Arquivo para a ‘Sem categoria’ Categoria
Cogito wounded and political
25
Aug
Paul Ricoeur is one of the few current French philosophers (died in 2005)
who not only reads and translates from German and English, but also speaks to international currents of thought as diverse as German phenomenology (was translator of Ideas I of Husserl in 1950), to Gadamer’s hermeneutics or the English analytical philosophy and American.
Its flagship book, Soi-même comme un autre (national translation The oneself as another is bad), brought inscribed his beautiful title both on the issue of identity (Soi-même) as his invention of identity through otherness : comme un autre, emphasizing both the metaphorical dimension as well as ethics of this invention, metaphors are in his book: the living metaphor.
Opposing the “exaltation of the Cogito” in Cogito wounded a “broken” (brisé) or “injured” (blessé) as already wrote in the preface to himself as another.
This decline is both the seizure of a much larger unit, even if never totalizable the subject: a unit that is established in every action, in every work, such as the reintroduction of the subject and the world, surpassing the subjects and objects separation.
In politics the cogito injured, is the impossibility (if we are not able to see how Other (comme un autre), the result is a dialogue sometimes confrontational other times of silence, under an even greater suspicion.
Ricoeur distrusts the same tendency to a totalizing hubris and distrusted the Cartesian solipsism, he saw an uncritical application, that is, beyond its limits, the recent anticartesianos paradigms of which hybridity is the worst aspect.
Political dialogue is not hybridity, not composing speeches and exchanges of favors, in a sense, is discussion and clash in another discovery of shared values and thoughts.
Nicholas Carr back load
15
Aug
Critical of the indiscriminate use of technology, Nicholas Carr opened his
speech saying about autonomous vehicles, “I think a lot of views on the overall automation assume that every vehicle will be automated and the whole direction of infrastructure will not only mapped in minutes, but It will also be equipped with the kind of sensors and transmitters and the entire network infrastructure that we need.”, said to ComputerWorld.
New criticism because she had called “Dumbest generation” and in his 2003 book as the Harvard Business Review published the book, “IT Does not Matter” where Carr raised the ire of big names in technology which questions the notion that the iT infrastructure provides strategic advantages to companies.
His new book “Utopia is Creepy: And Other Provocations”, which will the American publisher Norton & Co. on 6 September. It is a compendium of articles, such as “Would Google making us stupid?” And “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of privacy,” now not only young people but all be stupid, imagine what it will mean the Pokemon Go So!
In the interview he says that when his blog was ten years old in 2015, he began to look back through the posts and I realized that many of the items still resounding today, he publishes interesting blog and book just now.
He says he saw what was happening in the world of technology, particularly in the rise of what we used to call Web 2.0 and is now known as social media and social networking, but does show how critical it is in those articles.
He also calls the “ideology of Silicon Valley” the sense that the Internet and social media were breaking down the barriers to personal expression, freeing people and as if we our trust in Silicon Valley and its programmers to lead a kind of Utopia. It is a collection of articles, but with a theme running through it.
Let’s wait for the book, but decidedly Nicholar Carr’s vision is pessimistic.
I have good taste ?
10
Aug
I see in a lot of cars this phrase (in brazilian cars), and I began to wonder
what it would take a large number of people of all social classes, parties and religions to begin to put this in the car, I asked a few people and the response was not convergent.
I remembered again the book is not finished in Theodore Dalrymple holidays: “Our culture … or what’s left of it,” which states that political, economic and cultural factors began to destroy our culture … or what’s left of it.
Thought is an unconscious but important reaction because something is bothering us as much as injustice (theft, corrupt, abuses, etc.) and the economic crisis.
Our notion of aesthetics and beauty seems changed, not just the one that selects colors and races, but in any race or color what really means the beautiful and the good.
The question of aesthetics is linked to contempt for the poetic, the imagery (and imaginary) and more deeply the concept of lost aesthetic since the beginning of modernity, this requires a deeper study of what we think of everyday life: a harmony to (in ) Being.
