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A forgotten connection with medieval philosophy

13 May

Concepts such as essence, being, ontology, and especially intentionality, fell into obscurity in the Renaissance until they were abandoned in modernity, until being reinvented by Franz Brentano (1838-1917) in 1874 in a work entitled Psychology from the empirical point of view, where he wants to understand the extent to which phenomena are physical or mental, in relation to objects.
In this book in the first chapter of Book II, he states: “All the data of consciousness are divided into two great classes: the class of the physical phenomenon and the class of the mental phenomenon” (Brentano, 1973), where it retrieves the idea of relation intentional relationship between mental acts and their objects, which comes from the work of Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
Brentano characterizes this relationship from a reprint of the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of an “intentional in-existence” of an object, it is not a matter of not existing, but of existing in which it suggests a mode of immanence relationship between the intentional act and its object.
This is important because it recovers the subject and object relationship, lost by rational / idealism.
Phenomenology will use the concept of the suspension of judgment, the epoché that transforms into a place between parentheses, in this case is to suspend the facticity of the world has the judgment suspended by the phenomenological reduction, now that is transcendent (which is not self-evident) to the domain of an authentic immanence (the absolute clarification, of giving oneself, giving meaning).
This is fundamental in a post-truth world where facticity can hide the phenomenon in itself, and it is necessary to return to what Husserl will propose to return things themselves.
These are some applications of Dale Jacquette’s work on intentionality in Brentano:

BRENTANO, F. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.

 

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