Arquivo para a ‘Antropotécnica’ Categoria
Narratives, wars and dangers
03
Jun
In one of Byung-Chul Han’s recent essays,
while the author remembers Hyppolyte de Villemessant, founder of the French newspaper Figaro and Walter Benjamin, essayist and philosopher who died in the 40s, the author does not fail to associate the modern narrative associated with new media, with storytelling called storyselling (product that sells).
Thus, instead of provoking a reflection on the major problems of today, including the escalation of wars, the problem is old: “the reader of a modern newspaper jumps from one piece of news to another, instead of letting his gaze wander into the distance, and linger there. The long, slow and lingering look was lost” (Han, 2023, p. 17), that is, there is no reflection.
So it’s about creating a narrative favorable to this or that ideological vision, logic and humanity don’t matter, even in the face of tragedies we are more busy (not all of them fortunately) in creating a narrative to justify a certain position than to defend a principle. humanitarian, there is this or that war, but all of them kill innocent people, all of them, as Eduardo Galeano said, hide desires for power and exploitation over the nation to be dominated, but great empires have succumbed despite all the arrogance and genocides.
The resurgence of the war in Ukraine, the threats to the last stronghold of Palestinian refugees, the constant threats to Taiwan, in addition to incursions into Africa and now even South America, Venezuela is once again threatening Guyana with intense troop movements and provocations between the USA and Iran, warlike spirits ignite and even good but innocent people embark on these narratives, there is no other interest in wars: looting, deaths of innocent people and inhumanity.
There is no shortage of meetings between nations in Brazil, Europe and attempts to sensitize governments to the dangers of this war escalation around the world, but they come up against partial and partisan narratives, few minds are aware of the serious and civilizing danger of this escalation. , around the world, armaments are the only response that seems to reach the rulers, and so narratives of “heroic acts” of warlike events grow around the world that should shame those who invoke humanitarian principles, with the UN being the wars and environmental problems that have led starve more than 700 million people.
Even for a biblical or historical narration, where the intention is to build a “whole” narrative, there is a call for humanitarianism, when Cain kills his brother Abel, the divine question is “where is your brother?” (Genesis 4,9) and the narration suggested by Byung -Chul Han is that of the Egyptian king Psammenit who was captured by the Persian king Cambyses, and after the defeat makes the king humiliate when he sees his daughter turned into a slave and his son being taken to be executed (Han, pg. 21), however the Egyptian king only felt when he saw an elderly and frail servant among the prisoners and “hit his head with his fists and expressed deep sadness” (pg. 22), so the narration, says Han, “needs no explanation” (Han, pg. 22).
If we are capable of long, slow and lingering reflections, it is not difficult to understand the danger of the escalation of wars, of simple people like Psammenit’s service who suffer and die for issues that they barely understand, and that the narratives do not explain, they only try to justify the unjustifiable: death, jokes and lies.
As the philosopher Morin states, it takes resistance of the spirit, we are gradually losing the sense of love, hope and solidarity and if we read and investigate the news and facts of the wars we will see that there was nothing in them other than great genocides, robberies and In situations of hunger and misery, it is necessary to resist hatred and violence.
Han B.C. (2023) A crise da narração (The crisis of narration). Transl. Daniel Guilhermino. Brazil, Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
The narrative and its sunset
31
May
Modern thinking lacks a model for the Whole,
I would say that it even lacks systematic thinking, Peter Sloterdijk even states that it is not a time for thinking, it is a time of trends dictated by hashtags, Stories, blogs and reels (mass diffusion mechanisms using social media).
Byung-Chul Han states that despite the “inflationary use of narratives reveals a crisis of narrative”, paradoxical, however “there is a narrative vacuum that manifests itself as a void of meaning and as disorientation” (Han, pg. 9), before the narrations anchored us: “they assigned us a place and transformed being-in-the-world into being-at-home, giving life meaning, support and guidance, that is, life itself was a narration…” (idem, pg . 9), is at the same time deterritorialization and uprooting.
However, Byung-Chul himself lets slip, through reading The Narrator by Walter Benjamin (died in 1940) that this is before the new media, citing it as “knowledge that comes from far away finds fewer listeners today than information about the upcoming events” (Han, p. 17 quoting him), the reader jumps from one piece of news to another, he doesn’t linger there, “the long, slow and lingering look was lost. “(pg. 17).