(Português) Popper: um crítico específico de Hegel
22
Jul
Embora a grande contribuição de Karl Popper lembrada no mundo acadêmico seja em relação a sua visão de ciência, a questão da ciência “normal” que surge das contribuições e acréscimos em paradigmas científicos, há uma contribuição mais profunda na crítica a Hegel.
Publicou em 1934 A lógica da pesquisa Científica, enquanto ainda era professor escolar, nela criticou o neopositivo lógico do Circulo de Viena, criando uma teoria que a falseabilidade potencial é o critério a ser usado para distinguir ciência de não ciência.
Depois emigrou para Nova Zelândia onde foi lecionar na universidade de filosofia na Universidade de Canterbury, em Christchurch.
Dizia corretamente que era herdeiro de David Hume e Immanuel Kant, mas sua abordagem empírica tem elementos novos, influenciado por W.V. Quine diz que a observação empírica não é “simples”, porque é sempre seletiva, no sentido de que ocorre a partir de uma perspectiva, e esta perspectiva é sempre favorável a corrente filosófica que conduz à pesquisa, mas ele vê a ciência como um esforço de resolução de problemas, e mesmo sendo humana é possível diferenciar se ela é ou não ciência “pela solução”.
A crítica a Marx, que coloca entre todos os sistemas “totalitários”, feita no seu trabalho a Sociedade Aberta e seus inimigos, parte da ideia que todos historicistas (inclui Hegel) usam de modo inapropriado a ciência, porque a história humana não pode ser “prevista”, mas além de filosofia da ciência fez também trabalhos de história da ciência, a partir dos anos 1960.
Popper: um crítico específico de Hegel
Embora a grande contribuição de Karl Popper lembrada no mundo acadêmico seja em relação a sua visão de ciência, a questão da ciência “normal” que surge das contribuições e acréscimos em paradigmas científicos, há uma contribuição mais profunda na crítica a Hegel.
Publicou em 1934 A lógica da pesquisa Científica, enquanto ainda era professor escolar, nela criticou o neopositivo lógico do Circulo de Viena, criando uma teoria que a falseabilidade potencial é o critério a ser usado para distinguir ciência de não ciência.
Depois emigrou para Nova Zelândia onde foi lecionar na universidade de filosofia na Universidade de Canterbury, em Christchurch.
Dizia corretamente que era herdeiro de David Hume e Immanuel Kant, mas sua abordagem empírica tem elementos novos, influenciado por W.V. Quine diz que a observação empírica não é “simples”, porque é sempre seletiva, no sentido de que ocorre a partir de uma perspectiva, e esta perspectiva é sempre favorável a corrente filosófica que conduz à pesquisa, mas ele vê a ciência como um esforço de resolução de problemas, e mesmo sendo humana é possível diferenciar se ela é ou não ciência “pela solução”.
A crítica a Marx, que coloca entre todos os sistemas “totalitários”, feita no seu trabalho a Sociedade Aberta e seus inimigos, parte da ideia que todos historicistas (inclui Hegel) usam de modo inapropriado a ciência, porque a história humana não pode ser “prevista”, mas além de filosofia da ciência fez também trabalhos de história da ciência, a partir dos anos 1960.
Os trabalhos de Michael Polanyi (1871-1976) e Thomas S. Khun (1911-1996), deste em especial a Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas, que mostra que Popper trata apenas da ciência normal e não dos períodos paradigmas, cita como exemplo a superação de Newton por Einstein, vão fazer que Popper refaça suas teorias influenciando a questão científica, mas não a filosófica.
Entre os livros mais conhecidos desta época: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, (1963), Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (1977, In Search of a Better World (1984), Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem: In Defence of Interaction (1994).
Os trabalhos de Michael Polanyi (1871-1976) e Thomas S. Khun (1911-1996), deste em especial a Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas, que mostra que Popper trata apenas da ciência normal e não dos períodos paradigmas, cita como exemplo a superação de Newton por Einstein, vão fazer que Popper refaça suas teorias influenciando a questão científica, mas não a filosófica.
