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The possible, but difficult “clearing”

18 May

The concealment of knowledge also hides a concealment of knowledge, without any kind of clairvoyance, access to knowledge becomes attached to mental, logical or ideo-logical schemes that in turn are attached to contemporary thought.

The way Heidegger saw the clearing, it was difficult to assess even for his closest students like Hanna Arendt and Husserl, just to name big names, but in his school of thought many still remain stuck in idealism.

The central problem of idealism, for Heidegger, is that through the a priori categories of understanding, all the properties of objects are determined (as if it were only “logical” to know them) and so beings cannot manifest they are pure essence of what are, out of the “logical”.

Thus, between fundamentalist occultism, clearly problematic, and Western “scientific” thinking, as said by Heidegger “established itself as the only measure of man’s habitation in the world”, said in his text The end of philosophy and the task of thought.

In his text Plato’s doctrine of truth, he begins by translating Eidos (the Idea as it was badly translated) as an aspect, which is not an entity in its mere appearance, as it is immediately perceived by the senses, before showing the being appears and can be captured by the intellect (Heidegger, 2007, p. 3).

The other question pointed out by Heidegger is about the explicit translation of “alethéia” by unveiling and that cannot be identified with “truth”, “the question of unveiling as such, is not the question of truth… we should not translate alethéia by the current word truth ”(Heidegger, 1972, p. 36), and thus“ the statement of an essential transformation of truth is also not sustainable, that is, [Plato’s] transition from unveiling to rectitude ”(Heidegger, 1972).

What this implies is not clearly obvious, but it is the clearing itself (in the middle of the forest), that is, clarity, it is only possible in a space of previous opening, something that appears, a “presentation”.

Said explicitly by Heidegger himself: “The ray of light does not first produce the clearing, the opening, it just travels through it. [It] can only shine if the opening is already guaranteed “, so it is an event in time, and perhaps this time of concealment of the Pandemic precedes a” clearing “.

Heidegger, M.  O fim da filosofia e a tarefa do pensamento. São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades, 1972.

________. La doctrina de Platón acerca de la verdad. Eikasia, Revista de Filosofía, v. 12, extraor- dinario I, 2007.

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O problema central do idealismo, para Heidegger, é que mediante as categorias a priori do entendimento, determina-se todas as propriedades dos objetos (como se fosse só “lógico” o conhecer) e assim os seres não podem manifestar são essência pura do que são, fora do “lógico”.

Assim entre o ocultismo fundamentalista, claramente problemático, e o pensamento “científico” ocidental, como dito por Heidegger “se estabeleceu como única medida da habitação do homem no mundo”, dito em seu texto O fim da filosofia e a tarefa do pensamento.

Em seu texto A doutrina da verdade em Platão, ele começa traduzindo Eidos (a Ideia como foi má traduzida) como aspecto, que não é um ente em sua mera aparência, como é percebida de forma imediata pelos sentidos, antes de se mostrar o ente aparece e pode ser captado pelo intelecto (Heidegger, 2007, p. 3).

A outra questão apontada por Heidegger é sobre a tradução explícita de “alethéia” por desvelamento e que não pode ser identificada com “verdade”, “a questão do desvelamento como tal, não é a questão da verdade … não devemos traduzir alethéia pela palavra corrente verdade” (Heidegger, 1972, p. 36), e assim “também não é sustentável a afirmativa de uma transformação essencial da verdade, isto é, a passagem [de Platão] do desvelamento para retitude” (Heidegger, 1972).

O que isto implica não é claramente obvio, mas é a própria clareira (no meio da floresta), ou seja, claridade, só é possível em um espaço de abertura prévia, algo que aparece, uma “presentação”.

Dito explicitamente pelo próprio Heidegger: “O raio de luz não produz primeiramente a clareira, a abertura, apenas percorre-a. [Ele] só pode brilhar se a abertura já é garantida”, assim é um evento no tempo, e talvez quiçá este tempo de ocultamento da Pandemia anteceda a uma “clareira”.

