Arquivo para 2019

Counterfeiting and beliefs

22 Nov

For Popper, to support the objective world, he hoped to provoke what he called “philosophers of belief” (Popper, 1972, p. 109), namely “Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, or Russell are interested in our subjective beliefs. in its basis of origin ”and thus placed it in its third world (beyond the physical and cognitive) as“ the world of objective content of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thinking and of works of art ”(Popper, 1972, p. 108). ), but his worldview is expressed in the extent of his work, and this is his beyond.
What involves beliefs is not only religious acts, but the fixation on dogmas, or rather the construction of “objective content of thought” that seems to give us certainty where it is only apparent, and thus we fall into the easy path of “induction”. as Hume wanted.
The falsifiability method is not just a way of staying in the critique of science, but it is first of all to point out that many beliefs are “beliefs,” and beliefs themselves can help the human worldview if they understand that they should not be limited. purely to dogmas, I make a single argument using Popper… without criticism there would be no human progress.
These are times of disbelief, and unfortunately it strikes even the most dear to us, human life, there is little appreciation and little discomfort for the vulnerability of life, and beyond human contempt for nature and the planet seems to be. common voice.
But everything is a mark of an end of the epoch, and thought can and should play a very important role in a turn of the epoch, and in the matter of science falsifiability, responsible criticism is clear, and transdisciplinarity can be an essential exercise, yet. little done.
Criticism can be misunderstood, I see many “inductive” thoughts that thinking is not good, if we don’t think and just let the waves go we will go to uncertain destinations.
However, to think is necessary method, and what should be obvious but is not, to be lover of the truth beyond our convictions, to respect and to hear the Other with openness, and to know to go beyond. One phrase said in the revolutionary walls of the Sorbonne of Paris: “our ears have walls, our walls have ears”, it is necessary to superior several types of authoritarianism, and the most serious of all, the non-acceptance of the Other, which is not what we idealized, beyond, simply Other.
Evangelist Luke is the one who essentially follows the “way” of Jesus, so I would say in scientific or hermeneutic terms, the one who gives us “the method of Jesus”, the way in which he narrates his end near his death on the cross is narrated in this perspective.
In Lc 23,40-43, Jesus conducts the dialogue with the two thieves, would say that it is his “falsifiability” to speak of life near his death and in dialogue with two thieves, one mocking and the other asking that he be in his kingdom.
To those who believe the only saint with confirmation of Jesus is a thief (Lk 23:43): “You will still be with me in paradise today,” ironically the only one confirmed by Jesus, there was no other.
This near-death thief could see further: “Remember me in your reign.”
POPPER, k. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo (Objective Knowledge), Ed. University of São Paulo (Brazilian edition), 1975 (original 1972).


Common sense and critical science

21 Nov

It may seem that Popper’s critique of Hume, and directly in some books or directly in others as well as Kant, is only a theoretical problem, but there is something profound about addressing the real question about irrationality or ignorance beyond induction: the common sense.
Popper states in the preface to the English edition of Objective Knowledge (1972) (brazilian edition 1975): “I am a great admirer of common sense, which I claim is essentially self-critical”.
But if I am willing to uphold the essential truth of common sense realism to the end, I regard the common sense theory of knowledge as a subjectivist blunder. ”(Popper, 1975, p. 7).
After making a “tabular” summary of several common sense theory thinkers, he concludes that the attempt to maintain “common sense theory as an integral whole – realism plus common sense epistemology – tends to crumble… and the latter can be rejected. and replaced by an objective theory that uses the former. ”(Popper, 1975, p. 107).
Despite Plato and Hegel’s criticism, his lectures “A theory of the Platonic world” or “A theory of the objective spirit,” as the titles themselves confer, are the dialogues made with these theories, which will define what he calls the ´third world´”, it is in Popper’s most general view.
Although he says he uses “world” and “universe” without taking words seriously, his worldview or worldview is serious indeed, when we read that the other two worlds are:
“the first, the world of physical objects or material states: second, the world of states of consciousness or mental states, or perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act, and third, the world of objective content of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thinking and of works of art” (Popper, 1975, p. 108), which reveals influences but also their originality.
It admits the influences of Plato, Hegel and include that of Bolzano (had a theory of the universe as propositions and truths), and in the end admits the influence of “Frege’s universe of objective content of thought” (Popper, idem).
Different because it says what your thinking experiences are, the first surprising for the contemporary world is the experience that “all machines and equipment are destitute… but libraries and our ability to learn from them survive.
Clearly, after much suffering, our world can continue to walk ”(pp. 109-110). In the second as before, experience that machines and equipment are destitute: “as well as our subjective learning, including our knowledge of machines and equipment and how to use them.
But this time, all libraries have also been destitute, so our ability to learn from books becomes useless. ”(P. 110).
Italics are from the original. In stating experience as “subjective learning”, where even books are useless, it is contrary to Frege’s own thinking which quotes on the following page: “By thought I mean not the subjective act of thinking, but its objective content…” (Frege in Popper, 1975, p. 111).
It will say using the Oxford dictionary that knowledge is “being aware or informed,” but the information here is like books and not subjective / ontological information.

