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World of life and deviations

02 May

It seems obvious what the world of life would be, but it is not because simply this world is populated by theories and misconceptions trying to put life as some form of acting, of making functionalist or even of thinking in restricted forms that do not behave life.
It is not by chance that this was later developed by Heidegger and Gadamer, since all life refers to the Being, and closes itself in this and not from its relation with the objects, but with the vision it has of the relation with these objects which are part of the world of life.
Separating them into ontological and ontological, though distinct, means that there is something beyond the life of being, not in the mystical sense, but of the transcendental realizations (the apriori) of consciousness.
Thus the work of Hans Georg Gadamer “Truth and Method” is nothing other than to oppose a vision of historical consciousness other than that of something, the basic presupposition of the hermeneutics, there is therefore no clear relation to life, beings, objects and culture of concrete beings within a concrete reality.
The original meaning of the “world of life” (Lebenswelt) is embodied in Heidegger’s work of Being and Time, used in part by Sartre, Gadamer problematized it, and Schultz made it central to his phenomenological sociology.
Phenomenology brought from Franz Brentano the notion of intentionality, which according to Sokoloski, intention means the relation of consciousness that we have with an object, then refers in the last analysis to what we call consciousness.
The notion of intentionality is the one that contrasts most strongly with positivism, when reconsidering the subject and object relationship, in a perspective of inseparability, offers an opposition to its objectivism and neutrality.
By fully recovering the subject in relation to objects, phenomenology is a resumption of the humanization of science, a restorative view of Being and of existence.
The work of Alfred Schutz (1899 to 1959) incorporating phenomenology into Max Weber’s sociology, regains the importance of the concept of Verstehen (understanding) and distinguishes it from Erklaren (common-sense knowledge, or methods of modern social sciences).
Hans Georg Gadamer clarifies that Verstehen is close to the understanding of the Other, in which the relation of knowing is thus humanized.
SOKOLOWSKI, Robert. Introduction to phenomenology (in portuguese). São Paulo: Loyola, 2004.
The concept of intentionality is central to phenomenology and this vídeo clarifies the term:

 

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