Blog Marcos L. Mucheroni Filosofia, Noosfera e cibercultura

The positive truth established by science and the enlightenment had two foundations: the idea (idealism) linked to experience (empiricism), whose inglorious attempt was to create a universal encyclopedia of knowledge, Kant’s sapere audi great achievements of modernity were insufficient to abolish the war, created a crisis of values, a concentration of riches and a worldview with signs of fragility.
What transdisciplinarity and sober educators are demanding, a return to life-giving sciences, the humanistic perennials, Heidegger’s Charter on Humanism, in which he cries: “But in this we must not forget that” subject and object ” are inadequate expressions of the metaphysics which took over very early on the interpretation of language, in the form of Western “Logic” and “Grammar” (Heidegger, 2005: 8).
What we call interpretation, Heidegger asserts in paragraph 32 of “Being and Time” (it is mentioned in “Truth and Method”), is actually developing “the projected possibilities of understanding”, it means a dialogic process where it is possible to retrieve the pre-concepts and a new “fusion of horizons”, in this sense the Hermetic is opposed to the hermeneutic.
The preconception, seen as anticipation of human experience, attests to our bond to the tradition in which we are immersed, but we need what Gadamer calls “consciousness of the history of effects” (possible translation of “Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein”), as explained in her text “determined by a real historical becoming, in such a way that it does not have the liberty to situate itself in the face of the past”, hence its criticism of Dilthey.
Our estrangement from the truth, Gadamer begins with aesthetics, a culture of appearances – through which his book begins, recapitulates in the idealists the ideas of taste and experience (“Erlebnis”), the latter always put more emphasis, albeit in ways in Dilthey and Husserl.

They will be developed in such a way as to falsify the “sciences of the spirit” (see in his work “The Extension of the Question of Truth to Understanding in the Sciences of the Spirit”), in an analytical effort to concretize the so- his whole critique of Schleiermacher’s romantic hermeneutics, the “Aufklärung” (Illustration), and the historicism of Droysen, Ranke, Dilthey, and Hegel.
His criticism goes to the bottom of the notion of aesthetics of a work of art, when a painter, with certain technique or style, goes to painting with a certain technique, what is read in the picture is not the soul of artist.

Her analysis is also from the hermeneutic analytic, in criticizing Schleiermacher also gives reason to say that in the work of an artist, a poet, a writer would be the foundation to perceive the authorial intention, so the exegete would know more closely than his own author and not only his letter or painting, to know the Gospel of St. John would be, first of all, to know Saint John, in which Gadamer rejects the postulate of the Romantic school.
But he will accept the romantic school in “Let’s face the facts” of “Aufklärung”: “he reads the Johannine text as Protestant, as a Catholic, a third as a historian of Palestine.” If we swept all these presuppositions, perhaps in the written lines, pristine, “now the Aufklärung” desired the
meeting of an unprejudiced interpretation, which would remove both the tradition of authority and the authority of tradition (ie idealism!), in which the romantics were right.
There remain two snags, Sloterdijk’s answer to Heidegger and Ricoeur’s question: would it then be Truth or Method (or, not and), that is, truly ontological?