Arquivo para August 1st, 2017

The importance of Husserl’s phenomenology

01 Aug

The importance of Husserl’s phenomenology is that he performed at one strokeFenomenology1 the criticism of psychologism, through his most advanced post of his master Franz Brentano, to the characteristic relativism of our time and modernity and to historicism in a work little known to JF Lyotard) he stressed: “the Cartesian hope of a Mathesis universalis is reborn in Husserl” (1957: 6), although Lyotard later criticizes it.

The theme of epoché is not to return to a return to the classical theme of antiquity, but to what he called the “thesis of a presupposition: man is immersed in a kind of general ‘, ie an implicit understanding of the world; The world is then essentially familiar to man, and it is within this naturality that one intends to say what it is to know the real:

“I am aware of a world that extends endlessly in space, which has an endless development in time … I discover [the world] by an immediate intuition, I have experience of it” (1991: 37).

He understands by a natural attitude, that which does not cease “to realize the world as ontologically valid … My life in all its acts is part oriented to the being that belongs to that world, … are interests by things of the The world, being realized in acts concerning these things, as long as they are correlate of my intention. “(1989, 519).

So it is about this “being in the world” (Husserl was a pupil of Heidegger and his expression is earlier), it is a Selbstverständlichkeit, and this can not be doubted, then how is his epoché realized? Is to become skeptical and like this as abstention from the inconstancy in the “spectacle of the world,” or what Husserl defined as “distance from naive natural validations” (Husserl, 1989, 154), but clarifies that it is not the “Criticism of knowledge”.

The consciousness of the natural environment as an “existing reality” (perhaps perhaps Heidegger took his Dasein), but he questions the duration of this attitude: “It is something that persists as long as the attitude lasts, that is, as much as the life of consciousness Vigilante follows its natural course “(Husserl, 1991, p.96).

What is important and this is in his booklet Cartesian Meditations, it is not a question of establishing a “universal doubt” because it does not put the being in doubt, but only its attributes, so assumes universalist tensions, and now it is the phenomenology that can, with propriety , To be conceived as transcendental, since it allows for epoché a “total alteration of the natural attitude of life” (Husserl, 1989, 168), putting objectivity as such in check.

The epoché is then “a certain suspension of the insurrection which is compounded by a persuasion of the truth that remains unshaken” (Husserl 1991: 100).

When we operate this original epoch, Lyotard’s study of phenomenology in 1956 also pointed this out, shows the insufficiency that Descartes’s radical procedure as a doubt had limitations, as Husserl says:

“Since every thesis or judgment can be modified with full freedom, and that every object on which judgment is referred can be put in parentheses, there would remain no room for unmodified judgments, let alone for a science.” Husserl, 1989, p.102).

HUSSERL, E. The crisis des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcedentale. Trad. G. Large. Paris: Gallimard, 1989.

HUSSERL, E. Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie. Trad. Paul Ricoeur. Paris> Gallimard, 1991.