically primitive, but objects and properties are not; OSR2, which is the view that objects and relations are ontologically primitive, but properties are not; OSR3, which is the view that properties and relations are ontologically primitive, but objects are not.
Central to Heidegger’s ontology, as we said in the previous post, is the notion of ontological difference: the difference between being as such and specific entities, the error of current philosophy is beyond forgetting being, understanding being as such as a kind of ultimate entity, for example, as “idea, energy, substance, monad or will to power”, the first linked to contemporary “natural” philosophy and the last two to the social and power vision.
This error even had to be rectified in its “fundamental ontology”, focusing on the meaning of being, a project similar to contemporary meta-ontology, read the works of Michael Inwood (fundamental ontology) and Peter Van Inwagen, ( meta-ontology).
And all this seems essentially theoretical, but it is not, we are discussing ontic things and non-things (Byung Chul Han has an essay) and strategies and logics of power, which forget being.
Nicolai Hartmann is a 20th century philosopher, although his perspective is “continental”, he clarifies that the relative modalities of the senses depend on the absolute modalities and proposes this reality on four levels: inanimate, biological, psychological and spiritual, which form a hierarchy, even though its development is excessively schematic, there is the question of being, from which contemporary man escapes and puts not only these levels in check, but civilization itself.
The forgetfulness of being is fundamental to understanding the lack of temper and the crisis of meaning in life that is present in all human spheres, from politics, education to the spiritual.
Inwood, Michael (1999). «Ontology and fundamental ontology» A Heidegger Dictionary. [S.l.]: Wiley-Blackwell
Inwagen, Peter Van (1998). «Meta-Ontology». Erkenntnis. 48 (2–3): 233-50, 1998.
Ladyman, J. (1998) What is structural realism? Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.
