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Arquivo para October, 2019

The desired and not built peace

31 Oct

We know that the “pax romana” was the surrender to the empire that dominated the good face of the civilized world at the time, it is true today that there were already people in various parts of the planet, but their paleontological records do not leave many marks of their cultures, and perhaps as Rousseau thought ‘the good savage’ lived in peace, but in the natural conflict with nature.
The “eternal peace” elaborated by the idealists and idolized by the worshipers of the “modern state” is not deepened, because in fact for many this will be the state, excuse the final irony of humanity and should only be perfected. Kant published in 1798, in a Berlin magazine, the essay “Announcement of the forthcoming signing of a treaty for perpetual peace in philosophy”, which was a resumption of his essay two years earlier: “For perpetual peace”, that was confined in its philosophy.
This is because the goal was to resolve peace within a single state, or in terms of relations between different states, which we can see even with the emergence of the UN and the rise of democratic nations, which in essence the idea of state remains enlightened. .
From this essay it can be assumed that what the philosopher understood by philosophy means that if systems of philosophy found a solution to their conflicts they could help political systems to resolve their conflicts, so it remains in the idealistic field.
The conflict between object and subject, which supposes that it is in the object that is the conflict and not in the subject is the hypothesis of the idealism/enlightenment system, but it is in the facticity of the historical subjects that the conflicts are, I do not understand as the historicity romantic because facticity is the Heideggerian concept of the subject thrown into the world with his facts.
Thus, what is meant by peace beyond idealism is that which can be built on the facticity of everyday life, in every conflict encountered in every fact, without being confined to theoretical or philosophical assumptions, but where the “being thrown” is. in the world”.
Peace, therefore, is built and not an agreement between states or within them, the peace treaty of the 1st. world war led to the second, some readers of world history say, the fact is that there were two wars and the “modern” states not only did not avoid, but are authors. “If you want peace, build peace,” said an Italian politician, very few understanding this.

 

Anguish and the philosophy

30 Oct

A characteristic feeling of a crisis, of a philosophy, science or culture in crisis is anguish, it is so influential in philosophy that it gives meaning even to thinking, one would say philosophical anguish is part of deep feeling. of thinking.
The artist also has this feeling, but the aesthetic directs him, the image of the “scream” is the feeling expressed in Edvard Munch’s painting (1863-1944) portrays the anguish. Anguish, distress, and anxiety are related, and we live in a time when they become increasingly part of the plane of human existence, of scientific and social reflection, and relating it only to poverty is even greater poverty, although there is affliction yes.
According to Adam it was the anguish that preceded Adam’s sin by eating the forbidden fruit of paradise, but before he even knew what sin was, and this caused him to sin, it may seem like a paradox, but it is not, although this is only a metaphor.
It is kierkegaard himself that explains this, the fact that we have possibilities of choice, if we are not fixed in the state of non-self-conscious immediacy, is what leads us to reflection and with it the same possibility that we have of a conscious act without reflection it is that we have an unconscious act and that does lead us to sin, I would say the “true sin”.
It is the possibilities of choice, of our self-knowledge and personal responsibility, leading us from a state of non-self-conscious immediacy to self-conscious reflection, so reflection / anguish is good and makes us conscious in deeds.
Anguish is not despair, although it may be on the brink of it; on the contrary, it is hope.

The reflection of Brazilian professor Dr. Oswaldo Giacóia Jr about Kierkegaard is interesting for the topic:

 

Overworked and true empathy

29 Oct

Always smiling and needing to be happy can be altruism and even heroism of many people, which should give us confidence and empathy should be transparency, which is not always empathic. Of course, this does not mean being rude or rude, nor deviation from personality, but the relief of inner dualism in the face of truth, even when it is not sympathetic, makes one have greater internal coherence, which is not confused with identity.
Identity may be personal, group or cultural, sometimes confused with being conniving or convenient, but at the root this is falsehood, so empathy has its place in the face of truth and being, not always the social ethics that dictate rules of convenience. and “legality,” which has come to be called politically correct, but could well be politically convenient.
Since the 1930s, the Brazilian has been spoken of as the “cordial man”, although there is a great anthropological and historical distance from the politically correct, this would not be just the update.
Empathy should then be a good mood in the sense that the ability to calmly get into controversial issues and issues with a strong possibility of polarization, the world today needs this, and therefore confusing it with hypocrisy, easy smile or just tolerance can be “ cordial ”and may not be a true feeling.
In fact, doing to the other what we would like it to do for us, is not the empathic system, what neuroscience shows is that we have a set of neurons called mirror neurons that say that imitating the other is a more natural empathic form than To do something to another simply because we would like it done to us, deep down we are “asking” for something we want.