POPPER, K. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo, Editora Universidade de São Paulo, 1975. (original english version 1972).


Popper’s solution to empiricism

20 Nov

Recognizing as important the division between the logical and psychological problem, Popper’s solution to Hume’s induction was to reformulate HL (logical) by replacing it with ‘test assertions’, ‘basic assertions’ or ‘observation’, and will create two claims L1 and L2 (Popper, 1975, p. 18).

L1 is the claim that a universal explanatory theory would be true for “empirical reasons”, assuming Popper’s test and observation assertions, and his answer is no. L2 is the claim extending L1 and admitting the hypotheses that a universal explanatory theory can be either true or false for “empirical reasons” and in this case its answer is positive.

But Popper will recall that Hume has also proposed competing theories, that is, whose formulations do not agree, and the problem of choosing between various theories requires a new L3, suggesting a third claim of the problem of induction.

L3 is may a “preference” (author’s emphasis) with respect to truth or falsity, for some universal theories in competition with another, be justified for “empirical reasons”, yes but the author himself adds “if we are lucky” ( page 19), and I add there may be mysterious theory, which is not yet known and may come to light, this is the ontological reason, and is related to Being.

The author points out that the negation of L1 must be viewed as “all laws or theory as hypothetical or conjectural, that is, as assumptions” (Popper, 1972, p. 20). Of course (psychological) HPS is related to this, but Popper’s complementary solution will come in the formulation of the worlds, but before this it goes a long way in science.

In this way I point out his disagreement with Gilbert Ryle who states that certain hypotheses, in Popper’s case, means “proposition… which only conjectures to be true” (page 20), and that for Hyle there are “firm” propositions and these “are called laws, not hypotheses ”.

This was the opinion of many when Popper wrote Logic of Scientific Research (1959) in which he states that the logic of induction often leads “from singular (… or particular) statements, such as descriptions of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories.” (Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Research, 1972, p. 27).

There is always a “logical” leap from private to universal, but the most serious problem in postmodernity is that “general” or universal theories are no longer seen as such. Induction is an important problem because it is through it that we prove our “theories” that justify our “beliefs”, but often they are beliefs and induction is purposeful, we can, for example, find confirmations of our political view and when there are not, We say you see it is linked to harmful ideologies, there is no logical argument, but only induction.

Thus the evidence confirming a particular theory should not be taken into account, unless the test is genuine of this theory, as it can be said as in phenomenology, the object has its own method, but of course this is different from Karl’s theory of falsificationism.

Popper The criterion of the scientific status (Popper uses instead of law) of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability or testability, so the problem of narrative in science is rejected.

POPPER, K. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo, Editora Universidade de São Paulo, 1975 (original english edition 1972). 



Popper and the induction

19 Nov

Idealism had a complement without which the “world of ideas” would become only metaphysical, just what it thought it denied, its complement was empiricism, and that is the question now.

While idealism will find its climax in Hegel, modern materialist theories are also Hegelian, the issue of empiricism is more recent and can be said unresolved, at least at the theoretical level, Popper said on this subject: “The formulations that have now become traditional are historically very recent in date: they spring from Hume’s critique of induction and its impact on the common sense theory of knowledge” (Popper, 1972, p. 14), he goes on. quote Bertrand Russell, but there were others.

Popper summarizes Hume’s proposal on two levels, one that will use the acronym HL (Logical Problem) and one that will use the acronym HPS (Psychological Problem), the first part of repeated problems that we experiment with and the second that wise people “believe”. what examples of you without experience will conform to those of you who have experience… that is, do we have expectations in which we place great confidence? ” (Popper, 1972, p. 15) and will say that this comes from habits.

Popper says that Hume’s distinction is “of the utmost importance” between the logical problem of the psychological problem because it equates “valid inference processes” but sees it as “rational mental processes” (Popper, 1972, p. 17), in fact they are subjective and psychological, like “belief”.

Popper thus treats the logical problem, as it is in philosophy and the exact sciences (the term nature is used, which I prefer to differentiate), it is applied to HL (logical) and then goes to HPS.]

