Arquivo para June 1st, 2015

The first dichotomy object vs subject

01 Jun

One of the great mysteries of Enlightenment philosophy, is the Kantian concept of “thing-in-itself”. After so manyObjectSubject interpretations of the “thing-in-itself” of Kant (except is) already does not hurt that I come now to another.
The one thing is certain: Kant opposed the “thing-in-itself” the “phenomenon.” The “phenomenon” – according to Kant – is the objective and concrete manifestation of reality as observed by humans of an inter-subjective way through perception (sense); the phenomenon is the object with which the subject interacts, then to invent a transcendental subject that connects the thing to the subject, and the worst turned religion for many.

Therefore, the phenomenon is the thing, and the “thing-in-itself” is the essence of the thing, but the subject does not need to transcend to interact with them, just be scientific instruments.
Now, the essence of the thing or the “thing-in-itself” could be the composition of a macroscopic quantum object if Kant had not said that the human soul is the “thing-in-itself” the phenomenon “man”, created a individualized soul or soul is.
Here, things are even more complicated by would be much more credible theory of Leibniz’s monads than the “thing-in-itself” of Kant, an entity that is not Self.
From the “thing-in-itself” of Kant (the model of the categorical imperative would himself) have developed the more abstract concepts of idealism, as exemplified by the concept of “thingness” of Heidegger, which comes from her teacher Husserl .
According to Heidegger, the thingness is the notion of “things as things” to Husserl and Heidegger, the whole thing is thingness and “thing-in-itself”, allowing the thing be like “two in one”, but as one for that is beyond what the human being, which is the subject of another, turn out to be something and to be part of thingness; the only thing that is not part of thingness is Das Sein or all together Dasein that is the existential presence subjective but connected to all and to the whole, although there is I and all the rest.
If Kant was still a distinction between one and another human being than me, and things, Heidegger went on to say that the only thing that is not a thing I am (if not to follow the reasoning do not worry because it does not lose anything with that).
Assuming that Kant conceived the soul (human) as something immanent (in the sense of immanence that is assigned by quantum philosophy in the sense of quantum physics formalism), which seems to be the case, then Kant conceived, in scientific terms current, soul and quantum composition of each human being in particular, although it is a metaphor seems true, but it would be the corporeal soul?
I think so, even in the Kantian sense because we can feel it in the Other, then the best metaphor would be body and not reducing the “thing-in-itself” abstract.
The question of symmetries refer to these issues, there are many readings about.