The emptiness and the epoché in Husserl

03 Aug

If there is any similarity between the Husserlian epoché and the methodical doubt ofConscienciaPleiadeana Descartes, it is simple appearance, for the epoché (put in brackets) served for Husserl to enter the core of the appearances of things to consciousness.

Thus this supposed resemblance between the two philosophers does not authorize it to mean that the epoché, in putting the world aside, doubts the existence of things, and this doubt will lead to idealism, with the critique of “pure” Reason of Kant and others That there will come a dualism between the objective and subjective worlds.
With Husserl’s epoché one does not properly pretend to doubt the existence of the world and its objects, much less to reject the intuition we have to know it, reducing consciousness to some kind of transcendence.

The world will be anchored only in the aspect as it presents itself in consciousness “eeduced to consciousness”, as we have already argued here, Husserl’s phenomenological method promotes a revision in the Cartesian cogito.

The Husserlian method of phenomenological reduction brings with it other notions that must be presented here: the transcendent and the transcendental, being the transcendent, the consciousness as Husserl sees it, is the everyday and habitual perception we have of the things of the world, not a chair But this chair, this tree, this book, so the transcendental “is the perception that consciousness has of itself” (Brazilian Philosohpy dictionary ABBAGNANO, 2000, p. 973).
One can then say that “the transcendent is the outer world” while the transcendental “is the inner world” of consciousness (HUSSERL, 2008, p.18), thus redefined the notions of noema and noesis, since they existed in antiquity .
This emptiness to apprehend the object, since it happens in ‘pure consciousness’ or ‘transcendental’, it is the experiences entirely lose their psychological and existential character to preserve only the pure relation of the fully purified subject to the object as conscious, and this is To uncover, to know.
There is a distinction between the perceived object and the noema: “the noema is distinct from the object itself, which is the thing, eg the object of the tree’s perception is the tree, but the noema of that perception is the complex of predicates And ways of being given by experience. ” (Brazilian Philosohpy dictionary ABBAGNANO, 2000, p.724).
To what extent this experience can be “transcendental” is the ultimate question.



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