The psychological problem led Popper to criticize Hume’s system, what he calls the principle of transference, which is true for logic will also be true for psychology, which is undoubtedly “a somewhat bold conjecture in the psychology of cognition or thought processes.”(idem).

With his principle of transference Popper can present his main result which is, “Hume being certain that there is no repetition induction in logic, by the principle of transference, there can be no such thing in psychology (or scientific method or history). of science): the idea of ​​repetition induction must be the product of error… repetition induction does not exist.”(Popper, 1972, p. 18).

One can explore the consequences of empiricism beyond science, as in politics (The Open Society), but in the scientific method using Popper’s argument this will be definitive, empiricism is irrational. Karl Popper’s Trinity College (Oxford) interview with Sir Anthony Quinton illustrates this extension of his thinking in philosophy and politics:




Science and Karl Popper

18 Nov

One of the greatest contributions to the thinking of science remains little known, one of the great masters of the philosophy of science of our time Karl Popper (1902-1994), though quoted and influencing virtually every area of ​​human knowledge, is still poorly read. Born in Vienna, he emigrated to New Zealand and after the end of the war became a teaching assistant at the London School of the Economics in scientific method and became a teacher in 1949.

Received direct influence from the Vienna circle having worked on his doctorate with Moritz Schlick, Circle coordinator, with the thesis Zur Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie (On the question of the method of psychological thinking), then wrote his work in German, which would have an English edition. rewritten in 1959, which modified some points. Among the changed points is the question of method: “an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability; an asymmetry that results from the logical form of universal statements.

For they are never derivable from singular statements, but may be contradicted by singular statements “(page 19 of the English edition). He was a supporter communism but became adept at the liberal ideas of Ludwig Von Misses and F. Hayek, wrote in 1945 the book “Open society and its enemies”, showing the dangers of totalitarianism and in its democratic ideas the state should have limited and controlled power.

This book, too, was later revised in 1966, when it was published the 4th. edition.

He has published several books, including (books published in Portuguese), objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach (ed. Itatiaia, 1972, ed. USP, 1975), The Misery of Historicism (Cultrix, 1980), Critical Rationalism in Politics (Don Quixote, 1987), Open Society, Open Universe (1987), The Open Universe – Arguments for Indeterminism (Don Quixote, 1988), The Myth of Context. Lisbon: Issues 70, 1999) and The World of Parmenides: Pre-Socratic Enlightenment (ed. UNESP, 2014).

He was opposed to Bertrand Russell of the scientific idea of ​​induction from Hume’s empiricism, but he also opposed justificationism, which opposes the idea of ​​reason to the theory of reason, and as Bartley he was “the first unjustified philosophy. of criticism in the history of philosophy”.

His scientific method is in favor of falsificationism, according to which a theory in the empirical sciences can never be proved, but can be falsified, which means it must have decisive experiments, although not every theory can have them.

Received the Kyoto Prize, a kind of Japanese Nobel Prize, but in distinct areas of the Nobel Prize, is seen as a contribution to the work of humanity and its areas are: advanced technology, basic science, art and philosophy, the prize itself shows Japanese education. more open than the western, Karl Popper was awarded in 1992 in the field of philosophy.

Here’s the video of your political vision in a documentary called Philosophy against False Prophets:



Being, Appearance, and Selfhood

15 Nov

In both philosophical and juridical representation, there are two subjects, one that is and one that represents it. In the presentation it means that the Being is in relation to the Entity.

It was only in belief. For example, the president of a country is his presentation, so if any attack or violence means that the country is under attack, of course made exceptions to dictators who are not worthy representatives of popular will, but in philosophy the Being of the Entity, it is veiled, who he is.

Dasein is the Heideggerian response to this Being and the modern confusion the question of Identity, Freud’s Ego, the Cartesian code, and other proposals, but let us read two current ones.

The concept of identity is used to describe something that is different from others, but identical to itself, most definitions fall between identity and difference as dualism and not as presence of the Other, it is from a deep reading of Husserl that this change.

We already warned in the previous post, that Being is being, for a more precise definition let us use Husserl who sees it from his experiences: “This act passes, but I am and remain from now on a self that decided this way or that. , […] while it [the decision] is valid for me, I can come back to it often ”(Husserl, 2000: 83).

Paul Ricoeur makes a breakthrough when he analyzes the duality he perceives and manifests himself as an equal identity (sameness, being identical with himself and unchanging in time) and ipse-identity (ipseity, personal and reflective identity, shaped by alterity), and this is the presentation of Being in the Being.