Still quoting Walter Benjamin, he differentiates information more clearly from knowledge: “information only has value when it is new.
She only lives in that moment, she needs to give herself entirely to it and, without wasting time, she has to explain herself in it” (Han, pg. 18), curiously a thought prior to the 40s. He will go into the concept of information, so important in certain areas such as Information Science, saying that it [today] is “the means of the reporter, who scours the world in search of news” (pg. 19), there is no necessary distance from the fact that digests it and makes it knowledge, “the information withheld, that is, the explanations avoided, increase the narrative tension” (pg. 19).
The narrative crisis is not due to the new media that have enhanced them, but to the fact “that the world is flooded with information. The spirit of narration is being suffocated by the flood of information” (pg. 20), but what then is narration? Han quoting Walter Benjamin invokes Herodotus, narrating the defeat of the Egyptian king Psamenit to the Persian king Cambyses, after his defeat.
The Persian king humiliates him by making him see his daughter becoming a servant and his son being executed, but the Egyptian king remained motionless looking at the ground, but when he saw his slaves as prisoners, “he hit his head with his fists and expressed deeply sadness” (pg. 22), because by lamenting for the servants “they destroy the narrative tension” (pg. 22).
He mentions that for Benjamin, the first sign of the decline of narration is the emergence of the novel at the beginning of the modern era (pg. 23), with its condition of experience and wisdom, narration knows how to give advice “about life” (pg. 24), the narrative community is a “community of attentive listeners” (pg. 25), there is careful listening in it.
Modern political and ideological narratives are after curious, picturesque and spicy facts, there is nothing of wisdom in them, they move the public through the impact and rush of “hot” and summarized information, there is no narration, there is no attentive listening and when there is it is due to the ecstasy or the spectacle promoted, it is removed from the context of a narration.
Those who still exist in legalism and moralism, contradictorily with the daily life they live, present in the modern religious narrative, should remember facts such as the non-judgment of the adulterous woman (who should be stoned according to the Jewish custom of the time) and Jesus “does not judge her ” (John 8:3), the testimony of the sinner who sits in the back while the Pharisee sits in front and feels proud because “I am not like other men, extortioners, unjust and adulterers” (Luke 18, 11-13), and also Jesus’ challenge when healing a man with a dry hand on the Sabbath (Mc 2,4): “And he asked them: “Is it permissible on the Sabbath to do good or to do evil? Save a life or let it die?” But they said nothing”, the biblical narrative always makes this distancing a way of thinking and rethinking values, it is not Manichaeism and modern moralism.
The stories of pirates and the impressive stories of the Vikings, prior to the period of navigation and mercantilism and even of tax havens on islands spread across the globe, with the complacency of “legal and moral states”, where the deposit is deposited, are also narrated. public money stolen from nations and the people themselves by politicians.
Han, Byung-Chul. (2023) A crise da narração, transl. Daniel Guilhermino. Brazil, Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
The all, the whole and the divine
29
May
After developing delicate and controversial subjects
such as pain, waiting in the very sense of hope, which Byung-Chul uses the philosophical term of “containment”, he finishes his book, which could be said to be his first philosophical writing, even though he did his doctoral thesis on Heidegger, with what must be the most controversial for today’s philosophy: the whole.
At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, physics, science and philosophy that seemed full of their “knowledge” took a reversal, the linguistic shift, but there is another one underway that is even more profound: the revenge of the sacred, After leading humanity to two wars, to the exhausting work of the “Society of Fatigue” (in English it was translated as the Burnout Society), idealistic arrogance wants to proclaim the death of God, the all or the whole is what, the last James Webb’s research appears to be unanswered.
Even the Big Bang theory is at stake, the arrow of time may not be correct, in other words, time may be a human abstraction, galaxies seen at the ends of the universe do not coincide with the physics of the Standard Model (in this case of Cosmology) and show that the concept needs to be revised, but let’s leave this to physicists and cosmologists, our biggest dilemma is still: “what are we and where did we come from”, translated into philosophical language: what is being, and what is Being of beings (or coming from particles and cosmic dust).
