Arquivo para June 17th, 2020
From Brentano’s phenomenology to Heidegger’s Ontology
17
Jun
Among Brentano’s contributions, in addition to the intentionality of consciousness,
which is awareness of something or the object, is what some authors (Boris, 1994) call Philosophy of the Present, where the here and now is the only possible experience, breaking with the idea of empiricism that an experiment is only scientific if it can be repeated, and also breaks with the viewer’s neutrality, as he is part of the experiment, which makes him a hermeneutic.
From the intent of his master Brentano, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) will retain the aspect of the experience of “being aware of something”, but will modify the empirical phenomenology, to make it transcendental, not in the still spiritual sense, but of cognitive experiences , will leave aside the empirical view, for that of an immanent objectivity.
Husserl states in Ideias da Fenomenologia (1986) that: “The experiences of knowledge have, this belongs to its essence, an intent, they aim at something, they report in one way or another to an objectivity”, thereby abandoning the idea of the empirical of the Mestre Brentano, and takes up the concept of immanent objectivity as a revision of the Aristotelian and Thomist concepts, as “essence”.
In his work of maturity The crisis of European sciences Husserl makes the concept of transcendence more alive, within his Lebenswelt (World of Life), the transcendent “the transcendent is the outside world” while the transcendental “is the inner world” of consciousness (HUSSERL, 2008, p. 18), but this dichotomy between outer and inner world will make existentialist philosophers avoid the term consciousness.
Heidegger (1989) Husserl’s pupil was the first to avoid it, since the relationship between man and world has always been pursued by phenomenologists in order to overcome the idealistic phantasm of the subject-object relationship, the intentional and descriptive analysis of consciousness defined the essential relationships of mental acts and the external world, although Husserl matured the issue of phenomenological reduction.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), via Husserl as an intellectualist and Cartesian, abandons the terms conscience and intentionality, central to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, in the work The Being and Time (1927), not approved by Husserl, the student overcomes the concept awareness and proposes the concept of Dasein, inaugurating the existential phenomenology.
Human “finitude”, temporality and historicity (being in time) will be fundamental in Dasein’s Heideggerian analysis, a theory based on the “destruction” of the subject-object split
BORIS, G. D. J. B. (1993) Noções básicas de fenomenologia. Insight. Psicoterapia (São Paulo). v. 46, pp. 19-25, novembro.
Heidegger, M. (1989) Ser e tempo (Vols. 1-2). Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
HUSSERL, E. (2008) A crise da humanidade europeia e a filosofia. Porto Alegre; EDIPUCRS.