Empathy means the gift that everyone has to be able to feel what the other feels, so to speak of the Other is the true way of both finding an innate gift of humanity, neuroscience reveals, as well as making this truth explicit, we exist and feel the Other.
We only deny it by denying the self that has empathy as a natural “skill”, just by a constant denial training. There is, therefore, no true self without the Other, without the empathy with the Other, natural and not forced, which is thus made a staging and the Other will feel, empathy is thus ontological, part of Being.
The vídeo of  TedX by psyquiatrist Helen Riess is very interesting:https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=23&v=baHrcC8B4WM

 

 

Google’s quantum chip

28 Oct

The first important fact of the Sycamore chip, which works using quantum principles, is that it became known for a scientific article in the respected journal Nature.
Second is the speed and accuracy of the 200-second calculation that a supercomputer using the classic principles of binary digits would take 10,000 years to do.
The third important point is applications ranging from molecular processes that will benefit from this breakthrough, the development of better electric car batteries to replace fossil fuels, and less environmentally aggressive fertilizers.
The idea of bits is also at an end, as well as their duality, qubits can assume numerous states between 0 and 1, can also have simultaneous states, in a phenomenon called superposition, where they can represent 0 and 1 simultaneously, and with it itself a result beyond the technique.
You can handle even larger amounts of data than you do today with BigData, create chemicals or pharmaceuticals, and perform risk and safety analyzes quickly and accurately, for example, to avoid risk situations.
Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google and one of the authors of the article, states that “it will also allow us to understand the universe more deeply,” which means changing our worldview.
In the following video, Google’s demonstration of the supremacy of its quantum chip.

 

Idealism and Pharisaism

25 Oct

The pretense of idealism was to create a knowledge system capable of uniquely verifying the truth and for this purpose created a method that relates the subject to the object of knowledge, called transcendental reduction. Idealism split in two shortly after Hegel’s death in 1831, young Hegelians opposed groups of right-wing Hegelians or old Hegelians, who held the department’s chairs and other prestigious positions in university and government.

It was Ferdinand Lassale who defended the fundamental thesis of Hegelianism: “The State is God,” a phrase that Hegel himself was most cautious about. Hegel simply stated that it is “God’s course through the world that constitutes the state” and that in dealing with the state we must contemplate “the Idea, God Himself present on earth.” Only one thinker denounced this falsification of the idea of ​​religion at that time, was David Strauss (1808-1874), a Protestant liberal who wrote “The Life of Jesus” (Das Leven Jesu).

Already the young Hegelians saw the state apparatus as a claim for legitimacy based on religious doctrines, ideas that came from Lutheranism in Prussia, but wanted this theory to apply to any state, to this “fundamentalism” Marx will oppose, saying that it must think of the earth for the sky and not of “ideas” for the earth.

In germ, the ideas of fundamentalism, the almighty state, or the self-righteousness of the state must be governed by biblical “laws,” the whole new testament changes the idea of ​​law to that of man, the incarnation, and the living of faith, not relating it to the state, but people, will give these doctrines an amalgam for the fusion of idealism with religion.

The idea that theocentrism ended with the end of the middle ages is not to read carefully what Hegel proposed, albeit cautiously, but it is the idea that those who observe “the laws” are Christian.

The Bible gives a scandalous example of the tax collector, one who therefore performs the worst duties in the state and the Pharisee, one who follows the “laws” and thinks himself superior.

The biblical text says Luke 18: 11-13: “The Pharisee standing up, I prayed to him,“ O God, I thank you, because I am not like other men, thieves, dishonest, adulterers, nor like this collector. tax, I fast twice a week, and tithe all my income. ‘ But the tax collector stood at a distance, and did not dare look up at the sky, but beat his chest, saying, “My God, have mercy on me that I am a sinner!”

And in the end Jesus says that only one returned home justified.