This is expressed in the Theory of Everything, the name of the film, based on the book by Stephen Hawking’s wife, Jane Hawking, entitled: “Travelling to Infinity: My Life with Stephen”.
For a while we forgot this dilemma, addressed since the beginning of this series of posts about the reading of “Heidegger’s heart” by Byung-Chul Han, not just the anthropological sleep advocated by Foucault, but the idealistic sleep of the reason of our time, that which caused a forgetfulness of being.
The beginning of the chapter is a provocation, I believe, when quoting Hegel in the epigraph: “Truth is the whole”, since Heidegger and his rereading of Han return to that “turn” in which “the truth of the essence of being withdraws into the being” (pg. 337), where consciousness itself is already “the concern to distinguish between natural knowledge and real knowledge” (pg. 340), it is in the dialectical experience of pain: “the dialectical worker is a sufferer. He goes through an ordeal, exhausts himself in the power of the Absolute, and does so precisely to live” (pg. 346), the emphasis on living belongs to the author.
“Those who still speak of the whole today raise suspicions” (pg. 455) is the opening sentence of the final chapter, but idealism never abandoned the abstract notion of the Absolute, because it is an imperative of any theory to outline contours where the truth is valid, for This is the phrase in the epigraph of the final chapter, I think, but “in Heidegger’s heart beats for the totality from the beginning” (pg. 455), he expresses it in his pathos for everything: “What was said perhaps indicates that the present work intend to be philosophical, insofar as it was undertaken in the service of the ultimate totality” (pg. 456), but in contrast to the Hegelian, “the Heideggerian whole does not capitalize on the death of the particular” (pg. 457), if we want to return to physics is worth rereading by Werner Heisenberg: “The part and the whole”, where we see the thresholds of modern quantum physics, where there are several traces of well-defined philosophy.
Understanding pain, containment and anguish and identity in difference (we have already stated that it is not the idealistic difference), the Heideggerian whole is not a place of birth, not a place of origin, but a place of birth” (pg . 459), a “non-metaphysical house as a dwelling space” (pg. 459), we would say the dwelling of the Being, full and divinized.
And also, its mundane totality, is not contaminated by the climate of postmodern thought, in it one can notice the total lack: “of odor, landscape or nature” (pg. 460), “with the history of being Heidegger writes a certain metanarrative”, but it cannot be denied that “Heidegger’s thought also has metaphysical traits” (pg. 461), his philosophy “are not language games [like Derridá], nor speeches”. (pg. 463), for him there is the being of language, “language games would be an ontic phenomenon” (pg. 463).
We develop the question of the voice (see the post), but Han asks: “in what affective tone does today’s thinking place this voice”, is it not a response to that truth that dwells within every man? not following it Is it accepting pain, anguish, difference and dispute outside of conflict and war?
There is that inner voice, to those who know how to do silence and epoché, there is the Being that is the whole and that lives within us, but we have to go through pain, through donation and accept the difference.
HAN, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
Renunciation, economy and joy
28
May
Byung-Chul theorizes that despite the difference
between Derridá and Heidegger (see our previous post) there is a structural affinity in their vision of mourning, which is characterized by the renunciation of the subject’s autonomy in Derrida: “No matter how narcissistic our subjective speculation continues to be, , it can no longer close itself to this gaze, before which we ourselves show ourselves the moment we convert it into our mourning or we can give up on it [faire de lui notre dueil], mourning, making ourselves mourn for ourselves, I mean, I mourn the loss of our autonomy, for everything that made us the measure of ourselves” (Han, p. 430 citing Derridá’s text “Krafter der Trauer”, strengthening of pain), this That is, they both have in common a vision of renouncing the autonomy of the subject, the “I” of idealism.
Here the important thing is not to let mourning work (let us remember the concept already seen in the posts about “work mourning”) it is replaced in Derridá by a game of mourning: “however, the happier the joy, the purer the sadness that sleeps in it. The deeper the sadness, the more it calls us to joy…” (Han, pg. 430-431), but Heidegger’s mourning, explains Han, does not kill death, trying to kill it results in something even worse: “ wanting to resurrect, violently and actively surpassing the limit of death would only drag them (the gods) into a false and non-divine proximity and would bring death instead of our life” (Han, pg. 431-432 quoting Heidegger).