The alternation carried to the utmost is the ability to put oneself in the place of the other, evidences both the selfhood of oneself and another, and one does not allow oneself to think without the selfhood, does not nullify the Self.

It is only in this reflective ipse-identity that the possibilities for change fit, different from the iden-identity which is genetic, being a form of primary socialization unable to see the Other.

The need for a “social democracy” (portuguese term of priest Manuel Antunes) means a great cultural change where man will no longer see himself as a mirror, but in essence, in relation to the Other, and in society that will come in this reality.

It must be changing, as Jesus said when he saw men astonished with a temporal Temple. Luke 21: 6: “You admire these things, the days will come when there will be no stone unturned. Everything will be destroyed”, and did not speak of the end of the world, but great transformations that societies must go through.

HUSSERL Edmund, 2001. Cartesian Meditations: Introduction to Phenomenology. Sao Paulo: Ed. Madras, brazilian edition.

RICOEUR, Paul, 2000. Narrative identity and the problem of personal identity. Trad. Carlos João, Ed. Arquipélogo, Brazilian edition.


Being, the other and identity

14 Nov

Identity has been worked on by a number of authors, some in particular, the father of empiricism David Hume saw identity (the self) as his empirical argument starts from the idea that ideas are formed from previous impressions, so identity is a product. of various impressions, and as an empiricist he speculates on thought experiments.
Hume is important to the question of identity, although it fixes on his empiricism, because he is for modernity the complement of idealist logic, it can be said that it comes from Parmenides and Heraclitus reaching Aristotle, we know that Plato’s dialectic is different.
Hegel in his work Science of Logic will adopt logic, but with overcoming immediacy, ie the relationship with the other being has disappeared, there is only a relationship with himself, a relationship of negation, ie his being denies the relationship and from from denial he identifies himself, the act of looking in the mirror for example is a negation of oneself, an ‘image’, and that is identity.
The biblical text that says, “We still see ourselves as in a mirror in the Letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 13:12). Paul makes the reflection:“ Now, therefore, we see only a dark reflection, as in polished material; however, there will be a day when we will see face to face ”, I would say it is a historical prophecy, because much of philosophy, namely that which points to the ontological turn, says that this is the time of otherness, of seeing the Other beyond the self. .
But there may be some confusion because it is not a denial of identity, it is not a question of cultural, ethnic or religious identity, which are also dilemmas of our time, the fact that each has a personality, sees himself as a person, does not mean non-alterity.
It is just the opposite, it is easier and more possible to talk to people who see themselves beyond the mirror, it says in common language “they are resolved”, although we are always under construction, and it is precisely in this that the relationship with the Other helps, something like that. : “The more I know who I am, the more tolerant I am of the Other” and I want him to have his own personality and identity.
Also in the cultural and religious field this is so, if I have a clear conviction of my personality, my culture and my belief (not only about religious belief, science can involve “beliefs”), I can dialogue and be more tolerant of each other, and reciprocity.
Fundamentalism, dogmatism, and intolerance are the result of ignorance in general, and difficulty with one’s own identity in particular, if “I am” I am “in relation to the Other,” and there is no need for denial, but “epoché”, that is, put in parentheses. how does phenomenology think.


The originality of Being in Heidegger

13 Nov

The great question of Being in contemporary philosophy emerged from the thought of Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl from which he inherited phenomenology as a method, essentially proposed to penetrate the question of being.
Although it has been studied by philosophy at all times, even Kantian idealism has an ontology that is displaced from Being to the subject, it already existed in Plato as an idea (Platonic eidos is not Kantian) and Aristotle as substance.
The being does not manifest directly, but always with the being of the being, you can play a joke with the contemporaneity that is the sick Being, because the Being of the Being is hidden in appearance.
One can seek pure Being in an ethereal existence of a God, but it is the existential door through man that one has access to Being, in this case Heidegger is applying the phenomenological method, he departs from man in fact (not idealized by example), let it manifest itself as it is and only then try to understand it in its manifestation after the presence.
Its first existence is being-in-the-world, one of the most widely accepted translations for Dasein, but as this being is also a Being-in-Situation, Heidegger’s careful reading can clarify this, I make a translation of being-being itself. – in the world, because Heidegger also uses the worldview (Weltanstchauung), which is open to the world and the cosmos, including the worldview.
This concept is important for Heidegger’s understanding of Being because it means this worldview as the circle of beliefs, affects, interests, and even philosophical concepts that Being has, even if it does not study philosophy, Being is “being-in-a-situation” that It does not mean just place or even context, but the very vision one sees in seeing the world, its “worldview”.
So many ideas and beliefs seem obvious to a person, but practically all of them are tied to temporal situations and thus limited by the “situation” that does not exclude thinking.