 

 

Idealism and its religion

24 Oct

Beginning with the critique of idealism, in “The German Ideology” (1932), where he talks about Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, who even call them St. Buer and St. Stirner, for their claim to be theology.
If the essence of idealism is the separation of object and subject, I make a purposeful inversion, the essence of religious thinking for Ludwig Feuerbach is the separation of subject and sensible objects, for for him object consciousness can be, although distinct from itself, a consciousness that coincides shortly thereafter when dealing with the religious object, because of its “transcendence” is exactly what makes it return to self-consciousness, I explain.
For Feuerbach, and the sensitive object is out of being (though ontology here is only an appeal), the religious object is in it, it is an intrinsic object, and neither does it abandon it, its moral consciousness leaves it, it is an intimate object. , and even the most intimate, is the closest of all.
His critique of theology using idealism essentially presupposes a critical judgment, the “difference between the divine and the non-divine, between what is and is not worthy of worship,” so that with this dualism it is possible to play all the essence of the divine in the mass grave of the Ideal.
The consciousness of God is man’s consciousness itself to him, this is the Hegelian idealism made religion: the knowledge of God which is man’s self-knowledge, there is no God-self for man.
The negation of the subject is considered irreligious, and its relation to sensible objects, a negation of the subject, is the atheistic religion of Feuerbach, which Marx will turn to call them the Old Hegelians, and seeks to make their inversion here new now. from object to subject, here is the new “religious” version of the Young Hegelians, like Marx, even criticizing Feuerbach’s main atheistic thesis: “thought comes from the subject,” not the object.
It is no longer about Heaven to Earth,” said Marx, but now “from earth to heaven,” that is, from the object to the subject, the labor force and the production, to their divinization (of the object, of money, economy, etc.). If, for Marx, fetishization was the separation of labor from his instrument of labor and commodity, fetishization may be reification (res – thing) or objectification for these young “Hegelians”, where he sees the separation between subject and object. , in religious fetishism is the separation of (sinful) consumption of the individual (seen in self-awareness) to which the religious must “attend” and live his “concrete”. The fair relationship with money, work, health and education is only a surpassing of the idealistic religious view, its consummation in a man in harmonious relationship with the world, and in this case also beauty, poetry and life. healthy would have a perspective, for the “pure” religious not. This religiosity lacks an asceticism that in fact “elevates” them, although they seem as linked to contemporary themes, actually has an idealistic god and not pretending to be realistic as they would wish, their concrete is the modern state god their economy, or the positivist law and his narrow view of justice.

 

The crisis of Reason and Kant’s critique

23 Oct

What Kant has tried to solve in his Critique of Pure Reason, as its name implies, is that reason would not be enough, and thus I intend to make two critiques, namely the very idealism to which it proposes itself as a realist (although it seems contradictory, for the Kantians it is not), and the second is the Transcedental Deduction, the essence of their gnosiological method which confuses with another view of the transcendent, which is that of mystery, beyond the idealistic rational view.
What Kant called “transcendental realism” (of course there are several versions, including many that are contradictory to each other), was to conceive a critical distinction between epistemic conditions (it was Henri Allison who used this term) and are forms of systematization of knowledge with conditions. supposedly ontological, which are nonetheless ontic, for they are but possibilities of things themselves, and separate from the subject, is the idealistic transcendent.
Their refutation of idealism is viewed by the Kantians themselves as having: problematic, dogmatic, and empirical versions, which at bottom refer to the object of the “outside world,” that is, it contests every possibility of objective knowledge, and for this they hold or on the plane. empirical (clear through experience) or the transcendental plane, here as a resource for the subject to reach the plane of objects, in a clear separation between subjectivity and objectivity.
Kantian dualism remains in the problematic or dogmatic question, the former as a primacy of subjective awareness of perceptions and self-awareness of the domain of objectivity.
What characterizes Kant with his attempt to approach realism is in fact a transcendental dualist. It is because it ends by realizing the impossibility of knowing things as they are in themselves, and ends by defending isolation in subjectivity and a false interiority of presentations (making it present) and concluding, here, that it is dogmatic or skeptical that What we believe to be objective knowledge is actually a flow of perceptual impressions devoid of any objectivity, so the idealistic dualism of equidistant subject and object remains.
The way in which Kant will understand his “principled” relationship with self-awareness (in the Cartesian sense “I think”) and is with objective knowledge, must come along with his “deduction” which is essentially divergent with respect to his own. view of the Cartesian conception of the cogito, but both will not escape the conception of the ego, the transcendent self, or other analogies, which are well described in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations.
The instrumental reason that much of the idealist discourse struggles with the object of knowledge and its corresponding cognitive subject, its cognitive transcendence, will always be tied to the essential dualism of the separation of subject and object, its consequences to daily life are clear.
So what we think of everyday as objective, concrete or any substitute in the relationship with things, and with the knowledge of them as a result, will always be in the “outer world” or the physical world, with which the relationship will always remain under false mystery, subjectivity or the perceptions of self-awareness, or even, is an experience of the subject.

