Complexity, consciousness and machines
10
Oct
Both complexity and consciousness are phenomena that belong to the biological
nature, as Searle asserts, “it is an objective fact of the world to have certain systems – the brains – which are provided with subjective mental states, and physical systems of similar systems have traits mental “, so the infernal dichotomy between culture and nature is so capital in the liberal-idealist model.
This brings Searle closer to intentionality, the capital category of Franz Brentano and intermediary of Husserl’s phenomenology, but it is an “intentionality” defined as “the fundamental biological capacity of the spirit to put the organism in relation to the world,” and even if it is ” placed “on machines, they lack this subjectivity of the spirit.
It is different when we speak of intentional acts as acts of language, a phrase or even sounds that can come out of the mouth being recorded or marked on a sheet of paper, is a physical object at the origin as another, but as long as the ability to represent something is no longer intrinsic, for example, if it is a feeling, a belief, or a desire.
Intentionality in the machine exists only as a state, act or action, never as feeling, desire or belief, it is inherent in it that one state leads to another, even if it is a state of rest, but never that of feeling, if it exists it is simulated.
The author writes that “the ability of language acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the world is an extension of the biologically more fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to put the organism in relation with the world through mental states such as belief or desire, and in particular through action and perception. ”
The idea that this may be objective and will simply be a machinic act is as strange as digestion or tasting, it is not the difficulty of imitating these senses by machines, perhaps one day it is possible, but the fact that even though they do what biologically a person does will be a chemical-physical and never a mental act.
They can be done until the machines dream like in Blade Runner, or teach “love” as in A.I. (directed by Spielberg, 2001), it will still be a cybernetic and not a mental state.
In next week we explore complexity, it also has a biological origin.
.
