Arquivo para August 7th, 2019

Psychopolitics and power

07 Aug

In reading Byung Chul Han’s book, I came across the idea that I couldn’t talk about his arguments without going back and commenting on his psychopolitics of power. In his book Psychopolitics – neoliberalism and the new techniques of power (figure), the Korean-German philosopher demonstrated that the techniques of oppression used now.
It is not those that were politically thought out by Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, so we talk about him last week, or Big Brother’s super-surveillance (not the unreal reality show), but what he called smartphone surveillance.
It states verbatim: “The confession obtained by force has been replaced by voluntary disclosure,” i.e., “Smartphones have been replaced by torture chambers.”, And it is not that the tortures have disappeared in Guantanamo or Venezuela.
It is possible by rereading (in the case of this blog a reading, as we have not done so) of Nietzsche’s will to power and the microphysics of Power that Chul Han does in his pamphlet “What is power” (HAN, 2019).
It rereads the word by saying that the meaning of things is not a “is-so,” but the meaning is given “as you name things, determining yours where and for what” (Han, 2019, p. 56). ), until the truth is ultimately “is allied with power” (Han, 2019, p. 57) thus being “the victory and the duration of a certain kind of truth” (idem) by quoting Nietzsche himself.
After quoting Foucault he will say “power is ultimately what it represses” (p. 62), and makes a brief historicity of this concept by stating that Hegel was the first to see it like this (I make a note with the state as an idolatry). ), then Freud and Reich, in my point in a stricter sense, that of psychology.
But he will object to an ever-negative view of power, in his right consideration: “power, however, is not based on repression” (Han, 2019, p. 63), and quoting Foucault himself, “power is productive, and produces the real ”(HAN, 2019, p. 64).
As he notes, it is a rarely referenced note by Foucault, for he “distrusts” a “nature” or an “essence” (p. 65), which the author deepens.