See the video about idealism realistic em TEDx of the Daniel Wong:

 

The crisis of reason: technophobia

22 Oct

It was not Gerard Lebrun who coined the term technology, it was Jean-Pierre Séris (1941-1994) who among several issues in his text “La Technique” talks about a “strange transformation” that recalls the memories of Kantian questions: “What should I do? What can I do? What am I allowed to wait for? ”And that he ironically said what seems increasingly common:“ What should I ignore? What should I refrain from doing? ”(Lebrun apud Novaes, 1996, p. 471).
Speaking of the impact of the technique, it will not exemplify with the digital world, but bioethics, as a science of survival according to its inventor the American Potter in 1970, but well reminds Lebrun that in 1995 the International Bioethics Committee declared the genome “common heritage”. of humanity ”, saying that 20 years earlier the speech stigmatized this“ technique ”.
Lebrun says that the author “never takes sides ideologically”, and moves away from what he calls “passionate speeches”, does not adopt a “contrary to technique detractors” stance and reassures that “nothing in this book minimizes the dangers this or that risky technological intervention could bring the biosphere or animal life ”(idem, p. 471).
Clarifying that criticizing “was never synonymous with demonizing: in using the word criticism, neither Marx nor Kant preached a witch hunt” (Lebrun, p. 472), and was by the way another text in the same book of the “crisis of reason” we used in the previous post, the dissent, to disagree is to dialogue.
Lebrun clarifies that the use of the “technology” anglicism, “which erases the difference between things and the discourse about the thing … even more criticizable is the technoscience neologism, used to designate, very nebulously, a symbiosis between technique and technology. science, whose modalities, most of the time, are not careful to need ”(idem), using the concepts of Séris.
The fact that users are ignorant of using a technical device does not mean that there is an “intrinsic malignancy of the technique” (p. 472), or is it sufficient that Chernobyl, or a major blackout in New York or even a boy who can get secrets out of the Pentagon from his computer … which we use all the time (the Thaumata, as the Greeks used to refer to machines), become, at least potentially, unethical objects again ”(pages 472- 3).
It is fear that wants us to inculcate control of “technological progress,” the author cites Hans Jonas in his work “The Principle of Responsibility” is what makes JP Séris dissatisfied, but he also draws on Bernard Sève’s arguments that what Jonah calls “second-degree power,” distinguishing him from first-degree power “that which man exercises over nature through technique, that is, from man’s traditional image and power of intervention, in always controllable principle ”(page 473).
Remember that this power comes from Bacon who created a formula for this power in the first degree, and that Jonah will say that in unleashing the power in the second degree it will be necessary “unless the sentence is dictated by the disaster itself, it is a power over the power. power, ”
Then, is nothing other than the failure of the Baconian ideal, but who agrees not to subdue nature? thus the problem is not of technique but of the original domination of nature. We thus return to the initial questions “What should I do? What am I allowed to wait for? ”Jonas himself acknowledges that one cannot know the long-term effects of either technology or drugs, so“ will not undefined fear lean us against innovation, in favor of abstention? ”(Pag 476), I add, is it not fear that drives tyrants to power?
LEBRUN, G.Sobre a Tecnofobia (About technophobia). In: Novaes, Adauto. A crise da Razão: (The crisis of Reason). São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996.

 

