Reason and division
16
May
As said in the previous post, the subject of idealism
“has no fear”, says Byung-Chul “in this space without shadows of transparency, evacuated by the ray of certainty, there is neither surprise nor fear” (pg. 263), the author also rereads Descartes who “projected from his insatiable need for security is sterile, ghostly and uninhabitable” (pg. 263) and this “compulsion for security” leads to the dark, and even Kant’s correction that is saved by “repelling” and “ reinterpret” the imagination (pg. 266).
But reminds Byung-Chul that Kant in his Foundation of Metaphysics looked at the unknown dimension of human existence, the “disquieting unknown” although he is trapped in the “subjective deduction” that leads to the obscure, and recognizes “that it tunes us with the terrors of the abyss ” (Han citing Kant, pg. 267) and that in the “inner horror” “that every mystery carries with it” (pg. 267) and that it is in this “nakedness of anguish” that transforms the subject’s vulnerability.
In Being and Time, Han explains, “anxiety does not bring being-there to the proximity of the ecstatic amplitude that he sees in the late Heidegger”, nor to the proximity of “alienation” from “courage towards the abyss”, and Han concludes: “anxiety wrests the existence of the domestic order from “relational completeness”, taking it to the “region”, to the “world as such”, but at its center resides the self” and here explains the anguish: “Anguish it only leads to hypertrophy of the self” (Han, pg. 268).
Heidegger made an essential ontological discovery, where the rupture of the subject is “the being-there is what calls and the called at the same time […] what calls is the being-there that […] is distressed by its power to be” (Han citing Heidegger, pg. 269), in this “a negotiator’s soliloquy” takes place, but it is conducted between two selves, that is, between the impersonal self and the authentic self” (pg. 269), This division occurs both within the being-there and in the reaction with others, “out of anguish at the voice of the other, the being-there covers its ears” (pg. 269).
Thus this division or disunity arises within man, and it is in this “strangeness of being in suspension, in which being-there can approach a growing lack of foundation” (Han citing Heidegger, pg. 270), it is “in anguish that a certain epoché occurs”, the suspension of phenomenological judgment of Husserl, professor of Heidegger, in it the network of references, woven by the purpose of “for what”, the totality relates and its intersubjective implication collapse, in my conclusion here, unity is born and lives in it.
This conclusion, which is neither Heidegger’s nor Byung-Chul’s, is possible because the latter writes: “they are in a certain way “bracketed”, the “neutral” Impersonal and its “dictatorship” are “inhibited”, this “collapse of the world” (Han, pg. 270), reduce “being-there to a solipsistic sphere of being, a sphere of the “pure ‘fact that…” of one’s own isolated condition of being thrown” (pg. 270), it is “the residue of the epoché, the authentic self, marks the center of gravity of the ‘there, from which the world that has slipped away must be recovered from nothingness or must be filled explicitly with the “stability of the self” (Han, pg. 271) .
This division resulting from reason prevents a true ontology, see that Heidegger even uses the word “dictatorship” of certainty, of the self, of the empire of pure reason where there is no room for the enigma, the doubt, the mystery and the completeness of the being, then it is reduced to “anguish”, part of life, but in which being-there must not stop, nor “collapse”.
Reason, or the criticism of pure reason, is not exhausted in itself, it contains anguish, it needs uncertainty, mystery and full “inner” life.
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