Será preciso “Mudar de via” afirma Edgar Morin em seu último livro, a humanidade mudará ?

 

Heidegger, M.  O fim da filosofia e a tarefa do pensamento. São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades, 1972.

________. La doctrina de Platón acerca de la verdad. Eikasia, Revista de Filosofía, v. 12, extraor- dinario I, 2007.

 

 

Pandemic´s time of the planet

17 May

The data observed by the Opera Mundi website, there you can see the pandemic numbers all over the world, show that in the pandemic cycles, despite the vaccination that according to the website reached 1.5 billion doses administered on Sunday night (if the world population is around 7.5 billion people) this means 20% of vaccination worldwide, of course it varies in many regions.

India for example, which is the worst case of Pandemic at the moment, is the third most vaccinated with more than 179 million doses, but has a population of almost 1.4 billion people and this gives 7% only vaccinated, well below the world average (above) of 20%. The number of deaths falls, but the number of infections grows.

Brazil with approximately 37 billion vaccines for at least the first dose (the number of more than 50 billion vaccines is added to the first with the second dose, which counts those who took the 2nd dose twice) also means a number below average, with a population of more than 200 million inhabitants (211 in the last estimate), this is 20%, which means on average, but the seriousness of the Pandemic still requires greater efforts.

The purchase of 100 million doses of Pfizer could make us optimistic, if it weren’t for October, and the value of 6.6 billion reais means this means 66 reais per dose, something around 10 euros or 9 pounds sterling in exchange current, expensive price and the vaccine requires special logistics because it must be kept at low temperature (dry ice, refrigerated transport, refrigerators, etc.).

All of this could make us optimistic, but the reality is not quite this, it is observed that even in countries where there was a sharp drop (England and Portugal for example) you cannot let your guard down because the world is a global village and even with few flights people circulate, and a case of infection, and there are new strains of the virus, can trigger the whole process again.

It is time for the planet, we can and we must take a planetary attitude, we have not yet done so, and even regulators, governments and health agencies still seem to fall short of the measures to be taken, for example, in the case of India and in the creation of protocols for travel, a global plan is required.

There is a fair concern that this is done exclusively by political and non-technical-sanitary criteria, which is a fact, but as politics has not helped, we can help politics with sanitary attitudes, in a current language: public health policy.

The campaign is simple and global: vaccine for everyone, global protocols in relation to types of vaccines, by age, type of comorbidity, equitable distribution (for example, reaching 20% vaccination in all countries as a target for this month), we could think 50% by July that it would be an audacious attempt, but doing the math: there will be the production of 3.5 billion doses by July counting all vaccines (we are already at 1.4 billion) does not seem an impossible number.

Vaccine for everyone !!! aid to poor countries and countries of major pandemic crisis.

 