This vídeo sumarizes some ideas from Hiedegger:


Science, conscience and complexity

12 Nov

Modern science, especially from the seventeenth century onwards, built a new world that renounced metaphysics, theory, and was methodologically rooted in the mathematical project of nature mastery and the experiments and measurements for this domain project.
But has dominated nature reacted and reacted in unthought ways, extreme climates whether from European summers or American colds, rains and burns, where even the oceans already show signs of depletion, dominate or destroy nature?
The very limits of science as logic and power are in check, will we rule our lives solely by markets and their values, do cold numbers say anything about man?
In addition to the physical and scientific paradigms about new technologies, there are emerging social problems that worry even those who have always taken advantage of markets, economist Federico Cingano in an OECD study said: “When income inequality increases, economic growth falls,” thus it is inevitable to approach the subject from any perspective.
Beyond the problem of consciousness, philosophically or technically, there is a social dimension that is correlated, not indifferent, this also holds for consciousness in the historical question.
Edgar Morin warns of the teaching system, where it is still hermetically taught: “We do not teach the understanding of the other, which is fundamental in our day, we do not teach uncertainty, what is the human being, as if our human identity does not it was of no interest.
The most important things to know are not taught, ”he said in the Fronteiras do Pensamento (Thought Borders), a Brazilian cultural program.
He sees the crisis of democracy as the obscure relationship with the “enormous powers of money, which has led to corruption everywhere.
The emptiness of thought, coupled with this corruption, leads to a loss of confidence in democracy, and this has favored the neutral authoritarian regimes as we have seen in Turkey, Russia, Hungary and as we now see in the crisis of democracy in Peru and Brazil, ”the case Bolivia today is a separate case.
He also sees with concern the fundamentalist and ethnic closure: “Unless people become aware of the human destiny community on earth, people will close in on their religious, ethnic identities, and so on.
We live in a dark period of history, the only consolation is that these dark periods are not eternal ”we believe in the future. Edgar Morin’s full interview on Thought Frontiers follows below:


The question of consciousness

11 Nov

The big issue for artificial intelligence was until recently autonomy, robots, autonomous machines and now autonomous cars, with all the controversy the project evolves, Germany, for example, already provides a line of autonomous cars for the next decade that will begin.

The new issue is the question of consciousness, it has occupied the minds of philosophers for over a century, and can conceptualize in general terms the ability to take actions and consequences of these actions, which has to do with autonomy, because autonomy It is to analyze the consequences of acts performed by machines, the limits of dangerousness and privacy.

In the context of social or historical consciousness, this was Gadamer’s great debate with Dilthey, to which he attributed a conception of romantic consciousness for the absence of a “historical mediation” from facticity, and asks “how will the task of hermeneutics ”and finds a common ground between Schleiermacher and Hegel” (Gadamer, 2002, Truth and Method, p. 256), with the concepts of reconstruction and integration, and according to him, Dilthey makes the intermediate path between them.

Gadamer explains: “Schleiermacher and Hegel could present the two extreme possibilities of answering this question.

Their answers could be assigned to the concepts of reconstruction and integration. For both Schleiermacher and Hegel, in the beginning there is the awareness of a loss and alienation from tradition, which is what drives hermeneutic reflection” (idem).

However, he will say, each of them will determine the task of hermeneutics differently, and what Gadamer calls reconstruction and integration means the separation of preconceptions and alienation from tradition, and therefore rebuild and integrate.

Schleiermacher’s famous thesis is “What matters is to understand a better author than one would have understood himself,” Gadamer thought about the work of art, but Schleiermacher is stuck with his conception of “history of the spirit” which is his concept.

What Hegel says, according to Gadamer, is the creation of a category by stating that the essence of the historical spirit is not the restitution of the past, but the mediation of thought with the present life, which is the prevalence and idealism of the ideal over the factual questions.

And the origin of consciousness, as it happened, is that Terence Deacon is right in claiming that the mind came from matter, and with it came consciousness, if it is true, it is possible to think that somehow the machine, on the levels of intelligence artificial, you may have “consciousness” and then you will know that it is machine and that we humans are not.

What we relate in the videos of Gadamer and Peter Sloterdijk was to introduce this question, and the question of truth is proposed as the genesis of historical consciousness (Gadamer, 2002, p. 265), so machine consciousness cannot have this level.

GADAMER H. G.(2002) Verdade e Método (Truth and Method), 4th ed., Tr. Flavio P. Meurer. Petrópolis: Vozes (Brazilian edition).