Arquivo para a ‘Sem categoria’ Categoria
Does tradition and innovation have any relationship?
In the cultural sphere, it is often imagined that it does not, or establishes innovation only in the strict scope of culture, while it is related to beliefs, values, and mainly to the forms of social relations that involve the production of wealth, the use of techniques , for example, the transition from oral culture to writing, meant a profound change.
Innovation is linked to some significant cultural change, in general, with the influence of new techniques and production methods for consumption, but the term is broader.
The change today is from the media to the transmedia, that is, the media complement each other, you can make a video from a text or an oral exhibition of a certain culture, so you can talk about the narrative of transmidia, or “ storytelling ”, that is, telling stories.
The term was first used by Professor Marsha Kinder, from the University of Sourthern California (USA), in 1991, but in 2003 Professor Henry Jenkins created a definition that was enshrined in his book “Culture of Convergence”, where he defined it as: “[…] a new aesthetic that emerged in response to the convergence of the media”.
When referring to the term aesthetics, it goes beyond the pure production of consumer products to reach art, culture and, in a way, the belief system as a whole, even though rejection in several areas is common, the process of “innovation ”Advances.
There is also a redefinitionof storytelling, the tradition of oral culture of storytelling, where the tradition is perpetuated changes to a new form, now it becomes the use of audiovisual resources to transmit a story, which can be told in an improvised way (as in oral tradition), but can also be worked on and enriched with visual aids.
JENKINS, Henry. (2006) Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. NY: New York UniversityPress.
Phronesis and serenity
It is no coincidence that Gadamer adopts Phronesis as one of the key elementsin his discourse on Truth and Method, incompletely translated as prudence, the term actually to be confused with “wisdom” practice of serenity, free translation.
This is because in our view, Gadamer is a rehabilitator of practical philosophy, those who call for practicality, objectivity (sic! Idealist), are impractical for lack of wisdom, impulsive and active, typical of the society of fatigue.
In the Greek sense, ethics is added, but it is not a private knowledge in the moral sense, but public and social, which aims to minimize exacerbations of ego self-impulsiveness, when placed in a perspective of the work of art reaches a level of universal principle.
This includes the work of art because it was the excessive centralization in the self that reduced the relation of ethics to aesthetics, public amorality, slavery is not a new aesthetic, not even the negativity sometimes necessary to art, is its absence by lack of relationship with ethics and the training process.
Gadamer retrieves phronesis from Aristotle’s proposal in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he seeks to establish the articulation between the universal and the particular, still more between the individual and society, within historical forms of life, but with a common ethos.
One can thus establish a relationship with education, at a time when one talks about a school without a party, one has to think that there is another, without wanting neutrality because it will be an illusion, we explore in a post to follow.
We need to establish the relation of the phonesis with the techné and the episteme, which is the theoretical knowledge and know-how of techné, which is etymologically linked to art (τέχνη) and to crafts.
The harmony between the three forms of wisdom results in practical wisdom, praxis
Dasein and reason
Before entering into the concept of being-in-the-world, a provisional translation of Dasein, it is necessary to understand the extent to which ontology distances itself from Cartesian rationalism, at which point it approaches, for those who desire a deeper dive “Cartesian Meditations” (post) since Husserl was Heidegger’s teacher and he kept some concepts.
The two well-known Cartesian categories for something are res extensia and res cogitans, about which Heidegger wrote: “Doubtless this [with regard to God] needs production and preservation, but within the created entities [or only considering these ] … there is something that needs no other entity, in regard to the production and conservation of creatures, for example of man.
These substances are two: the res cogitans and the res extensa “(Heidegger, 2015, p.144). Thus the Cartesian dualism is not only between two finite substances, which are naturally distinct, but between the two finites and the infinite, and Heidegger clarifies immediately after returning to the medieval ontology, sometimes called fundamental or ontotheology by other authors, the question (Heidegger, 2015, 145), that is, “in the affirmations God is or the world is, we preach the being … the word ‘is’ can not indicate the being each time referred to in the same sense (αυυωυúς, unívoce), since between both there is an infinite difference of bein.
