The heart, the pain and the truth
24
May
Heidegger’s thought must start from starting, read by Byung-Chul in Introduction
to the Phenomenology of Spirit “in terms of the forgetfulness of being”, he sees it as an “arid self” that finds “its limitation to the being that meets it ” (Han, pg. 334 citing Hegel).
Although he recovers Hegel, in part, in the epigraph of the last chapter: “truth is the whole”, he re-discusses dialectics and its metaphysics in idealism: “in relation to “just being” which empties it to a name “that does not names nothing else”, natural consciousness… when it becomes aware of being, it assures that it is something abstract. ” (Han, pg 336).
Natural consciousness (seen in this way) “lingers on ‘perversities’… “it tries to eliminate one perversity by organizing another, without remembering the authentic inversion” where “the truth of the essence of being is withdrawn into beings” (pg. 336 with quotes from Heidegger), who sees this as a step back and the “already” forgotten, misunderstood (pg. 337), does not appear completely denied, it appears in the form of “not yet” which is not a negation, nor a barricade, since “next to the already prevents it from presenting itself” (pg. 337).
There is a whole development in contrast with Hegel’s dialectic, more than a topic it could very well be a book, but the dialogue he has with Derridá and Adorno in the chapter on Mourning and the work of mourning, leads to his vision of the whole outside of dialectical abstraction, says the concern with immortality, with killing death, is not only secret in the hearts of Plato or Hegel (pg. 384), it would be the main concern with the “cardiographic” archive of the history of philosophy, in it the philosopher “works” to reverse the negative of being.
This is what will give basis to his “work of mourning”: “being capable of death as death”, that is, being capable of mourning, this “tragedy” “is radically different from the noisy work of mourning of the Hegelian dialectic” (Han, p. 385).
“Tears free the subject from his narcissistic interiority… they are the “spell that the subject casts on nature” (Han, p. 394) now quoting Adorno, and the author states that “Aesthetic Theory is the book of tears (idem) and that unlike Kant, and that “the spirit perceives, in front of nature, and that “the spirit perceives, in relation to nature, less its own superiority than its own naturalness” (p. 395).
“The aesthetic experience shakes the narcissistic subject who considers himself sovereign and makes the hardened principle of the “I” crumble… the tear of the shaken and moved subject proves to be capable of truth” (pg. 395).
Capable of truth, of the infinite and for those who believe in God, not a God of passing goods and false joy, but that of the already, but not yet, that beyond pain and the transience of temporal things.
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
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