Heidegger explains that it is “not a symptom that can be eliminated by psychoeconomic accounting. He does not have a deficient trait that involves work (of mourning).
This “withdrawn” or “saved” for which Heidegger’s “holy and mourning” heart beats is not subject to economics, this “saved” cannot be spent or capitalized, it is therefore that which is and characterizes renunciation, Han does not exemplifies, but we can think of humanitarian aid in disasters and wars, as it will characterize the identity of renunciation and gratitude as conceivable outside of economics, using Heideggerian terms “grievously bear the need to renounce” and promises the “unthinkable donation”.
A profound and wise phrase by Heidegger says, renunciation is the “highest form of possession”, it seems contrary, but we only really have what we can give because otherwise it is a commodity of exchange, and even more so renunciation becomes gratitude and “ duty of gratitude”, this pain increases and becomes joy: “the deeper the sadness, the more the joy that rests in it calls us”. (pg. 433), but it does not even become sublimation, which forces us to “work”, as it is the “inhibition of all income” and the “awareness of the emptiness and poverty of the world”.
Praise of misery one might think, is not a praise of moderate and continuous joy, different from the euphoria and ecstasy that is followed by depression, “the lack of the divine brings about mourning, goes back to an obstinate forgetfulness of being, in which Heidegger inscribes the divine” (Han, p. 433-434), but it is certainly not yet the biblical divine, but surrounds it.
The reward and joy of the Divine inscribed in the being, is that which renounces and gives, but knows that there will be a reward of receiving a hundred times more, not in goods, but in joy.
Han, Byung-Chul (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
The difference, the wars and the calamities
27
May
All reading in the recent posts about “Heidegger’s
heart: on the concept of affective tonality” by Byung Chul Han is not a mere philosophical exercise, especially because philosophy has returned to sophistry in a more sophisticated way: narrative, it is because the absence of pain perception exacerbates the difficulty in understanding the other’s pain and the difference.
He wrote about Hegel’s dialectic: “Heidegger uses the word ‘differ’ to describe the tragic-dialectic movement of difference”, and opens quotation marks: “But, in truth, in Hegel beings no longer exist, since all beings have dissolved into the movement of the absolute concept” (pg. 414), and added: “The “differance as differance”, the “differing”, is the blind spot of metaphysics” (pg. 415), and thus: “Différance is more contentious than than Hegel’s difference” (pg. 415) and this explains how idealist thought is more attached to highlighting its political difference than capable of understanding the true meaning of treating those who are different, especially the excluded, the innocent in wars, and The pain of a tragic flood becomes more of a game in the field of power than reaching the hearts of those who can help the affected people.
Difference “is not articulated in “contradictions” that exist in the space of identity, but works for manifestations of identity” (pg. 415), this is how pain works.
Byung-Chul opposes Hegel in addition to Heidegger also to Derridá, “differance maintains discord […] without ever forming a third expression”, maintains contention, “without ever giving reason for a solution along the lines of speculative dialectics ” (Han, pg. 416 quoting Derridá), and says “the pure play of difference is nothing, it does not even relate to its own fire” (pg. 417), see Han’s emphasis on the Western culture of “relationship ”, but the German-Korean’s wit gets there: “Subjectivity is always produced in a movement of westernization” (pg. 417).
The search for “speculative dialectics” is for an ontotheological or ontoteleological synthesis, I would say more the latter since Hegel’s god is invented, that of an abstract absolute, but not far from the triumphant God of Manichaeism, expressed not only in the justifications of wars and in différance, the westernized god also judges, condemns and excludes and makes sacred readings a game of convenience, mourning, pain and suffering have no space, everything is power, joy and consumption, the kingdom in sameness proclaiming difference.
“What does Derridá’s pain revolve around?” asks Byung-Chul, “Around the lack of a sacred name?” (pg. 424), those would say yes because not even the Absolute, or the Whole can have an ontological answer, perhaps enthelogical (in the sense of pure e objective being), but the author points out his mourning as “probably” like the difference, it is banal (Derridá says this).