If the meaning of ‘is’ was univocal, then the servant would have the same sense of not created or the uncreated would be demoted to a servant “(idem). It solves the quarrel of the universal, between realists and nominalists, “Being does not perform the function of a simple name [the nominalists thought], since in both cases it is understood to be” (ibid.).
Explicit and surpasses scholasticism ” positive sense of the signification of the s’ as an ‘analogical’ meaning to distinguish it from univocal or merely synonymous signification “(ibid.).
The quotes are of Heidegger’s own to indicate the analogy of being as substance, and extending to contemporaneity neither the analog nor digital are to be, belong only to the ontic, or in our designation to the artifacts.
Finally, it underscores the Cartesian ontology that “falls far short of scholasticism” which left the sense of being and the character of the “universality” of that meaning contained in the idea of substantiality “(ibid.), While acknowledging that even medieval ontology questioned very little this sense.
Although Descartes is able to recover in some respects, he notes for his time and is worth even today, we have not even freed ourselves from the crisis of European thought of the last century, “the Cartesian ontology of the world is still today in force in its fundamental principles”, materiality.
Heidegger, M. Ser e Tempo (Being and time), 10a. Brazilian edition, Trad. Revised by Marcia Sá Cavalcante, Bragança Paulista, SP: Editora Universitária São Francisco, 2015.
Deceleration and the technique
After convincingly criticizing Baudrillard and categorically asserting that “mere speed does not suppose great influence on the production of historical sense” (page. 36), goes back to the easy critique of technology.
What counts above all is the instability of the trajectory, the disappearance of one’s own gravitation, irritationen or temporal oscillations. “(Page 36), Byung-Chul Han yields to Baudrillard’s temptation that modern technology is responsible for this Well, but what is the origin of this?
Baudrillard’s Culture and Simulation book is from the 1970s, the internet was born with academic users, and Freud’s civilization was in the 1930s, not to mention Nietzsche who passed away at the beginning of the last century, more precisely on August 25, 1900.
Therefore, it is necessary to return to Han’s earlier arguments which are more solid, “acceleration is not the only plausible explanation of the disappearance of meaning” (page 35), and the expression “atoms of meaning” also leads to an error, because the sense is not nuclear “(idem), takes a small step in the right direction:” rest is not caused by the acceleration and the movement of exchanges, but by the no-if-know-to-where “(page 38) , a lack of goals.
He will also criticize Bauman, for whom modern man is a pilgrim in the desert, who practices a “life on the way” (page 43), and at a glance returns to the meaning affirming “secularization does not entail a demarcation (Demarratovosoerimg)”, but goes back and says that modernity continues to be a narrative, but the printed culture and reproduction does not have the mythical and eschatological character of oral culture, is another narrative, the romantic, Gadamer has already clarified.
The criticism of technique and technical progress is the common temptation, to point out it as religious is at least contradictory since it is the legitimate heir of the lights and reason, it is not history as a history of salvation, but as romantic historical determinism the fashion of Dilthey.
The immersion in digital culture, or in cyberculture, did not deterritorialize (radio, TV and the cinema did it before) nor secularized, those who made it were the lights and financial capital that recognizes neither country nor place, the narrative that omits the process of production of videos, images, photographs and also digital code all over the planet is not only a technical or technological inversion, it is a cultural inversion, thanks to them cultures and people have been reborn.
It is not necessary to walk the world, because the world walks by you, and this is what stimulates young people to know other countries and places, rooted country that is anti-evolutionary and conservative, man walked the world before fixing borders, who fixed the empires, which now erect walls and speeches radical patriarchs, the world is already a global village, what there is now is a nostalgic feeling of a world that never returns
The scent and significance
Like art, scent requires appreciation and sensitivity, but this is longer than meaning, this tells us Byung-Chul Han: “the world is full of meaning. The gods are only meaningful. ” (Han, 2016, 25). It penetrates into the true meaning of the narrative, of the primitive and contemporary oral: “narrative creates the world from nothing” (p.25), but it is not bound by the image: “the world can read itself as an image” (idem).
