The crisis of Reason and Kant’s critique

23 Oct

What Kant has tried to solve in his Critique of Pure Reason, as its name implies, is that reason would not be enough, and thus I intend to make two critiques, namely the very idealism to which it proposes itself as a realist (although it seems contradictory, for the Kantians it is not), and the second is the Transcedental Deduction, the essence of their gnosiological method which confuses with another view of the transcendent, which is that of mystery, beyond the idealistic rational view.
What Kant called “transcendental realism” (of course there are several versions, including many that are contradictory to each other), was to conceive a critical distinction between epistemic conditions (it was Henri Allison who used this term) and are forms of systematization of knowledge with conditions. supposedly ontological, which are nonetheless ontic, for they are but possibilities of things themselves, and separate from the subject, is the idealistic transcendent.
Their refutation of idealism is viewed by the Kantians themselves as having: problematic, dogmatic, and empirical versions, which at bottom refer to the object of the “outside world,” that is, it contests every possibility of objective knowledge, and for this they hold or on the plane. empirical (clear through experience) or the transcendental plane, here as a resource for the subject to reach the plane of objects, in a clear separation between subjectivity and objectivity.
Kantian dualism remains in the problematic or dogmatic question, the former as a primacy of subjective awareness of perceptions and self-awareness of the domain of objectivity.
What characterizes Kant with his attempt to approach realism is in fact a transcendental dualist. It is because it ends by realizing the impossibility of knowing things as they are in themselves, and ends by defending isolation in subjectivity and a false interiority of presentations (making it present) and concluding, here, that it is dogmatic or skeptical that What we believe to be objective knowledge is actually a flow of perceptual impressions devoid of any objectivity, so the idealistic dualism of equidistant subject and object remains.
The way in which Kant will understand his “principled” relationship with self-awareness (in the Cartesian sense “I think”) and is with objective knowledge, must come along with his “deduction” which is essentially divergent with respect to his own. view of the Cartesian conception of the cogito, but both will not escape the conception of the ego, the transcendent self, or other analogies, which are well described in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations.
The instrumental reason that much of the idealist discourse struggles with the object of knowledge and its corresponding cognitive subject, its cognitive transcendence, will always be tied to the essential dualism of the separation of subject and object, its consequences to daily life are clear.
So what we think of everyday as objective, concrete or any substitute in the relationship with things, and with the knowledge of them as a result, will always be in the “outer world” or the physical world, with which the relationship will always remain under false mystery, subjectivity or the perceptions of self-awareness, or even, is an experience of the subject.

See the video about idealism realistic em TEDx of the Daniel Wong:


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