Arquivo para May 28th, 2019

The approach of difference without distinction

28 May

Before addressing the necessary introduction of distinction rather than difference, let us examine two thinkers who have worked on the issue of difference in contemporaneity.
The first is Jacques Derridá he who comes to be considered a “difference” philosopher (the translation taken from several different translators and interpreters to neographism différrance), comes from the text of the book Margins of philosophy initially, to present a justification for a new spelling of the question.
The main elements draws from Sausurre’s linguistics and introduces the semantic approach and philosophy of the same, and the controversial point with the discourse of contemporaneity is the idea of making an ontological approach to difference in a path that does not restrict the necessary linkage of being . In the text Derridá points out the difference as: “It has already been necessary to emphasize that difference is not, does not exist, is not a present being (on), whatever it is, and we will be led to accentuate what it is not, everything, and therefore, it has no existence or essence. “(DERRIDÁ, 191, p.37).
One can clearly see the polemic by the above phrase, but it is more complex still, the aspect that concerns Derridá’s approach is that it introduces the idea of difference by constructing a semantic and philosophical approach to it, both essential in language studies.
Another equally important author is Giles Deleuze, whose question is whether we need to represent the difference? the point in question makes four essential points of representation: identity in form the determined concept, analogy in the relation between ultimate determinable concepts, and, the opposition in the relation of determinations within the concept, and the similarity in the determined object of the own concept. In his first book, Difference and Repetition, Deleuze begins his study of the concept of difference and addresses, as we pointed out in the previous post, indifference, namely, the undifferentiated abyss or “nothing black “And also the” nothing white “.
The French philosopher says that “difference is generally distinguished from diversity or otherness,” since, according to him, Two terms differ when they are others, not by themselves, but by something” and here, it addresses the question of contrariety and contradiction, making it clear that only “a contrariness in essence or in form gives us the concept of a difference that is itself essential, “although enlightening adds little to what is distinct and needs distinction as a being, again repeats in a certain way the ontological argument of Derridá.
Deleuze, G. Diferença e Repetição. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2006.
Derrida, J. Margens da Filosofia. Trad. Joaquim Torres Costa, António M. Magalhães; revisão técnica Constança Marcondes Cesar. -Campinas, SP : Papirus, 1991.