Without mentioning them, Han seems to penetrate the rock art, when he unveils the relation: “here all that has meaning is the eternal repetition of the same, the reproduction of the already been, the imperishable truth.
This is how prehistoric man lives in a present that endures. “(HAN, 2016, 26) Han’s cosmogony penetrates the eschatological: “it distinguishes in any way from historical time that promises progress … the eskáton indicates the end of time … the eschatological time admits no action, no project” (HAN, 2016, 27).
It also reveals the deeper meaning of the post-truth, “time will be defactised and at the same time denatured (entnaturalisier)” (page 28), by pointing to it already in the Enlightenment: “the revolution refers to a defaced time.
Free from all being/to be launched, from any natural or theological force, the world, like a steamy colossus, looses itself towards the future, where it hopes to find salvation “(page 29). Citation Robespierre speaking at the constitutional ceremony of 1793: “The progrès de la raison humaine ont préparé cette grande révolution, et c’est à vous que’est spécialement imposé le décision le l’accélérer” (quoted on page 29).
Was the triumph of reason, also comments on the same experience in “The Death of Danton” written by Büchner, when quoting Camille: “The common fixed ideas which pass for being common sense are unbearably boring” (cit. Byung-Chul separates oral time from history by understanding “the mythical which functions as an image,” and sees the history of the Gutenberg galaxy as one that “gives way to information” (p. 30), to give these a definition unpublished: “in reality, the information presents another paradigma”.
“Within it, inhabits another very different temporality. It is a manifestation of atomized time, of a time of points (Punkt-Zeit) “(page 31). I return to the previous page to understand its concept of aroma: “History illuminates … imposes a linear narrative trajectory … has no aroma” (HAN, 2016, 30).
Contrary to Baudrillard’s thesis, “information is not related to history as the always perfect simulation of the original or the origin” (page 31), it will say for this is a new paradigm.
He will say at the end of this chapter that time “rushes, fills itself to balance a lack of the essential Being,” causing “the lack of Being to become even more pervasive” (32).
Why do we need to think?
I dreamed of writing a philosophy book, I will not write it any more, I may make considerations, such as I shall do here, but upon unexpectedly finding the author Thomas Nagel in: “What does all this mean? An Introduction to Philosophy “in his 5th. edition in portuguese, original en english in 1987 (Oxford University Press) I think he did the trivial: to present fundamental questions in everyday words.
So I’ll just make comments, it’s not a summary, it’s just notes, and maybe it’s interesting to say how I found it, it was even from another work: What’s it like to be a bat? (The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, pp. 435-50, 1974), where it says that this question may make sense, but it does not make sense to ask what it is like to be a toaster, updating to this day what it feels like to be Robot Sophia, people asking this question.
It is not this question that answers directly, but current issues that are in everyday thinking, namely: How we know what it is, what other minds are, the meaning of words, freedom (free will), death and the sense of life.
Philosophy does not seem to deal with this, but only in dialogue with other thinkers, the author explains at the beginning of the book: “Philosophy is different from science and mathematics … it is not based on experimentation or observation, but only on thought . “(p.8).
We all think, it is wrong to think that only philosophers and scientists think, the question of philosophy is; “To question and to understand very common ideas that we use every day without thinking about them” (p.8), and in doing this we are taken “in the wave” wherever it wants to take us, in times of crisis and deep changes this can be fatal .
The author explains, among other things, two questions that I consider essential: “A physicist will ask what atoms are made of or what explains gravity, but a philosopher will ask how we can know that there is anything outside our minds” (p. 9).
This is essential because this is the contemporary idealist question, and idealism is the great philosophy of our time, it is the basis of what is conventionally called modernity.