In our view, the inability to mourn, to renounce, to understand pain prevents us from a complete vision of the whole as sacred. The innocent deaths of wars, natural catastrophes and respect for differences do not cause us grief, without a Sacred that references these values, we create a thing, an entity that replaces it.
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
Pain and Being
23
May
We said previously that the chapter on the topic
of the Voice could be the final one, but as Heidegger saw it, and Byung-Chul Han was faithful, it is part of the development of the Being, when talking about pain, a subject that Han also dealt with in the “Palliative Society: pain today” and we have already made some posts, the way we treat the pandemic and now the floods that affected thousands of lives in Rio Grande do Sul, should be a point of analysis and understanding, in a society that does not want to look at this side of life: suffering and pain.
Not by chance, Heidegger addresses this when elaborating on Parmenides, where ontology is reduced to Being is and non-Being is not, to a logic A and not-A, with no third hypothesis, there Heidegger speaks of “a certain death (sacrificial ) of the human being: “But the supreme form of pain is the dying of death, which sacrifices the human being for the preservation of the truth of being” (pg. 321), so the sacrifice is not here, as “the sacrifice has in itself its own essence and does not need objectives or benefits? ” (idem).
In the previous post we discussed idealistic sleep, here Han quotes Foucault asking “is it a matter of a certain agony to awaken the thought of an “anthropological awakening”?” (idem), perhaps an anthropotechnical awake or even as we prefer an onto-anthropotechnical sleep, since the forgetfulness of being is not just a philosophical category.
When addressing the emptiness of modern man, also based on the reading of Foucault, Han recalls that Heidegger, when resuming the metaphysical category “subjectum”, which in “its essence is modern man is the “subject” and it is exactly here that Heidegger “criticizes implicitly anthropological thought” (pg. 322), it is according to Heidegger: “the continuation of Cartesianism”, Han quoting him: “With the interpretation of man as subjectum. Descartes creates the metaphysical presupposition for future anthropology of every type and orientation” (pg. 323).
Thus it is not man’s opposition to beings, but modernity’s mistaken opposition to language: “concern for language would be concern for death. Giving language back to man would therefore mean giving him back death, his mortality” (pg. 324), and it is also not about the ‘being’ or ‘non-being’ of the human being” (pg. 325-326 ).
It is important to highlight the calculating economy seen by Heidegger: “Pain is from ‘because’, not from ‘due to’… mourning does not lament, it does not seek to fill the place that was left empty… mourning without mourning is only conceivable outside of economics (VIII.3)” (pg. 328).
Pain is not the resignation of absolute interiority: “the subject who works on identity, returning to himself in his interiority, assimilating the world, is incapable of pain” (pg. 329), while other thinkers stopped in anguish or in the search through difference or even through the subject destined for an “absolute spirit”, Heidegger sees in pain a “fundamental affective tone of melancholy” (pg. 329), it is the tone of being… of finitude… of finite thought, “ it is the identical feature that, as the basis of a certain formal manner, supports every fundamental tonality occupied by some content, the main feature that, as the same, is the basis of the mode as the respective tuning” (pg. 330).
So pain, for Heidegger and I suppose for Han (he treats it a little differently in the palliative society), !pain is not the eye that cries, or the face contorted by hunger or torture”, pain opens a space in which thinking becomes possible for the first time… a space without anthropological traces, and from which the subject disappeared… thinking would be, a gift of pain” (pg. 331).
The conclusion of this topic: “the rift of pain drags the veiled march of grace until an unused advent of clemency” (pg. 332), which is why we venerate power, violence and the lack of vision of true peace, love outside the bubbles, selfishness and ultimately a lack of “clemency”, it may seem like a religious matter only, but it is the search for the essence of Being.
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
Waiting for hope greater than the rush
22
May
Someone wrote that hope would not be the verb
wait, but Alexandre Dumas wrote: “all human wisdom is summed up in two words: wait and hope”, so hope is articulated with wait as trust with confidence, synonymous with hope, as we have already said in another post she opposes the fear, anguish and emptiness of modern nihilism, themes already developed in Byung-Chul’s reading of Heidegger.