Idealism and its religion

14 May

Beginning with the critique of idealism, in “The German Ideology” (1932), where he talks about Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, who even call them St. Buer and St. Stirner, for their claim to be theology.
If the essence of idealism is the separation of object and subject, I make a purposeful inversion, the essence of religious thinking for Ludwig Feuerbach is the separation of subject and sensible objects, for for him object consciousness can be, although distinct from itself, a consciousness that coincides shortly thereafter when dealing with the religious object, because of its “transcendence” is exactly what makes it return to self-consciousness, I explain.
For Feuerbach, and the sensitive object is out of being (though ontology here is only an appeal), the religious object is in it, it is an intrinsic object, and neither does it abandon it, its moral consciousness leaves it, it is an intimate object. , and even the most intimate, is the closest of all.
His critique of theology using idealism essentially presupposes a critical judgment, the “difference between the divine and the non-divine, between what is and is not worthy of worship,” so that with this dualism it is possible to play all the essence of the divine in the mass grave of the Ideal.
The consciousness of God is man’s consciousness itself to him, this is the Hegelian idealism made religion: the knowledge of God which is man’s self-knowledge, there is no God-self for man.
The negation of the subject is considered irreligious, and its relation to sensible objects, a negation of the subject, is the atheistic religion of Feuerbach, which Marx will turn to call them the Old Hegelians, and seeks to make their inversion here new now. from object to subject, here is the new “religious” version of the Young Hegelians, like Marx, even criticizing Feuerbach’s main atheistic thesis: “thought comes from the subject,” not the object.
It is no longer about Heaven to Earth,” said Marx, but now “from earth to heaven,” that is, from the object to the subject, the labor force and the production, to their divinization (of the object, of money, economy, etc.). If, for Marx, fetishization was the separation of labor from his instrument of labor and commodity, fetishization may be reification (res – thing) or objectification for these young “Hegelians”, where he sees the separation between subject and object. , in religious fetishism is the separation of (sinful) consumption of the individual (seen in self-awareness) to which the religious must “attend” and live his “concrete”. The fair relationship with money, work, health and education is only a surpassing of the idealistic religious view, its consummation in a man in harmonious relationship with the world, and in this case also beauty, poetry and life. healthy would have a perspective, for the “pure” religious not. This religiosity lacks an asceticism that in fact “elevates” them, although they seem as linked to contemporary themes, actually has an idealistic god and not pretending to be realistic as they would wish, their concrete is the modern state god their economy, or the positivist law and his narrow view of justice.Beginning with the critique of idealism, in “The German Ideology” (1932), where he talks about Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, who even call them St. Buer and St. Stirner, for their claim to be theology.
If the essence of idealism is the separation of object and subject, I make a purposeful inversion, the essence of religious thinking for Ludwig Feuerbach is the separation of subject and sensible objects, for for him object consciousness can be, although distinct from itself, a consciousness that coincides shortly thereafter when dealing with the religious object, because of its “transcendence” is exactly what makes it return to self-consciousness, I explain.
For Feuerbach, and the sensitive object is out of being (though ontology here is only an appeal), the religious object is in it, it is an intrinsic object, and neither does it abandon it, its moral consciousness leaves it, it is an intimate object. , and even the most intimate, is the closest of all.
His critique of theology using idealism essentially presupposes a critical judgment, the “difference between the divine and the non-divine, between what is and is not worthy of worship,” so that with this dualism it is possible to play all the essence of the divine in the mass grave of the Ideal.
The consciousness of God is man’s consciousness itself to him, this is the Hegelian idealism made religion: the knowledge of God which is man’s self-knowledge, there is no God-self for man.
The negation of the subject is considered irreligious, and its relation to sensible objects, a negation of the subject, is the atheistic religion of Feuerbach, which Marx will turn to call them the Old Hegelians, and seeks to make their inversion here new now. from object to subject, here is the new “religious” version of the Young Hegelians, like Marx, even criticizing Feuerbach’s main atheistic thesis: “thought comes from the subject,” not the object.
It is no longer about Heaven to Earth,” said Marx, but now “from earth to heaven,” that is, from the object to the subject, the labor force and the production, to their divinization (of the object, of money, economy, etc.). If, for Marx, fetishization was the separation of labor from his instrument of labor and commodity, fetishization may be reification (res – thing) or objectification for these young “Hegelians”, where he sees the separation between subject and object. , in religious fetishism is the separation of (sinful) consumption of the individual (seen in self-awareness) to which the religious must “attend” and live his “concrete”. The fair relationship with money, work, health and education is only a surpassing of the idealistic religious view, its consummation in a man in harmonious relationship with the world, and in this case also beauty, poetry and life. healthy would have a perspective, for the “pure” religious not. This religiosity lacks an asceticism that in fact “elevates” them, although they seem as linked to contemporary themes, actually has an idealistic god and not pretending to be realistic as they would wish, their concrete is the modern state god their economy, or the positivist law and his narrow view of justice.

 

Ethics and religion.

13 May

Ethics and religion have always been related in history, modernity has separated them.

Hegel (1770-1831) despite the criticism of the Kantian model, in an attempt to build a teleological morality he created the “state morality”, which from his work ‘Principles of Philosophy of Law’ goes on to determine how the institutions that mediate it the life of the subjects referring to it as: a person in the abstract (the individual) as is typical of idealism; a moral subject and not a moral society as subjects including the moral state, and thus having an ethical citizen.