Nagel, Thomas. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Simplicity and Wisdom
To simplify is not to reduce concepts or things that are naturally profound, among them, love, wisdom and knowledge itself are difficult to be treated in a simple way, and should not be seen with simplicity and little wisdom, but it is possible with life and with very concrete examples of everyday life to show and demonstrate what is human knowing.
But in times of post-truth and book access to the production and diffusion of knowledge, the mistakes of simplism and shallow culture can have devastating effects, which does not mean confusing and unnecessarily complexing what is explained or demonstrated.
Just as the reduced knowledge of a given subject or object of study can and usually leads to reductionism, a term used in scientific terms to say that the reduction of complexity did not explain the phenomenon it was proposed to study, is one of the major causes of cultural impoverishment contemporary, to which the Web is only a “medium” of diffusion.
Studies that lead to a better structuring of knowledge such as Ontologies, Semantic Web and now a new dawn of artificial intelligence, undoubtedly lead to further progress in human thought and scientific knowledge.
It is necessary, it is emphasized to not complicate beyond what is necessary and also not to reduce beyond the possible so that the essence of a phenomenon or object of study is not lost when studying it.
In social terms, it is generally imposed by authority much more by the form than indeed by content, the pomp that has certain knowledge does not necessarily mean the wisdom or depth of knowledge, often change the form by the content.
Thus, if some deity or supreme wisdom were among us, it would scarcely be recognized, as in Christian culture, the biblical passage from Mark 6: 3 reflects: “This man is not the carpenter, son of Mary, brother of James, of Joseph, of Judas and of Simon? Your sisters do not live here with us? “And they were scandalized by him.” Do not be scandalized by simplicity, but precisely by the absence of it among those who arrogate knowledge and wisdom”.
Unity, complexity and simplicity
Apparently irreconcilable, some say that the paradigm of the contemporary world, complexity is opposed to simplicity, but let us analyze this interpretation of Edgar Morin’s thinking much better by saying “… part of the phenomena, at the same time, complementary, competing and antagonistic , respects the diverse coherences that unite in dialogical and polylogical and, with this, faces the contradiction by several routes.
Thus, it uses the basic concept of a complex self-organized system “(Morin, 2000, p. 387), which refers to the idea of unity as a key notion. This complexity necessitates new strategies and coherent modes of dialogue to penetrate the mysteries, notes Morin: “(…) necessity, in their coherence and their antagonism, nations of order, disorder and organization obliges us to respect complexity physical, biological, human “(Morin 2000, pp. 180-181).
Understanding the complexity of the culture that involves it: juvenilization, cerebralization, Culturalization, which is explained in one of his basic books The lost paradigm and human nature, whose Portuguese edition is 1973.
Although there are other ideas of complexity, Morin says that the word complexity: “pushes us to explore everything and complex thinking is the thought that, armed with principles of order, laws, algorithms, certainties, clear ideas, patrol in the fog the uncertain , the confused, the Unspeakable “(MORIN, 2000, pp. 180-181).
The idea that complexity can not coexist with simplicity is the incomprehension not only of the dialogic, but of the polylogical one that consolidates and unites the two concepts: “to distinguish and make communicate, instead of isolating and disjoining, to recognize the singular traits, original, historical facts of the phenomenon rather than linking them purely and simply to determinations or general laws, to conceiving of multiplicity-unity … “(MORIN, 2000, p.354).
This alternative of unity in diversity is explained by the author using examples in the biological field, which is in practice the exercise of simplicity, where the diversity of nature composes life.
MORIN, E. Ciência com consciência (Science with conscience). Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand, 2000
Law, Pharisaism and the fig tree
The excess of legalism and rules kills life, the fig tree is a tree that is long “dry” and then the leaves and fruits leave, but for some time it seems dead.
Pharisaism are those moral, religious rules and in our time “from the state” that has become a god, who kills life in the desire to control it, Petr Sloterdijk wrote about it in “Rules for the human park”, although it does not agree with all, in essence his diagnosis is correct, except for the fact that he made a “religion” out of this dispute.