We want to reread Han’s reinterpretation of Waiting or Containment, VII 2.3 which begins on page 302, as we said previously this is the author’s longest essay and perhaps (I think so) his first truly philosophical writings, since it combines Heidegger with his vision of Kant, Hegel, Derridá and Lévinas, the latter seems to the author’s taste.
Chul-Han states that this is the author’s initial affective tone, when writing his youthful poem, in 1910: “in front of the gate of the spring garden / we wait and listen / until the larks fly / until the songs and the violins / the murmur of the fountains / the silver / bells of the flocks / become a universal chorus of joy” (Han, pg. 302 quoting Heidegger), as the author says it seems “sung in naive images” but late Heidegger seems to wait for “the day of Being” which also resonates naively, but “waiting in Heidegger is not linked to a chronological date nor to an empirical event” … it is “a singular movement, in a flat (non) intentionality, in a (non-) peculiar economy” (page 303), “does not wait for a deficiency to be repaired” (idem).
In the seminar on Heraclitus, Byung-Chul wrote, he makes the difference between waiting and having hope: “having hope always includes counting on something, while waiting – if we stick to the word – is an attitude of conformity […] Having hope it means “to be firmly occupied with something”, while in waiting there is resignation, reserve” (pg. 304) so I think, in hope there is a confidence in what I am occupied with.
However, he completes the idea of waiting with restraint, he will write: patience and waiting are “basic traits of restraint” (pg. 305), thus it articulates in the face of the “infinite absence of a tangible counterpart”, “it is the basic trait of serenity” , the lack of contemporary serenity is largely due to a lack of waiting, restraint and patience.
There is thus an articulation between the “not yet” and the “already”, so “Heidegger’s waiting cannot be described as the intentionality of waiting until the end” (pg. 306), “nothing happens only in waiting, which distances itself from the impatient putting-in-front-of-itself, from the intentionality of representation” (pg. 307), in this Heidegger will explain how “renunciation is a counter-economic measure”, he states quoted by Han: “True renunciation – that is , sustained and achieved by a genuinely expansive fundamental affective tone – is creative and generating. By allowing her former possession to go, she receives, and not later as a reward; Bearing in mourning the need to renounce giving in is in itself a reception” (Han, pg. 307, citing Heidegger).
Thinking learns to be grateful by learning to renounce, wrote Han and quoting Heidegger: “Renunciation is a gratitude in not denying oneself, that is where renunciation lies. Renunciation is having to be grateful and, therefore, gratitude” (pg. 308), we theorize here in countless posts the issue of power, renunciation is its position and opposite, “only the gift, which is only possible beyond the economy, makes conceivable gratitude” (pg. 309) and thus it is a “symbolic retribution” “a non-economic thought, which distances itself from the “calculative understanding” (pg. 309), “grateful thinking radically questions the autonomy of the subject without installing a trans-objective instance of power” (idem) and concludes that the “autonomous and trans-objective” “structure would restore the economy” (pg. 309).
Trusting is thus an articulation of the containment of waiting with patience in hope, whoever trusts is capable of renouncing and being grateful, and has his payment in these gifts.
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
The great idealistic sleep
21
May
The dream of idealism was to propose goals to
be achieved that gradually proved to be contradictory and some of them are a fundamental part of the crisis of current thought, in which the reasons of state precede the popular will, even if it acts in its name, in fact the concentration of power It seems fair to those who believe they have the final say, finally the reason, to exercise power, this has medieval origins, although diffuse.
Even though literature differentiates “idealists” from “realists”, this exists after the Renaissance/seventeenth century paradigm, where in “The Prince” by Machiavelli (1513) it was understood that all the means provided by force and intelligence are lawful for the ruler, from that employed with skill and according to the circumstances (MAQUIAVEL, 2001, p. 85), thus emerge in everyone and in all societies attitudes of force considered reasonable when exercised by the State.
Also contractualism, from Thomas Hobbes, who lived between 1588 and 1679, the State is the fundamental institution to regulate human relations, given the character of the natural condition of men that impels them to seek fulfillment of their desires in any way, at any price, violently, selfishly, this is driven by passions.