For this, Hegel describes a modern state that provides the full realization of the individual’s freedom. For him, each item of this triad (State, individual, Society) can be analyzed separately, but they are products of iterations, which are developed to arrive at the subsequent one.

In the beginning, in §4, Hegel tries to introduce free will as a starting point of law and as a motto for the development of the work, as it is in all idealistic culture about freedom:

 “The domain of law is the spirit in general; there, its own base, its starting point is in free will, in such a way that freedom constitutes its substance and its destiny and that the system of law is the empire of realized freedom, the world of the spirit produced as a second nature from itself. ” (Hegel, 1997)

What he calls “realized freedom” will be done through a state conceived by an abstract right, the morality and an ethic that refer to it.

Ethicity was defined by Hegel as: “… the idea of ​​freedom while living well, that in its consciousness it has its knowledge and its will and that, through the action of this conscience, it has its reality.” (Hegel, 1997), this is idealism is the conscience that determines reality.

As the individual has an institutionalized freedom, abstract law is the supposed freedom of free will that is determined in the face of things, classic idealistic division between subjects and objects, between objectivity and subjectivity, so to take possession, become owner, make contracts a knowing subject is created, aware of his rights, not admitting himself, but the ignorance of the current laws and thus of the conscience that each person has before objects, everything is established and guided by the state, by its ethics.

Here, there is a central aspect of our development, because it is in the State that the individual finds the possibilities of the common good to be realized, because in the particular will of each one desires the common good, it will be what makes the citizen a truly free being, that it is nothing but arbitrary interests enshrined by the State.

The moral crisis of institutions (and the state) is due to the construction of an abstract individual, of nations and not of peoples, they are not subjects, what happens is according to moral rules pre-established by interests, but whose ethics are questioned.

In a more recent time, based on studies by Husserl, after Heidegger, and recently by Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Lévinas, the ontological ethics is made from the Other.

Paul Ricoeur was influenced and maintained a dialogical attitude with Mounier, Marcel, and many others, maintaining a dialogical attitude with which he maintained a personal relationship.

Looking at aspects of the person (of the Other) of nature here, dialogue with religion is possible.

 

HEGEL, G. W. F. (1997) Princípios da Filosofia do Direito. Tradução: Orlando Vitorino. SP, Brazil: Martins Fontes. 1ª edição.

 

 

What do we mean by moral today

12 May

Almost every rational and elaborated basis on morality is based on an idealistic theory, which belongs to both rational thinking to Hegel and Kant, but in both there is already a criticism of pure and empirical rationalism, so what kind of morality is this socially proclaimed.

It cannot be said that it is positivist, nor communal, nor at the other end something merely platonic, the fact that both insisted on distinguishing the approach of practical philosophy both in Kant and in Hegel, where they are distinguished then.

Both set out to undermine the skeptic’s doubts about the possibility of objective judgments and practical requirements; both, moreover, reject positivist derivations of the law, exclusively empiricist descriptions of human behavior and intuitionist forms of justification.

Furthermore, the two philosophers seem to share the same conception of the conditions of human freedom. For both Hegel and Kant, a theory of morality and political rights devoted to promoting the cause of freedom must demand more than just the absence of obstacles to the satisfaction of our animal passions, it must be endowed with a certain rationality (idealism).

For Hegel, as well as for Kant, freedom requires, in addition, respect for the ends that we have as rational natures.

We achieve this type of freedom when our actions are motivated by the law of reason and when the social norms that restrict us are norms that we can rationally endorse.

The difference with Hegel’s system is that it overcomes a certain subjectivity of Kant’s “individual” model, but submits morality to some norm, in general, that which is established by the State, the problem of both is the relativization of the moral question, now trapped to the individual, now attached to the State, ignoring the Being.

