Scientific vision and ontology
16
Oct
Contemporary science is the fruit of an a priori concept construction, which can be
thought of as that which is prior to experience or perception, in terms of philosophy, this corresponds to two forms of knowledge or argument, when we say in my experience I feel that … it is the argument of perception, when I say I see it this way … it means that I have a world view and I am resorting to it.
In the ontological phenomenology an “a priori” is also admitted, but it does not mean an “a priori construction”, since it must be dissociated from “empiria”, because in fact even if we can not make explicit our world view, it was socially and culturally constructed, which in the hermeneutic circle are the preconceptions, in the sense that they are somehow formulated.
Just as both scientific research and ontology have concepts “a priori” they can converge, but in practice ontology requires a purification, ie, the explanation of which are the prejudices, for example, idealism or culture.
Every scientific investigation makes an a priori that is the “fixation of the sectors of objects” and is only possible from an opening to the being of being, that is, what is the ordinary experience that it has of the world, sometimes difficult to explain and question.
In order for a true scientific question to be asked, it is necessary to determine the region of the entities, often called contextualization, but at most only corresponds to a romantic view of history (read Gadamer), the region means being taken to the horizon of the original experience, the horizon of the fundamental relation of the entity that questions with the questioned world, usually done in reverse.
In medieval philosophy, the whole discussion of these a priori leads to the quarrel of the universals of Boethius (470-525), who translated Isagoge from Greek into Latin, soon perceived the magnificent program that Porphyry’s questions proclaimed.
At bottom the quarrel is whether there are universals, which would be them, that triggered a struggle between nominalists (everything is name) and realists (they exist independent of the names).
Existential analytics “is before all psychology, anthropology and, above all, biology.” (Heidegger, 2015, pp. 89), although we already say in the previous post Paul Ricoeur affirms that there is in Heidegger (he would say in all ontology) an a priori that is based on anthropology, which we call original for cultural reasons.
Heidegger, M. Ser e tempo, 10a. edição, Trad. Revisada de Marcia Sá Cavalcante, Brasil, Bragança Paulista, SP: Editora Universitária São Francisco, 2015.