In the words of Hobbes, “if two men desire the same thing […] they become enemies”. Everyone would be free and equal to seek profit, security and reputation, according to national author Francisco Welfort, in his work The Classics of Politics (2006), equality between men, in Hobbes’ view, generates ambition, discontent and war”, but it was idealism that divided Man, or the Being of beings, as preferred in ontology, into two opposing halves.
Even though contractualism has the empiricism of Locke (1632-1704), where the state must be a mediator of conflicts, interfering as little as possible in the lives of individuals, and finally Rousseau (1712-1778) who states that man is good, the society that it corrupts (see that there is contractualism on the left and on the right).
Returning to the ontological aspect, in the Heideggerian sense: “the beating of the heart by that “magic key” that could “break a thousand padlocks” would not be the fundamental trait” (Han, p. 280), there is no rigid and perennial light in it. , whose violence and unbridled presence as cause and mistress could penetrate, explain and dominate all phenomena” (Han, p. 281) where there is a direct reference to Plato’s Republic, and Byung-Chul sees him as the first Heidegger.
The second Heidegger is the one who sees the clearing, which “does not offer a fixed setting with a constantly raised curtain, where the theater of beings unfolds” (Han, p. 283) citing Heidegger, where he replaces the physical paradigm of “light ” by the figure of the clearing, to “react against the violent mechanisms of that light that allows everything to coagulate into image” (Han, p. 283), although there is no direct reference to the Enlightenment, it is inevitable to this “luminous” vision of power .
The evident presence is replaced by the non-apparent, which cannot be translated as the counterpart of an encounter: “Here there is no longer an ‘encounter’, no appearance for man already fixes itself in advance and captures what has appeared” (Han, 284), Plato’s world of shadows has never seemed so real as it does today.
So it makes sense to both “unveil” and “clearing”, as terms that are neither “re-vealing” nor illuminating, they are ontological paths where Being “lives”.
HAN, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
MAQUIAVEL, Nicolau. (2001) O príncipe (the Prince). Transl. de M. J. Goldwasser. Brazil, São Paulo: Martins Fontes.
There is a voice of truth
17
May
Although it is a preceding chapter in the book “The Heart of Heidegger”, chapter
IV “Voice” could be a conclusion by Byung-Chul, however this is correct as it would not be a Heideggerian conclusion, the epigraph which is a quote from the book of Kings to the prophet Isaiah is symbolic: “Go out and stand on this mountain before the face of the Lord… and it came to pass, when Elijah heard it, that he wrapped his face in his face […]” (Han, pg. 107 ).
He searches the “series of indications” in Heidegger’s “Four Seminars”, the first is listening than writing, he proposes that there is a connection with metaphysics, while writing is fixed in “logocentrism”, he puts the listener in an affective tone of the appropriating event? And he responds with Plato’s speech about writing as “betrays the living and animated speech of the wise man” (Han, pg. 110), as it withdraws into interiority in time, differs from Hegel who sees “the truth of space” , interestingly the one who claims the story.
“The voice also fulfills the need for an unobstructed interiority, undisturbed by an exteriority” (Han, pg. 111) and it is important that “It creates the appearance of an absolute unworldly interiority” (pg. 111) and it is not about of the egocentrism of Cartesian reason, and of idealism: “hearing-oneself-speak, the fundamental formula of subjectivity, does not do justice to all the phenomenality of the voice” (pg. 113), it questions the narcissistic economy of the mirror.
The flute and the voice for Plato and also in Aristotle are very similar to the human voice, Aristotle wrote: “Now, the singing and the sound of the flute mix as a result of their similarity […]. Furthermore, the flute, due to its sound and its similarity (with the voice), can hide many errors in singing […]” (Aristotle apud Han, pg. 116).
The Being-there of Being and Time (Heidegger) “certainly cannot be suspected of narcissistic blindness. Being-there does not settle inside without windows. Existence means being-outside” and goes beyond “Being-there is at home outside the world” (Han, pg. 118), but neither Heidegger nor Han go all the way in this elaboration, that is, being at home and outside the world world what they really are.
They identify that “being-there relies on the voice that propagates”, and that the “strange voice” reveals itself as belonging to being-there (Han, pg. 119), and who is “the one who calls and the listener are identical” (pg. 119), and who is “the one who calls and the listener are identical” (pg. 119) since “this voice does not carry any meaning, any concept” (pg. 120).