His proposals, which were a response to Letters on Humanism by Heidegger, which made me deplore him for a long time, gradually understood philosophers and theologians, that there was a conference at Elmaus, in Basel, which later compiled and turned into book.
Sloterdijk’s diagnosis that the human fig tree has dried up due to “domestication” can be clearly read in the excerpt from his book:
“What still domesticates man if humanism has sunk as a school of human domestication? What domesticates man if his previous efforts of self-possession only led, basically, to his seizure of power over all beings? What domesticated man if in all previous experiences with the education of mankind remained obscure who or what educates educators, and for what? Or is it that the question of the care and training of the human being can no longer be formulated in a pertinent way in the field of mere theories of domestication and education? “(Sloterdijk, 1999a, 32).
Here is the human fig tree, this is Pharisaism and its “religious” or “state” rules, after reading it again, I read at the beginning a sentence of Jean-Paul that Sloterdijk quotes by writing to Heidegger: “Books are letters addressed to friends, only longer, “and I understood that deep down he is a Heideggerian, but with a fair and well-placed criticism: where is humanism?
Our knowledge is anthropocentric, rejects even the technique that is human production as “strange”, we have at bottom a contempt for processes of change, those who criticize it as fascist must remember that it was the idea of ”strong” state that motivated fascism and dictatorships.
The idea of pharisaical authority that frightened Jesus in the biblical writings, while Sloterdijk also criticizes religion, recovers it by saying that there is a “non-spiritual asceticism,” which transformed temples into places of robbery and filth, is no different from the modern state, to all who worship and revere it, there is a general mistrust of politicians.
Sloterdijk, Petr. Regeln für Menschenpark, (1999a) Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp. In Brazilian Edition:
Regras para o parque humano – uma resposta à carta de Heidegger sobre humanismo, São Paulo, Estação liberdade, 2000.
History of the algorithm
The idea that we can solve problems by proposing a finite number of interactions between several tasks (or commands as they are called in computing languages) for several problems originates in Arithmetic.
Although the machine of Charles Babbage (1791-1871) and George Boole’s (1815-1864) Algebra make a huge contribution to modern computers, most logicians and historians of the birth of the digital world agree that the problem of fact was raised by David Hilbert’s second problem (1962-1943) at a 1900 conference in Paris.
Among 23 problems for mathematics to solve, some recently solved such as Goldbach’s Conjecture (see our post), and others to solve, the second problem was to prove that arithmetic is consistent, free from any internal contradiction.
In the 1930s, two mathematical logicians, Kurt Gödel (1906-75) and Gerhard Gentzen (1909-1945) proved two results that called new attention to the problem proposed, both referring to Hilbert, so in fact, there is the origin of the question, roughly, if an enumerable problem is solved by a finite set of steps.
In fact, Gentzen’s solution was a proof of the consistency of Peano’s axioms, published in 1936, showing that the proof of consistency can be obtained in a system weaker than the Zermelo-Fraenkel theory, used axioms of primitive recursive arithmetic , and is therefore not general proof.
The proof of the inconsistency of arithmetic, called Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, is more complete and shows that some proof of the consistency of Peano’s axioms can be developed without this arithmetic itself.
This theorem states: if the only acceptable proof procedures are those that can be formalized within arithmetic, then Hilbert’s problem can not be solved, in other more direct form, if the system is complete or consistent.
There are polemics raised about these results, such as Kreisel (1976) who argued that the proofs were syntactic for semantic problems, Detlefsen (1990) who says that the theorem does not prohibit the existence of a proof of consistency, and Dawson (2006) that the proof of consistency is erroneous using the evidence given by Gentzen and Gödel himself in 1958 work.
The controversies aside, Kurt Gödel’s participation in the important Vienna circle in the 1920´s before the war exploded, and the subsequent discussions of his theorem by Alain Turing (1912-1954) and Claude Shannon (1916-2001) underline its importance for the history of algorithms and modern digital computer.