The glade of being
The understanding of Heidegger’s position on what he considers the “clearing” depends on the proper understanding of the concepts of transcendence, world, and world formation, which can be simplified as a worldview (Weltanschauung), but is explicit in his works Being and time (1927) and Fundamental concepts of metaphysics (1929/30).
This is the description made by Sloterdijk in his Rules for the Human Park, since he tends to simplify this horizon of questions that Heidegger transposes when he enunciates a radical difference between animal and man, in an attempt to overcome the infernal dichotomy between culture and nature, which comes in modernity on the man “wolf of man” or “good savage”, among other possibilities.
Heidegger’s position on the difference between animals and men is linked to his interpretation of human existence, its transcendence (Transzendenz) in which man, and only man, is the maker of the world.
At a winter conference in 1929/30, he elaborated what would later be “The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world – finitude – solitude,” he deals directly with the question of the difference between animal and man.
Heidegger also does not accept that questioning is in a theory of the evolution of species, precisely because he has diagnosed that all theory of this kind already presupposes previous determinations of both man and the that is the animal.
It is neither creationist nor evolutionist what he wants to know is what ontological characters depend on the statement that makes the vitality of the living before the lifeless: stone and mineral materials in generation, cosmic dust in a more cosmological sense.
With this will formulate three theses to create a characterization of the essence of life: 1) the stone is without world; 2) the animal is poor of the world, and, 3) man is world-maker. Heidegger is clear in his philosophical re fl ection that the relationship between metaphysics and positive science still needs to be thought of in its characteristic ambiguity of always differentiating subject from object, so its transcendence is not idealistic, in the phenomenological-hermeneutical method, the modal differences that make explicit in the different ways of being considered in them, the stone-being, the animal-being and the being-man, being clear, each being and being.
They also resolve two other premises of modernity, a religious one that is the crisis between creationism and evolutionism, there is an evolution because man is the formator of the world and there is a creation because it distinguishes itself from the animal that is not the formator of the world.
It is not a question of strengthening the thesis of anthropocentrism, so Sloterdijk’s criticism is valid, since for him it is necessary to “clarify the clearing”, but for him as for Heidegger humanism has become anti-humanism, to assert as “the most miserable” of the “history of Europe” (Sloterdijk, 2000, p.20), and suffice to recall the horror of the two world wars.