This unity of Being and Being-with-Other cannot be achieved without this true non-egocentric, non-polarizing and non-individual spirituality, a trinitarian concept is needed, that is, there is a third Person who unites the ear and the listener in one thing There is only one final point missing in this conversation between Heidegger and Byung-Chul (in the image the painting by Tsherin Sherpa (Nepal), Lost Spirits, 2014.).
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
Reason and division
16
May
As said in the previous post, the subject of idealism
“has no fear”, says Byung-Chul “in this space without shadows of transparency, evacuated by the ray of certainty, there is neither surprise nor fear” (pg. 263), the author also rereads Descartes who “projected from his insatiable need for security is sterile, ghostly and uninhabitable” (pg. 263) and this “compulsion for security” leads to the dark, and even Kant’s correction that is saved by “repelling” and “ reinterpret” the imagination (pg. 266).
But reminds Byung-Chul that Kant in his Foundation of Metaphysics looked at the unknown dimension of human existence, the “disquieting unknown” although he is trapped in the “subjective deduction” that leads to the obscure, and recognizes “that it tunes us with the terrors of the abyss ” (Han citing Kant, pg. 267) and that in the “inner horror” “that every mystery carries with it” (pg. 267) and that it is in this “nakedness of anguish” that transforms the subject’s vulnerability.
In Being and Time, Han explains, “anxiety does not bring being-there to the proximity of the ecstatic amplitude that he sees in the late Heidegger”, nor to the proximity of “alienation” from “courage towards the abyss”, and Han concludes: “anxiety wrests the existence of the domestic order from “relational completeness”, taking it to the “region”, to the “world as such”, but at its center resides the self” and here explains the anguish: “Anguish it only leads to hypertrophy of the self” (Han, pg. 268).
Heidegger made an essential ontological discovery, where the rupture of the subject is “the being-there is what calls and the called at the same time […] what calls is the being-there that […] is distressed by its power to be” (Han citing Heidegger, pg. 269), in this “a negotiator’s soliloquy” takes place, but it is conducted between two selves, that is, between the impersonal self and the authentic self” (pg. 269), This division occurs both within the being-there and in the reaction with others, “out of anguish at the voice of the other, the being-there covers its ears” (pg. 269).
Thus this division or disunity arises within man, and it is in this “strangeness of being in suspension, in which being-there can approach a growing lack of foundation” (Han citing Heidegger, pg. 270), it is “in anguish that a certain epoché occurs”, the suspension of phenomenological judgment of Husserl, professor of Heidegger, in it the network of references, woven by the purpose of “for what”, the totality relates and its intersubjective implication collapse, in my conclusion here, unity is born and lives in it.
This conclusion, which is neither Heidegger’s nor Byung-Chul’s, is possible because the latter writes: “they are in a certain way “bracketed”, the “neutral” Impersonal and its “dictatorship” are “inhibited”, this “collapse of the world” (Han, pg. 270), reduce “being-there to a solipsistic sphere of being, a sphere of the “pure ‘fact that…” of one’s own isolated condition of being thrown” (pg. 270), it is “the residue of the epoché, the authentic self, marks the center of gravity of the ‘there, from which the world that has slipped away must be recovered from nothingness or must be filled explicitly with the “stability of the self” (Han, pg. 271) .
This division resulting from reason prevents a true ontology, see that Heidegger even uses the word “dictatorship” of certainty, of the self, of the empire of pure reason where there is no room for the enigma, the doubt, the mystery and the completeness of the being, then it is reduced to “anguish”, part of life, but in which being-there must not stop, nor “collapse”.
Reason, or the criticism of pure reason, is not exhausted in itself, it contains anguish, it needs uncertainty, mystery and full “inner” life.
Han, B.C. (2023) Coração de Heidegger: sobre o conceito de tonalidade afetiva em Martin Heidegger (Heidegger’s heart: on the concept of affective tonality in Martin Heidegger). Transl. Rafael Rodrigues Garcia, Milton Camargo Mota. Brazil, Petrópolis: Vozes.