 

 

Between ethics and morals

11 May

The great difference between ethics and morals is in the etymological root of the word, while the first derives from the Greek word êthos, which means “character” in some way but linked to the meaning of the polis with which the Greeks were concerned, the second derives from Latin word moralis, which is in a way also “abode” of Being, which the Greeks reflected, but distinctly.

By unveiling (a word that Heidegger’s phenomenology favors) forgetting Being, it means that its “home”, its Dasein is hidden and forgotten by contemporary philosophy, so what is called morality has become almost synonymous with ethics, but not the It’s.

This field in contemporary philosophy is dedicated to understanding human actions (seeing them as moral actions) and this according to a temporal code may be right or wrong, so there is no timeless definition of morality and it becomes similar to the ethical code , the one defined by a moment in human history.

So morality is constantly changing, and ethics is what is established temporarily by some form of consensus, in general, established by state laws, which are also changeable.

There is therefore no discussion of principles and values ​​that are fundamental, the right to life for example, which should be a fundamental value also becomes questionable, in the case of euthanasia and abortion, even death from some type of homicide can be “cool” and it is not.

Nothing justifies an arbitrary end of human life, all human life must be spared and preserved from temporal values, so also the discussion of death in a pandemic, which has a natural cause, can and must be analyzed in the case of social or personal neglect or negligence. .

The discussion of morals as a set of habits and customs of society, without being linked to principles is dangerous and can create rules and laws, which are the establishment of an ethics, which can transgress basic rights: life, human dignity and limits healthy social coexistence.

The philosopher Theodor Adorno defends this view in his book “Minima Moralia” (London: Verso. 1978) and also Peter Sloterdijk will oppose the absolute imperative (not to hinder progress and human action in the sense of creating a more solidary society) to the categorical imperative ( which is an individual’s moral ethical attitude) established by Kant.

In her book “The banality of evil”, Hanna Arendt warned about the concern with what she called “the activities of the life of the spirit”, related to action, ethics and politics, which took a consistent form in the judgment of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, a city that has not only the Judeo-Christian-Islamic symbolism of the great Abramic root, all descend and recognize the symbolism of Abraham as a result of their beliefs, but also a moral code

 

 

Imunidade de rebanho “vacinado”

10 May

The slow fall in infections and deaths, still above 2,000 daily deaths (2091 on Saturday), although there is no statistical analysis to prove it is probably due to the vaccine, as both isolation measures and a clear protocol to open activities “Non-essential” is unclear and is not safely implemented, for example, urban transport and commerce, in Brazil.

The arrival of more than 628,290 doses of the Pfizer vaccine in Brazil Airport, which is expected to be distributed throughout the country, around 1.1 million doses, the capital of São Paulo has already indicated the need for more vaccines, which received 135,720 doses and needs to vaccinate the elderly from 60 to 62 yesrs, in 371 thousand doses.

Rio de Janeiro distributed 472 thousand doses throughout the state, for the 65 to 69 years old age group, elderly people over 80 and health workers, most of the vaccine is from AstraZeneca and is mainly intended for the second dose.

According to FioCruz 17.71% of the population was vaccinated by Friday, and 8.05% with the second dose, throughout the country the numbers are a total of

As of May 15, FioCruz starts to produce inputs in the country, with this it will be the first fully national vaccine, however the national doses will be ready only in the second semester, received the first dose 35,235,949 and 17,715,680 the second dose , in proportional terms this means 8.37% of the population has already received the second dose, and 25.95% the first.

The government gives the number of approximately 75,600,000 doses already distributed in Brazil, this means that there will be 22 million vaccines available for this week, it is expected that this number will be real, as it will represent a significant increase in vaccination.

At this rate, if it is true we will wait for the numbers at the end of this week, it could mean immunization, at least with the first dose of the vaccine of half the population, before the arrival of the harsh winter for July and July, however it is necessary to remember that others viruses will be in the air, and hospital protocols and nursing homes need to prepare for this scenario.

It follows covid’s CPI and it is expected that in fact the responsibilities, and possible deviations and financial abuses, which is an act of inhumanity in a pandemic moment.