Entre os livros mais conhecidos desta época: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, (1963), Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (1977, In Search of a Better World (1984), Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem: In Defence of Interaction (1994).
Critics of Hegel
21
Jul
I consider the most important one that emerged from Husserl,
who has roots in Franz Brentano, because there arose much of existentialism, and three of the most important contemporary thinkers: Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas, there is Karl Popper, a critique of part of which will be for the next post.
The first fiercest critics of Hegel are Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, both had an important influence of American transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), and although both also had the influence of oriental readings, it is through this influence that can explain the transcendentalist subjectivism of both, or in other words, it has not completely broken with the egoic center of Western culture where the self is where part of the philosophy, both make speeches on the question of “will”.
Karl Marx is not just an opponent, of the belief Hegelian system in the state, and this in a way in a kind of “god”, for example, the philosophy of history, he does what he defined himself as a Hegelian head down, not a sky system for the earth, but the earth to heaven, but what was heavenly paradise Marx? A classless society, the real socialism revealed that just built new “caste” in power.
Let us return to Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), work maturity Crisis of European Sciences (1936), Husserl wrote, “our critical reflections on Kant already made clear in the danger of striking conclusions, but still obscure or, if you want the lighting pure conclusions in the form of vague anticipations … and it also became understandable how he was forced toward a mythical conceptual construction and a dangerously hostile metaphysics all true science. ”
He defended an essentiality, is famous for his phrase “return things for themselves”, but his belief in the phenomenological model that creates basis for a genuine science, rewired to be (existentialism would come with Heidegger, his student who succeeded him in the gym ) a new transcendentalism, and explained: “We ourselves will be directed to an internal transformation that we will be face to face – in direct experience – the size long felt but constantly hidden from’transcendental’. The basis of the experience revealed in his infinity, will then become the fertile soil of a philosophy of methodical work with the self-evidence, moreover, that all conceivable philosophical and scientific problems of the past are destined to be presented and resolved on this basis“, wrote Husserl.
Idealism the age of reason
19
Jul
Empiricism was not created by David Hume, but John Locke, Immanuel
Kant however is that inspired by Hume, who will say “dare to know”, seeking wisdom, in the vision of the Enlightenment away from the beliefs and superstitions, say Kant:
“Enlightenment [Aufklärung] is the man out of his youth, of which he himself is guilty. The minority is the inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another individual. The man is the culprit himself this minority is the cause of it is not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolution and courage to use it yourself without the guidance of another. Sapere aude! “(Kant, 1783)
The period between the late seventeenth century and the late eighteenth century, known as the Enlightenment, was characterized by criticism of any belief, by criticism of own instruments for obtaining knowledge, and consider knowledge as something which aims to make life better human beings, both in the individual field, as in society.
Kant tried to get a moral to the personal field, that although criticize in the Practical Reason Critique the dangers of exaggeratedly egoic society of his time, for him as a “mania I”, a “social pathology”, which turns the notion of respect on a misconception based on the inner feeling of each individual, establish to reconcile rationalism with empiricism, that “Act as if the maxim of thy action were to be transformed, through your will, a universal law of nature.” in his Rationale the metaphysics of morals.
Thus, its reason is an attempt to overcome the “pure” reason of Descartes, but remain still stuck to it, the Kantian reason is not the way to think of each one, is something necessary and universal, ie all are are governed by it.
One can say roughly that in idealist philosophy the basic principle is that I am I, in a proper sense of idealism, I is object for me (I), so that its basic dichotomy that is the opposition between subject and object remains as incident inside the self, since I own is the object to the subject (I).
Idealism in its complexity can make a rough division into three parts: (1749) ‘philosophical system that approaches the thought all existence’ (1828) ‘design aesthetic in which to seek the expression of the ideal over the real’ ( 1863) ‘attitude which consists of subordinating thought and conduct to an ideal’, which will find its climax in Hegel.
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Page numbers citing this work are Beck’s marginal numbers that refer to the page numbers of the standard edition of Königlich-Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1902–38.