The crisis of Reason: the dissent

21 Oct

Much has been written about it, but usually without leaving it, it’s like postmodernity, everyone shudders at the term, but any serious thinker knows we’re in the end of the modern, which will come later only crystal ball, but read The signs and understanding what changes we are experiencing can help a lot.
First I explain the prison we live, years ago when reading Horkheimer’s book the “Eclipse of Reason”, original from 1947, that Editora Unesp did a good translation of German, the author analyzes the technoscientific signs of modernity, but as instruments of More than those who can take dangerous and arduous tasks out of the hands of workers, the economic subjugation of course continues, which will lead to a mechanistic analysis of the digital universe, which is something other than Fordism and Toyotism.
In the philosophical aspect the work is between “objective reason” and “subjective reason”, which is basically the realization of human potentials as ends, with the development of practical instruments that enable such goals, the “means”, without escaping beyond rationalism. of ideas of progress.
It was another work that aroused my analysis beyond rationalism and development and progress at all costs, a compendium parading several national authors on “The Crisis of Reason”(Companhia das Letras, 1996), among several interesting essays highlighting the Jacques Rancière “The Dissent” and Gerard Lebrun’s “About Technophobia”, written in 1996.
Rancière makes a correct analysis based on the idea that “the currently dominant discourse that identifies political rationality to consensus and the consensus to the very principle of democracy” (Rancière apud Novaes, 1996, p. 367), and made his criticism pointing out three paradoxes.
The first paradox is soon after the fall of the former Soviet Union its opponents while celebrating its fall, resumed the “objective necessity”, ie the idea of resuming the productive forces of development in full swing, emptying the alternatives, thus established the “consensus” democracy as “the pure regime of economic necessity” (idem).
The second paradox is the mismatch of political wisdom, criticizes the discourse “which glorifies the actor, the individual who argues, who hires, who acts” (idem), the less things are to be discussed, “the more the ethics of the discussion are celebrated. , of communicative reason, as the foundation of politics ”(idem), is not what he says, but paradoxically when there is less ethics and less dialogue.
The third paradox is almost a prophecy, which Rancière calls “the national consensus of political parties and the advent of the great supranational spaces, reappear the brutal, more archaic forms of ethnic wars, exclusion, racism, xenophobia” (Rancière apud Novaes, 1996, pp. 368), it should be noted that the text is old, but this revival of the “national” was already evident.
His discourse is more complex as the text progresses, highlighting a passage that I consider important about consensus: “In its ordinary statement, consensual wisdom is presented as a thesis on the evolution of the politician summarized in the following idea: The old form of politics, that of conflict, has lapsed. The modern form is that of covenant, to deal between responsible partners…” (idem, p. 378), that is to say, it is not consensual, therefore, the dissent.
Ranci{ere, J.  (1996)O dissenso. In: NOVAES, A. A crise da Razão. Sâo Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996.

(in Picture, between among several paintings in text, I chose the Divine Freedom of Goya).

 

For a spiritual ascesis

18 Oct

What we see beyond the crisis and cultural night, beyond a deep social crisis without a thought that catalyses the real forces of society that point to the future, is also a night of God, educator Martin Buber describes it as God’s Eclipse.
Buber wrote in his book: “I later built for myself the meaning of the word ‘mismatch’, through which was roughly described the failure of a true encounter between human beings. When, after another 20 years, I saw my mother, who had come to visit me, my wife, and my children from afar, I couldn’t look into her still astonishingly beautiful eyes without hearing the word “mismatch” somewhere as if it were. tell me.
I suppose that everything I have experienced over the course of my life about the authentic encounter has its first origin at that time in the gallery. ”(BUBER, 1991, p. 8). Thus revealing the true face of the “silence of God” of Judaism in which it has its roots, will be in another book the “I-Thou” where he will reveal an aspect of his asceticism which is “the encounter with the Other”, which for Buber more. than one person, your Tu has a divine essence, God inhabits the other.
These days there are two strong tendencies, and in both asceses there is in fact no spirituality beyond transcendence, or the activism that Byung Chul condemns as the “active vita” that leads to tiredness, or the idealistic subjectivism that can It seems to be religion but it is not, what it arouses is nothing but sentimentality, and can lead to “faithful” tears, not necessarily to God, if they do discover Him they must seek another true asceticism.
Thus it is possible that they will find God in one way or another, but there is no other way to remain in the faith, not of the blind but of those who have found a clearing, if indeed meditation and prayer are to remain, they are indispensable.
For those who have no faith, a good reading, separating passages and thoughts, living the moment as we wrote in the previous post, is fundamental, that is, also for reading can follow the rule of doing it without “gluttony”, try put the soul in silence, making a true “epoché”.
To those who believe always reflect that Jesus prayed, and asked his disciples to pray with him, and not to lose this practice, Jesus will tell the parable of the bad judge who does not want to attend the widow, but by his insistence and so that she does not. he curses, he answers, says the opening passage: “Jesus told the disciples a parable to show them the need to pray always, and never give up…”, which is in Luke 18: 1.
BUBER, Martin. (1995) Eclipse de Dios. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995.