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Arquivo para November 20th, 2019

Popper’s solution to empiricism

20 Nov

Recognizing as important the division between the logical and psychological problem, Popper’s solution to Hume’s induction was to reformulate HL (logical) by replacing it with ‘test assertions’, ‘basic assertions’ or ‘observation’, and will create two claims L1 and L2 (Popper, 1975, p. 18).

L1 is the claim that a universal explanatory theory would be true for “empirical reasons”, assuming Popper’s test and observation assertions, and his answer is no. L2 is the claim extending L1 and admitting the hypotheses that a universal explanatory theory can be either true or false for “empirical reasons” and in this case its answer is positive.

But Popper will recall that Hume has also proposed competing theories, that is, whose formulations do not agree, and the problem of choosing between various theories requires a new L3, suggesting a third claim of the problem of induction.

L3 is may a “preference” (author’s emphasis) with respect to truth or falsity, for some universal theories in competition with another, be justified for “empirical reasons”, yes but the author himself adds “if we are lucky” ( page 19), and I add there may be mysterious theory, which is not yet known and may come to light, this is the ontological reason, and is related to Being.

The author points out that the negation of L1 must be viewed as “all laws or theory as hypothetical or conjectural, that is, as assumptions” (Popper, 1972, p. 20). Of course (psychological) HPS is related to this, but Popper’s complementary solution will come in the formulation of the worlds, but before this it goes a long way in science.

In this way I point out his disagreement with Gilbert Ryle who states that certain hypotheses, in Popper’s case, means “proposition… which only conjectures to be true” (page 20), and that for Hyle there are “firm” propositions and these “are called laws, not hypotheses ”.

This was the opinion of many when Popper wrote Logic of Scientific Research (1959) in which he states that the logic of induction often leads “from singular (… or particular) statements, such as descriptions of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories.” (Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Research, 1972, p. 27).

There is always a “logical” leap from private to universal, but the most serious problem in postmodernity is that “general” or universal theories are no longer seen as such. Induction is an important problem because it is through it that we prove our “theories” that justify our “beliefs”, but often they are beliefs and induction is purposeful, we can, for example, find confirmations of our political view and when there are not, We say you see it is linked to harmful ideologies, there is no logical argument, but only induction.

Thus the evidence confirming a particular theory should not be taken into account, unless the test is genuine of this theory, as it can be said as in phenomenology, the object has its own method, but of course this is different from Karl’s theory of falsificationism.

Popper The criterion of the scientific status (Popper uses instead of law) of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability or testability, so the problem of narrative in science is rejected.

POPPER, K. (1975) Conhecimento Objetivo, Editora Universidade de São Paulo, 1975 (original english edition 1972).