 
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Friends and not servants

07 May

Friendship is a link that allows for reciprocity, says Byung Chul Han in his book No swarm: Perspectives of the digital: “Power is an asymmetrical relationship. It establishes a hierarchical relationship. The power of communication is not dialogical. Unlike power, respect is NOT necessarily an asymmetric relationship. In fact, one often feels respect for exemplary people or superiors, but “reciprocal” respect, which is based on a symmetrical relationship of recognition, is fundamentally possible. ”

This relationship means that we may or may not be in reciprocity, and we may or may not be in healthy relationships of friendship, affectivity and love (without a sense of agape), it does not mean that other relationships do not exist, for example , civil authority, social or religious for those who should really be respected as “authority” and not by imposition or fear, this case is justified only when there is a clear intention to violate social rights and duties.

In an authoritarian society the only respect is hierarchical, moral rules are forgotten, ethics only serves the logic of power and mutual respect is confused with total “freedom”.

It is not possible to go straight to the plane of love without going through some individual or reciprocal empathy that is the most desirable, even though when the relationship is asymmetrical, someone who has respect manages to remain in some way in an empathic way, even if there are acceptable limits, unless violence, for example.

In the biblical passage that the Master explains to the disciples what kind of love they should have, that love “as I loved you” (John 15:12), he adds: “I no longer call you servants, because the servant does not know what your lord. I call you friends, because I let you know everything I heard from my Father ”(Jn 15.15), this implies a relationship of symmetry and reciprocity as indicated above.

Jesus shows this by washing his feet (photo), but his friendship was over the limit: he gave his life for his friends.

It is also a good harmony of friendship, nobody has more friendship (or love) than the one who gives his life for his friends. 

 

The relationship between friendship and love

06 May

Philia translated from greek, romanized becomes filia, in Portuguese son is “filho”, the same root of affiliation, where the a here is no longer a negation of inclusion, in the sense of belonging, affiliated with an institution, for example.

In this Greek root fit both love and friendship, philo-sophia, love or friendship to wisdom, however love can also be (we have already made a post) like the eros or agape friendship, which in this case surpasses friendship.

Friendship can grow and become an agapic love, that is, capable of creating trust and above any interest, in which case friendship and love complement and expand.

In human, cultural and spiritual terms it is what favors a person’s good performance and mental health, so the distrust and enmity that can lead to hatred is the cause of many wars, because the economic, political or social interest without real ties it is nothing else.

There is no way to break a spiral of hatred when it grows, many wars and totalitarian regimes are proof of this, and the root is in every social cell where friendship and love have ceased to exist.

On the other hand, when these bonds grow and spread in a network, everything becomes healthy and there is a virtuous cycle where the best human and social values ​​appear: solidarity, fraternity and what we call agapic love, which goes beyond any interest, it is an “amisticia” in ancien roman.

The Roman thinker Cícero has a text with exactly this name (Amisticia) and says in the text: “This is the first precept of friendship: ask friends only what is honest, and do for them only what is honest”, so this is the origin of a society that aims to be happy and peaceful. 

 

 

 

Amisticia *Friendship in latin

05 May

It comes from the Latin that comes from the word and means generosity, closeness, although there was a Greek graduation and we put its meanings in the previous post, in fact it is related in that case to an affection, so-so interested and here coming from Latin, it means a choice.

The idea of proximity can unite and synthesize the two meanings, although today there is much talk of the relational being, the proximal being (the word does not exist) is superior to the relationship and in times of networks (it should be of media and not network, which is relationship) this relationship does not mean having proximity, so it is a restricted definition, it can have a relationship but outside of it.

Something positive can be removed from each aspect, being in a relationship is better than indifference, which is the absence of it, while closeness means the possibility of a friendship with deeper ties and this should include a form of Love superior to interest, to simple affection. or the simple relationship.

Consciously or not, it is this form of relationship that every human being seeks, most of the time in the opposite way, incorrect or without depth.

What form of friendship is this sought by philosophers, poets, mystics or religious, where is it? They ask, did those who say they found it found it? This has to do with the truth